But checking on a politician is an investment in your community with little personal return to yourself. It requires trust to think it will pay off to you.
Right, but Denmark doesn’t rely on ordinary members of the community volunteering to check on the politician, with no thought of personal gain. Of course that won’t work. The solution is institutional—in other words, there are paid officials within government agencies who are responsible for these investigations, and laws and requirements for transparency, and so on.
You are making a fine argument as to why institutionless trust can’t scale. But whoever said it could? And your solutions don’t even solve your problems on their own terms. Why would a “noble lie” solve the problem with the hat? Won’t someone just steal anyway? The solution to the problem of the hat is a policeman.
OK. Maybe I am entirely clueless here, but I just don’t see how if you pay official A to keep check on official B how the heck they don’t instantly collude into a mafia the very second citizen volunteer vigilance stops keeping watch on them?
Here is one interesting thing. People with radical politics, anarchists, communists, libertarians, suchlike, tend to say precisely that, that yes, they collude. Even “conservative” Chesterton said every aristocracy is a mob with style (or something similar, not accurate quote).
People who are moderates and skeptical should probably think it happens to some extent all the time, but all the difference between the first world and the third is precisely the extent of it: preventing most of that collusion, preventing that one big political-business-criminal mafia “blob” from coming into existence and colonize the top echelons is what is the difference between functional and dysfunctional, improving and deteriorating places.
But instutions like playing one Ivy League windbag to keep check on basically his classmate cannot possibly work in themselves, they collude very easily. There must be some other kind of “trick” there.
Of course it’s possible for collusion to take place. So you have to make it hard for collusion to take place, you need failsafes. That’s why I didn’t just say “you need a guard” I talked about transparency and the legal regime. There are different ways this can work.
You are right that one element is to make sure that affinity networks (like Ivy League classmates or ethnic groupings) don’t get to colonize the top echelons. But there’s more to it than that. I think you need to look at the specific legal regimes in a bunch of Western countries, see how they work, and see how they set the incentives for actors within it. And then you’ll be able to explain why there’s more corruption in Ukraine than in Italy, and more in Italy than in England. And none of them are perfect, by the way.
You are right that one element is to make sure that affinity networks (like Ivy League classmates or ethnic groupings) don’t get to colonize the top echelons.
The UK works relatively well despite the huge portion of it’s leadership going to school in Eton and then going to college in Oxford or Cambridge.
Right, but Denmark doesn’t rely on ordinary members of the community volunteering to check on the politician, with no thought of personal gain. Of course that won’t work. The solution is institutional—in other words, there are paid officials within government agencies who are responsible for these investigations, and laws and requirements for transparency, and so on.
You are making a fine argument as to why institutionless trust can’t scale. But whoever said it could? And your solutions don’t even solve your problems on their own terms. Why would a “noble lie” solve the problem with the hat? Won’t someone just steal anyway? The solution to the problem of the hat is a policeman.
OK. Maybe I am entirely clueless here, but I just don’t see how if you pay official A to keep check on official B how the heck they don’t instantly collude into a mafia the very second citizen volunteer vigilance stops keeping watch on them?
Here is one interesting thing. People with radical politics, anarchists, communists, libertarians, suchlike, tend to say precisely that, that yes, they collude. Even “conservative” Chesterton said every aristocracy is a mob with style (or something similar, not accurate quote).
People who are moderates and skeptical should probably think it happens to some extent all the time, but all the difference between the first world and the third is precisely the extent of it: preventing most of that collusion, preventing that one big political-business-criminal mafia “blob” from coming into existence and colonize the top echelons is what is the difference between functional and dysfunctional, improving and deteriorating places.
But instutions like playing one Ivy League windbag to keep check on basically his classmate cannot possibly work in themselves, they collude very easily. There must be some other kind of “trick” there.
Of course it’s possible for collusion to take place. So you have to make it hard for collusion to take place, you need failsafes. That’s why I didn’t just say “you need a guard” I talked about transparency and the legal regime. There are different ways this can work.
You are right that one element is to make sure that affinity networks (like Ivy League classmates or ethnic groupings) don’t get to colonize the top echelons. But there’s more to it than that. I think you need to look at the specific legal regimes in a bunch of Western countries, see how they work, and see how they set the incentives for actors within it. And then you’ll be able to explain why there’s more corruption in Ukraine than in Italy, and more in Italy than in England. And none of them are perfect, by the way.
Only institutional change can explain how (say) New York city governance moved from being incredibly corrupt in the 19th century to moderately corrupt in the mid-20th century to a bit corrupt today. It’s not because the population has become more “saintly,” and it’s not because of any “noble lie.” But it did require time.
The UK works relatively well despite the huge portion of it’s leadership going to school in Eton and then going to college in Oxford or Cambridge.