It seems to come up all the time that people aren’t aware that CDT with a sufficiently good world model (a sufficiently accurate causal graph) is the same as TDT, even though this has been known for years. If you could address that somewhere in your sequence I think you’d save a lot of people a lot of time—it’s the most common objection to standard discourse about decision theory that I’ve seen.
It seems to come up all the time that people aren’t aware that CDT with a sufficiently good world model (a sufficiently accurate causal graph) is the same as TDT
CDT leaves the money on the ground? Not unless the “sufficiently good world model” isn’t so much “sufficiently good” as it is an artificial hack that compensates for bad decision making by twisting what causal graphs are supposed to mean.
It seems to come up all the time that people aren’t aware that CDT with a sufficiently good world model (a sufficiently accurate causal graph) is the same as TDT, even though this has been known for years. If you could address that somewhere in your sequence I think you’d save a lot of people a lot of time—it’s the most common objection to standard discourse about decision theory that I’ve seen.
I’ll discuss it in the final post.
CDT leaves the money on the ground? Not unless the “sufficiently good world model” isn’t so much “sufficiently good” as it is an artificial hack that compensates for bad decision making by twisting what causal graphs are supposed to mean.