I don’t approve of this. Assuming that everyone who pledges to join the clique actually submits a CloneBot and nobody finds a way to beat the recognition code and defect from the clique, and assuming there isn’t a subtle bug in the code that disqualifies some or all of the clones, then the clone cohort can indeed eliminate the non-clone bots. At that point though, we’re right back where we started, and then what? Why not just let the best bot win in the first place?
If everyone goes through with this, then of course I’d be better off submitting a clone myself (again assuming no cheating/errors/etc. - I would certainly need to see the code myself before deciding to join), but this is a bit different from typical public-goods-type pledges. Typically, everyone wants the thing done but given that it is done would individually rather not contribute. Here everyone would rather the thing not be done, but given that it is done would individually rather contribute. This is a straightforward example of a bad equilibrium.
If you have pledged, or are thinking of pledging, consider:
How surprised would you be if a bug in the CloneBot code disqualified all the clones?
How surprised would you be if someone managed to bypass the code checking and defect from the group?
How surprised would you be if one or more people who pledged didn’t actually submit a CloneBot?
Is this the kind of equilibrium you want to encourage?
I get it that you don’t like that players join forces. I am not sure I’d allow coordination if I had a say on the rules. But per the rules coordination is part of the game. That’s it. For all we know, others are making cliques in secret.
I believe my scheme substantially increases our chances of winning, so I’ll go with that.
Admissions are closing soon. Good luck, whatever you decide :)
At least one member asked for a basic obfuscation measure. Publishing the code would defeat their purpose.
Also, from an insider’s perspective, publishing the code now would only slightly increase our chances to get another member before the end of admissions, while it would entail a significant risk of opponents adjusting their strategy against it. I should have decided on the publication earlier, but honestly it was never a priority.
I don’t approve of this. Assuming that everyone who pledges to join the clique actually submits a CloneBot and nobody finds a way to beat the recognition code and defect from the clique, and assuming there isn’t a subtle bug in the code that disqualifies some or all of the clones, then the clone cohort can indeed eliminate the non-clone bots. At that point though, we’re right back where we started, and then what? Why not just let the best bot win in the first place?
If everyone goes through with this, then of course I’d be better off submitting a clone myself (again assuming no cheating/errors/etc. - I would certainly need to see the code myself before deciding to join), but this is a bit different from typical public-goods-type pledges. Typically, everyone wants the thing done but given that it is done would individually rather not contribute. Here everyone would rather the thing not be done, but given that it is done would individually rather contribute. This is a straightforward example of a bad equilibrium.
If you have pledged, or are thinking of pledging, consider:
How surprised would you be if a bug in the CloneBot code disqualified all the clones?
How surprised would you be if someone managed to bypass the code checking and defect from the group?
How surprised would you be if one or more people who pledged didn’t actually submit a CloneBot?
Is this the kind of equilibrium you want to encourage?
I get it that you don’t like that players join forces. I am not sure I’d allow coordination if I had a say on the rules. But per the rules coordination is part of the game. That’s it. For all we know, others are making cliques in secret.
I believe my scheme substantially increases our chances of winning, so I’ll go with that.
Admissions are closing soon. Good luck, whatever you decide :)
I can’t say it’s not fair, and I do realize you’ve put a lot of work into this. Have you decided to make the clone code public?
At least one member asked for a basic obfuscation measure. Publishing the code would defeat their purpose.
Also, from an insider’s perspective, publishing the code now would only slightly increase our chances to get another member before the end of admissions, while it would entail a significant risk of opponents adjusting their strategy against it. I should have decided on the publication earlier, but honestly it was never a priority.