Something that doesn’t often get remarked upon is that the Cold War wasn’t the first instance of the strategy of MAD. World War 1 was the culmination of a MAD strategy gone awry.
One difference between the Cold War and World War 1, however, is that in the Cold War at least one of the nations involved was actually employing people to study the mathematics behind the strategy.
I don’t think Europe pre-WWI can accurately be characterized as powers using a MAD-style strategy.
WWI was the result of complex interactions between multiple powers, none of whom were dominant in their region, and feared domination by another power in the region because they lacked the power to impose existence-ending consequences on rival states if the rival won military victory.
The Cold War was between only two powers who each had the ability to impose existence-ending consequences on the rival state even if the rival won a conventional military victory.
In short, MAD may have been a Nash equilibrium in a two-power international system, but it almost certainly was not the Nash equilibrium before WWI. (If one looks to history, it is not clear that any Nash equilibrium exists in those circumstances). From such reasoning grows the International Relations Realists school of political science.
But both France and Germany thought that in the event of a war that their side would rush to an easy victory. That seems to me to be quite the opposite of MAD.
Something that doesn’t often get remarked upon is that the Cold War wasn’t the first instance of the strategy of MAD. World War 1 was the culmination of a MAD strategy gone awry.
How did World War 1 involve mutually assured destruction? It seems to me that destruction can’t have been particularly strongly assured given that the significant powers on one of the sides wasn’t destroyed. There were significant casualties and economic cost but MAD tends to imply something more than just “even the winner has casualties!” considerations. Are you using “MAD” far more loosely than I would expected or making some claim about history that surprises me?
(By contrast a Cold War in which both sides had lots of nuclear weapons stockpiled actually could result in mutual destruction if someone made a wrong move.)
Far more loosely. Part of the object behind the complex network of alliances was to make war too costly to initiate. Once war was initiated, however, it was guaranteed to be on a massive scale. The damage done by WW1 is forgotten in consideration of the damage done by WW2, but it carried a substantial toll; around 33% of military-age British men died over a four year time period.
In both cases the nations involved were always one event away from total catastrophe.
France also had more casualties in WW1, and may even loom bigger in our memories.
That seems likely. Absent any specific information to the contrary I expect ‘looming’ to approximately track casualties/population and by that metric France was over three times worse off than Australia.
I think that the entangling alliances that precipitated WW1 were intended as a win-lose strategy, intending to deter aggression by having lots of allies.
The nations joining alliances are doing so to increase their chances of winning a war, not to increase the chances that their opponent will lose a war; there’s no mechanism for a lose-lose outcome.
I think it is more accurate to say that the powers aligned against the potential regional hegemon, who responded with alliances with the willing, regardless of whether they were worthwhile allies.
If you look at the treaties starting in 1848, you see a slow drift from everyone-balance-against-France to everyone-balance-against-Germany. The UK’s century or more long running conflict with France transforms into a very close alliance in less than a generation.
Let me put it slightly differently: I think best explanation of Germany’s willingness to ally so closely with Austria-Hungary (to the point that a dispute which had no interests for Germany could initiate WWI) is best explained as a unwillingness of anyone else to ally with Germany. Sure, the Central Powers allies make rational sense to Germany once they are all the possible allies. But the historical fact that no one else was willing to ally with Germany cries out for explanation (and France, Britain, or Russia would have maximized their chance to win any European war by allying with Germany).
Your attempt at an explanation is interesting, but to my knowledge, doesn’t fit the facts. The nations weren’t unwilling to ally with Germany, in contrary, the German Emperor didn’t want to maintain the alliances that had been created by Bismarck. For example, Russia wanted to renew the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinsurance_Treaty), but Germany didn’t.
My most important point is that reasoning of the form “If only the Kaiser had been less obsessed with a strong navy, Britain might have been induced not to ally with France” is likely false. Since the 1700s, Britain’s policy had always been to prevent a European hegemon—the UK’s opponent changed from France to Germany when the potential hegemon changed from France (Louis XIV, Napoleon) to Germany.
