My most important point is that reasoning of the form “If only the Kaiser had been less obsessed with a strong navy, Britain might have been induced not to ally with France” is likely false. Since the 1700s, Britain’s policy had always been to prevent a European hegemon—the UK’s opponent changed from France to Germany when the potential hegemon changed from France (Louis XIV, Napoleon) to Germany.
That said, with the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious that Germany could not be closely allied with Austria-Hungary and Russia. Both wanted to dominate the Balkans to the exclusion of any other great power: Russia for warm water ports, AH to have a freer hand against internal dissent.
Also with the benefit of hindsight, Germany looks awfully foolish for picking AH over Russia. But even if the Reinsurance Treaty was renewed in 1890, it is unclear whether Russia would have continued to be willing to renew it over the next two decades.
But my thesis is that nations act in their own interest, regardless of internal dynamics. That is not the same as saying that nations always correctly figure out what their interests are. Britain’s failure to take steps to prevent the unification of Germany in the 1850-60s is as inexplicable as Germany’s choice of AH over Russia a few decades later.
I think internal dynamics play a greater role than you assume. Personalities do matter in politics. To take a current example, while little has changed about the facts between Russia and Germany of today, the relationship between those two nations has changed a lot after Merkel succeeded Schröder as chancelor, simply because Putin and Merkel don’t work as well together on a personal level as Schröder and Putin did.
That is a very valid critique of international relations realism.
But what specific international interests has Germany changed its position on because of the closer relationship between specific leaders? Likewise, are there any specific international positions that Russia has changed because of the closer relationship?
I suspect that Russia’s geopolitical interests matter a lot more to Russia’s stance on big issues (e.g. Syria) than any interpersonal relationship. In other words, just about any internal structure of government in Russia would likely be saying the same things that the current government is saying.
Like China propping up the North Korean government even though the Chinese probably doesn’t like North Korea’s behavior. The geopolitical consequences of reunification are not in China’s interests, and that probably outweighs just about any misbehavior from North Korea, unless NK escalates a lot.
The example that I would have liked to bring up was Germany’s stance on the Nord Stream project (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord_Stream), which serves as a direct supply with russian natural gas independent of transit countries. In Germany, the support for this project by Schröder was widely perceived as a result of his relationship to Putin and his plans after leaving politics (he is head of the shareholder’s committee). I assumed this project is clearly against German national interest, since it creates an even stronger dependence on russian natural gas than the dependence already existing right now. I assumed that Merkel’s worse personal relationship with Putin and her not benefitting personally from this project would have lead to a stance that is more in line with Germany’s interest in energy independence.
Indeed, she has voiced that opinion—for example, advocating a LNG terminal in Wilhelmshaven (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-East/Jan/10/Merkel-says-Germany-should-lessen-dependence-on-Russian-energy.ashx#axzz2Ww9dAIzo). However, when it comes to actions, she consistently supported Nord Stream and sabotaged alternatives.
My most important point is that reasoning of the form “If only the Kaiser had been less obsessed with a strong navy, Britain might have been induced not to ally with France” is likely false. Since the 1700s, Britain’s policy had always been to prevent a European hegemon—the UK’s opponent changed from France to Germany when the potential hegemon changed from France (Louis XIV, Napoleon) to Germany.
That said, with the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious that Germany could not be closely allied with Austria-Hungary and Russia. Both wanted to dominate the Balkans to the exclusion of any other great power: Russia for warm water ports, AH to have a freer hand against internal dissent.
Also with the benefit of hindsight, Germany looks awfully foolish for picking AH over Russia. But even if the Reinsurance Treaty was renewed in 1890, it is unclear whether Russia would have continued to be willing to renew it over the next two decades.
But my thesis is that nations act in their own interest, regardless of internal dynamics. That is not the same as saying that nations always correctly figure out what their interests are. Britain’s failure to take steps to prevent the unification of Germany in the 1850-60s is as inexplicable as Germany’s choice of AH over Russia a few decades later.
I think internal dynamics play a greater role than you assume. Personalities do matter in politics. To take a current example, while little has changed about the facts between Russia and Germany of today, the relationship between those two nations has changed a lot after Merkel succeeded Schröder as chancelor, simply because Putin and Merkel don’t work as well together on a personal level as Schröder and Putin did.
That is a very valid critique of international relations realism.
But what specific international interests has Germany changed its position on because of the closer relationship between specific leaders? Likewise, are there any specific international positions that Russia has changed because of the closer relationship?
I suspect that Russia’s geopolitical interests matter a lot more to Russia’s stance on big issues (e.g. Syria) than any interpersonal relationship. In other words, just about any internal structure of government in Russia would likely be saying the same things that the current government is saying.
Like China propping up the North Korean government even though the Chinese probably doesn’t like North Korea’s behavior. The geopolitical consequences of reunification are not in China’s interests, and that probably outweighs just about any misbehavior from North Korea, unless NK escalates a lot.
I notice that I’m confused.
The example that I would have liked to bring up was Germany’s stance on the Nord Stream project (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord_Stream), which serves as a direct supply with russian natural gas independent of transit countries. In Germany, the support for this project by Schröder was widely perceived as a result of his relationship to Putin and his plans after leaving politics (he is head of the shareholder’s committee). I assumed this project is clearly against German national interest, since it creates an even stronger dependence on russian natural gas than the dependence already existing right now. I assumed that Merkel’s worse personal relationship with Putin and her not benefitting personally from this project would have lead to a stance that is more in line with Germany’s interest in energy independence. Indeed, she has voiced that opinion—for example, advocating a LNG terminal in Wilhelmshaven (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-East/Jan/10/Merkel-says-Germany-should-lessen-dependence-on-Russian-energy.ashx#axzz2Ww9dAIzo). However, when it comes to actions, she consistently supported Nord Stream and sabotaged alternatives.