Leibniz doesn’t believe in material substance, so in no sense is he a dualist. If you are asking if there are materialists theists- eh, maybe but as far as I know it has never been a well developed view. That said, the entire platonism-materialism question can probably be reduced to an issue of levels of simulation… in which case it is easy to envision a plausible theism that is essentially dualist but not repugnant to our computationalist sensibilities.
If you first tell them, or give them enough information to realize, or strongly suspect, that without this concession by them they fail, then you can get them to agree to very nearly anything.
But those people are slightly different than the versions uninformed of this, people who would reject it.
The unorthodoxy is motivated and not serious in terms of relative degrees of belief based on what is most likely true.
“Fall”? I don’t understand the second sentence either.
The unorthodoxy is motivated and not serious in terms of relative degrees of belief based on what is most likely true.
Often, though on occasion their reasons are isomorphic to stories we’d find plausible. If someone thought it was worthwhile to reinterpret some of the older theistic philosophers in light of modern information theory and computer science… some interesting ideas might fall out.
But yes- I doubt there are more than a handful of educated theists not working with the bottom line already filled in.
the second sentence means I am trying to distinguish between who someone is and who they might have been. Another intuition pump: put identical theists in identical rooms, on one play a television program explaining how they have to admit that all good evidence makes it unlikely there exists (insert theological thing here, an Adam and eve, a soul, whatever) and on the other play something unrelated to the issue. Then ask the previously identical people if they believe in whatever poorly backed theological thing they previously believed. the unorthodox will flee the false position, but only if they see it as obviously false.
Often, though on occasion their reasons are isomorphic to stories we’d find plausible.
That doesn’t mean the reasons we find it implausible aren’t good or can’t be taught., just as teaching how carbon dating relates to the age of the Earth militates against believing it is ~6,000 years old, one can show why what ancestors tell you in dreams isn’t good evidence.
So my conclusion, my supposition, is that if you muster up the most theistic-compatible metaphysics you find plausible, and show it to those theists who don’t know why anything more supernatural is implausible, inconsistent or incoherent, they will reject it.
That they accept it after learning that you have good objections to anything more theistic is not impressive at all.
Got it. Don’t disagree. But it doesn’t follow that a) we should disregard all theistic philosophy or b) not use theistic language. Given that there are live possibilities that resemble theism the circle of concepts and arguments surrounding traditional, religious theism are likely to be fruitful.
But yes- I doubt there are more than a handful of educated theists not working with the bottom line already filled in.
Rationalization is an important skill of rationality. (There probably needs to be a post about that.) But anyway, I think my “theistic” intuitions are very similar to those of Thomas Aquinas, a.k.a. the rock that Catholic philosophy is built on. Like, actually similar in that we’re thinking about the same decision agent and its properties, not just we’re thinking about similar ideas.
Leibniz doesn’t believe in material substance, so in no sense is he a dualist. If you are asking if there are materialists theists- eh, maybe but as far as I know it has never been a well developed view. That said, the entire platonism-materialism question can probably be reduced to an issue of levels of simulation… in which case it is easy to envision a plausible theism that is essentially dualist but not repugnant to our computationalist sensibilities.
It would be repugnant to their sensibilities if you described in detail the sorts of scenarios that comply with our sensibilities.
For most, probably. But you might be surprised how much unorthodoxy is out there.
If you first tell them, or give them enough information to realize, or strongly suspect, that without this concession by them they fail, then you can get them to agree to very nearly anything.
But those people are slightly different than the versions uninformed of this, people who would reject it.
The unorthodoxy is motivated and not serious in terms of relative degrees of belief based on what is most likely true.
“Fall”? I don’t understand the second sentence either.
Often, though on occasion their reasons are isomorphic to stories we’d find plausible. If someone thought it was worthwhile to reinterpret some of the older theistic philosophers in light of modern information theory and computer science… some interesting ideas might fall out.
But yes- I doubt there are more than a handful of educated theists not working with the bottom line already filled in.
Edited “fall” to “fail”.
the second sentence means I am trying to distinguish between who someone is and who they might have been. Another intuition pump: put identical theists in identical rooms, on one play a television program explaining how they have to admit that all good evidence makes it unlikely there exists (insert theological thing here, an Adam and eve, a soul, whatever) and on the other play something unrelated to the issue. Then ask the previously identical people if they believe in whatever poorly backed theological thing they previously believed. the unorthodox will flee the false position, but only if they see it as obviously false.
Something like this.
That doesn’t mean the reasons we find it implausible aren’t good or can’t be taught., just as teaching how carbon dating relates to the age of the Earth militates against believing it is ~6,000 years old, one can show why what ancestors tell you in dreams isn’t good evidence.
So my conclusion, my supposition, is that if you muster up the most theistic-compatible metaphysics you find plausible, and show it to those theists who don’t know why anything more supernatural is implausible, inconsistent or incoherent, they will reject it.
That they accept it after learning that you have good objections to anything more theistic is not impressive at all.
Got it. Don’t disagree. But it doesn’t follow that a) we should disregard all theistic philosophy or b) not use theistic language. Given that there are live possibilities that resemble theism the circle of concepts and arguments surrounding traditional, religious theism are likely to be fruitful.
Immortals with infinite mind space definitely should not ignore theistic philosophy.
It’s sometimes useful to use theistic language, sometimes not. Usually when I see it when theism isn’t a subject, it isn’t useful.
Rationalization is an important skill of rationality. (There probably needs to be a post about that.) But anyway, I think my “theistic” intuitions are very similar to those of Thomas Aquinas, a.k.a. the rock that Catholic philosophy is built on. Like, actually similar in that we’re thinking about the same decision agent and its properties, not just we’re thinking about similar ideas.