That said, with the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious that Germany could not be closely allied with Austria-Hungary and Russia. Both wanted to dominate the Balkans to the exclusion of any other great power: Russia for warm water ports, AH to have a freer hand against internal dissent.
Also with the benefit of hindsight, Germany looks awfully foolish for picking AH over Russia. But even if the Reinsurance Treaty was renewed in 1890, it is unclear whether Russia would have continued to be willing to renew it over the next two decades.
But my thesis is that nations act in their own interest, regardless of internal dynamics. That is not the same as saying that nations always correctly figure out what their interests are. Britain’s failure to take steps to prevent the unification of Germany in the 1850-60s is as inexplicable as Germany’s choice of AH over Russia a few decades later.
I think internal dynamics play a greater role than you assume. Personalities do matter in politics. To take a current example, while little has changed about the facts between Russia and Germany of today, the relationship between those two nations has changed a lot after Merkel succeeded Schröder as chancelor, simply because Putin and Merkel don’t work as well together on a personal level as Schröder and Putin did.
That is a very valid critique of international relations realism.
But what specific international interests has Germany changed its position on because of the closer relationship between specific leaders? Likewise, are there any specific international positions that Russia has changed because of the closer relationship?
I suspect that Russia’s geopolitical interests matter a lot more to Russia’s stance on big issues (e.g. Syria) than any interpersonal relationship. In other words, just about any internal structure of government in Russia would likely be saying the same things that the current government is saying.
Like China propping up the North Korean government even though the Chinese probably doesn’t like North Korea’s behavior. The geopolitical consequences of reunification are not in China’s interests, and that probably outweighs just about any misbehavior from North Korea, unless NK escalates a lot.
The example that I would have liked to bring up was Germany’s stance on the Nord Stream project (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord_Stream), which serves as a direct supply with russian natural gas independent of transit countries. In Germany, the support for this project by Schröder was widely perceived as a result of his relationship to Putin and his plans after leaving politics (he is head of the shareholder’s committee). I assumed this project is clearly against German national interest, since it creates an even stronger dependence on russian natural gas than the dependence already existing right now. I assumed that Merkel’s worse personal relationship with Putin and her not benefitting personally from this project would have lead to a stance that is more in line with Germany’s interest in energy independence.
Indeed, she has voiced that opinion—for example, advocating a LNG terminal in Wilhelmshaven (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-East/Jan/10/Merkel-says-Germany-should-lessen-dependence-on-Russian-energy.ashx#axzz2Ww9dAIzo). However, when it comes to actions, she consistently supported Nord Stream and sabotaged alternatives.
But the historical fact that no one else was willing to ally with Germany cries out for explanation (and France, Britain, or Russia would have maximized their chance to win any European war by allying with Germany).
Are you saying that the evidence suggests that Germany would have ‘won’ the war if France, Britain, or Russia had been allied with Germany?
I’m pretty confident that the answer is yes for each country.
France (>.95) This alliance definitely wins. Using casualties as an indirect measure of military strength, France is third most (after Germany and Russia). But this is a total counter-factual because there is essentially no historically plausible path to WWI that leads to France and Germany on the same side.
Historically, I believe the last alliance between those states before WWI was the War of Austrian Succession (and Prussia was not unified into Germany at that time).
Russia (>.75) Second most casualties, but with the benefit of hindsight, there’s strong reason to think this overstates Russian military power—although Russia defeated Napoleon and would go on to defeat Hitler with minimal assistance. Still, even assuming that Russia is equivalent in military power to the second raters like Ottoman Empire and Italy (a very questionable assumption), the removal of the Eastern Front probably adds enough German troops to the Western Front to overwhelm France.
UK (>.65) Fourth most casualties. Fought on the same front as France, so removal of those troops increases leverage on the outcome of the France-Germany fight. As you may know, the French army barely made it through the war, so lack of other forces to absorb casualties seems plausible for swinging the outcome.
