It’s not CDT-rational to bid one dollar for 20 dollars if there is a high probability that others will be bidding as well, because you are unlikely to actually make that $19 profit. You are likely to actually get $0 for your $1. And if you know in advance that you would make the decision to pour more money in when you are being outbid, then the expected utility of bidding $1 is even lower, because you will be paying even more for nothing.
Indeed I consider that the winning move would be to blackmail the person starting the auction for a small percentage of his winnings, (else you expain to everyone present why he’ll get those winnings).
It’s not CDT-rational to bid one dollar for 20 dollars if there is a high probability that others will be bidding as well, because you are unlikely to actually make that $19 profit. You are likely to actually get $0 for your $1. And if you know in advance that you would make the decision to pour more money in when you are being outbid, then the expected utility of bidding $1 is even lower, because you will be paying even more for nothing.
Indeed I consider that the winning move would be to blackmail the person starting the auction for a small percentage of his winnings, (else you expain to everyone present why he’ll get those winnings).