Something that doesn’t often get remarked upon is that the Cold War wasn’t the first instance of the strategy of MAD. World War 1 was the culmination of a MAD strategy gone awry.
One difference between the Cold War and World War 1, however, is that in the Cold War at least one of the nations involved was actually employing people to study the mathematics behind the strategy.
I don’t think Europe pre-WWI can accurately be characterized as powers using a MAD-style strategy.
WWI was the result of complex interactions between multiple powers, none of whom were dominant in their region, and feared domination by another power in the region because they lacked the power to impose existence-ending consequences on rival states if the rival won military victory.
The Cold War was between only two powers who each had the ability to impose existence-ending consequences on the rival state even if the rival won a conventional military victory.
In short, MAD may have been a Nash equilibrium in a two-power international system, but it almost certainly was not the Nash equilibrium before WWI. (If one looks to history, it is not clear that any Nash equilibrium exists in those circumstances). From such reasoning grows the International Relations Realists school of political science.
But both France and Germany thought that in the event of a war that their side would rush to an easy victory. That seems to me to be quite the opposite of MAD.
How did World War 1 involve mutually assured destruction? It seems to me that destruction can’t have been particularly strongly assured given that the significant powers on one of the sides wasn’t destroyed. There were significant casualties and economic cost but MAD tends to imply something more than just “even the winner has casualties!” considerations. Are you using “MAD” far more loosely than I would expected or making some claim about history that surprises me?
(By contrast a Cold War in which both sides had lots of nuclear weapons stockpiled actually could result in mutual destruction if someone made a wrong move.)
Far more loosely. Part of the object behind the complex network of alliances was to make war too costly to initiate. Once war was initiated, however, it was guaranteed to be on a massive scale. The damage done by WW1 is forgotten in consideration of the damage done by WW2, but it carried a substantial toll; around 33% of military-age British men died over a four year time period.
In both cases the nations involved were always one event away from total catastrophe.
It tends not to be forgotten here. Australia had far more casualties in the first world war than the second.
France also had more casualties in WW1, and may even loom bigger in our memories.
That seems likely. Absent any specific information to the contrary I expect ‘looming’ to approximately track casualties/population and by that metric France was over three times worse off than Australia.
I think that the entangling alliances that precipitated WW1 were intended as a win-lose strategy, intending to deter aggression by having lots of allies.
The nations joining alliances are doing so to increase their chances of winning a war, not to increase the chances that their opponent will lose a war; there’s no mechanism for a lose-lose outcome.
I think it is more accurate to say that the powers aligned against the potential regional hegemon, who responded with alliances with the willing, regardless of whether they were worthwhile allies.
If you look at the treaties starting in 1848, you see a slow drift from everyone-balance-against-France to everyone-balance-against-Germany. The UK’s century or more long running conflict with France transforms into a very close alliance in less than a generation.
Let me put it slightly differently: I think best explanation of Germany’s willingness to ally so closely with Austria-Hungary (to the point that a dispute which had no interests for Germany could initiate WWI) is best explained as a unwillingness of anyone else to ally with Germany. Sure, the Central Powers allies make rational sense to Germany once they are all the possible allies. But the historical fact that no one else was willing to ally with Germany cries out for explanation (and France, Britain, or Russia would have maximized their chance to win any European war by allying with Germany).
Your attempt at an explanation is interesting, but to my knowledge, doesn’t fit the facts. The nations weren’t unwilling to ally with Germany, in contrary, the German Emperor didn’t want to maintain the alliances that had been created by Bismarck. For example, Russia wanted to renew the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinsurance_Treaty), but Germany didn’t.
My most important point is that reasoning of the form “If only the Kaiser had been less obsessed with a strong navy, Britain might have been induced not to ally with France” is likely false. Since the 1700s, Britain’s policy had always been to prevent a European hegemon—the UK’s opponent changed from France to Germany when the potential hegemon changed from France (Louis XIV, Napoleon) to Germany.
That said, with the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious that Germany could not be closely allied with Austria-Hungary and Russia. Both wanted to dominate the Balkans to the exclusion of any other great power: Russia for warm water ports, AH to have a freer hand against internal dissent.
Also with the benefit of hindsight, Germany looks awfully foolish for picking AH over Russia. But even if the Reinsurance Treaty was renewed in 1890, it is unclear whether Russia would have continued to be willing to renew it over the next two decades.
But my thesis is that nations act in their own interest, regardless of internal dynamics. That is not the same as saying that nations always correctly figure out what their interests are. Britain’s failure to take steps to prevent the unification of Germany in the 1850-60s is as inexplicable as Germany’s choice of AH over Russia a few decades later.
I think internal dynamics play a greater role than you assume. Personalities do matter in politics. To take a current example, while little has changed about the facts between Russia and Germany of today, the relationship between those two nations has changed a lot after Merkel succeeded Schröder as chancelor, simply because Putin and Merkel don’t work as well together on a personal level as Schröder and Putin did.
That is a very valid critique of international relations realism.
But what specific international interests has Germany changed its position on because of the closer relationship between specific leaders? Likewise, are there any specific international positions that Russia has changed because of the closer relationship?
I suspect that Russia’s geopolitical interests matter a lot more to Russia’s stance on big issues (e.g. Syria) than any interpersonal relationship. In other words, just about any internal structure of government in Russia would likely be saying the same things that the current government is saying.
Like China propping up the North Korean government even though the Chinese probably doesn’t like North Korea’s behavior. The geopolitical consequences of reunification are not in China’s interests, and that probably outweighs just about any misbehavior from North Korea, unless NK escalates a lot.
I notice that I’m confused.
The example that I would have liked to bring up was Germany’s stance on the Nord Stream project (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord_Stream), which serves as a direct supply with russian natural gas independent of transit countries. In Germany, the support for this project by Schröder was widely perceived as a result of his relationship to Putin and his plans after leaving politics (he is head of the shareholder’s committee). I assumed this project is clearly against German national interest, since it creates an even stronger dependence on russian natural gas than the dependence already existing right now. I assumed that Merkel’s worse personal relationship with Putin and her not benefitting personally from this project would have lead to a stance that is more in line with Germany’s interest in energy independence. Indeed, she has voiced that opinion—for example, advocating a LNG terminal in Wilhelmshaven (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-East/Jan/10/Merkel-says-Germany-should-lessen-dependence-on-Russian-energy.ashx#axzz2Ww9dAIzo). However, when it comes to actions, she consistently supported Nord Stream and sabotaged alternatives.
Are you saying that the evidence suggests that Germany would have ‘won’ the war if France, Britain, or Russia had been allied with Germany?
I’m pretty confident that the answer is yes for each country.
France (>.95) This alliance definitely wins. Using casualties as an indirect measure of military strength, France is third most (after Germany and Russia). But this is a total counter-factual because there is essentially no historically plausible path to WWI that leads to France and Germany on the same side.
Historically, I believe the last alliance between those states before WWI was the War of Austrian Succession (and Prussia was not unified into Germany at that time).
Russia (>.75) Second most casualties, but with the benefit of hindsight, there’s strong reason to think this overstates Russian military power—although Russia defeated Napoleon and would go on to defeat Hitler with minimal assistance. Still, even assuming that Russia is equivalent in military power to the second raters like Ottoman Empire and Italy (a very questionable assumption), the removal of the Eastern Front probably adds enough German troops to the Western Front to overwhelm France.
UK (>.65) Fourth most casualties. Fought on the same front as France, so removal of those troops increases leverage on the outcome of the France-Germany fight. As you may know, the French army barely made it through the war, so lack of other forces to absorb casualties seems plausible for swinging the outcome.