Nor should I, unless I believe that someone somewhere might honestly reconsider their position based on such an attempt.
I think for the purposes of promoting clarity this is a bad rule of thumb. The decision to explain should be more guided by effort/hedonicity and availability of other explanations of the same thing that are already there, not by strategically withholding things based on predictions of how others would treat an explanation. (So for example “I don’t feel like it” seems like an excellent reason not to do this, and doesn’t need to be voiced to be equally valid.)
I think I agree that this isn’t a good explicit rule of thumb, and I somewhat regret how I put this.
But it’s also true that a belief in someone’s good-faith engagement (including an onlooker’s), and in particular their openness to honest reconsideration, is an important factor in the motivational calculus, and for good reasons.
openness to honest reconsideration, is an important factor in the motivational calculus
The structure of a conflict and motivation prompted by that structure functions in a symmetric way, with the same influence irrespective of whether the argument is right or wrong.
But the argument itself, once presented, is asymmetric, it’s all else equal stronger when correct than when it’s not. This is a reason to lean towards publishing things, perhaps even setting up weird mechanisms like encouraging people to ignore criticism they dislike in order to make its publication more likely.
I think for the purposes of promoting clarity this is a bad rule of thumb. The decision to explain should be more guided by effort/hedonicity and availability of other explanations of the same thing that are already there, not by strategically withholding things based on predictions of how others would treat an explanation. (So for example “I don’t feel like it” seems like an excellent reason not to do this, and doesn’t need to be voiced to be equally valid.)
I think I agree that this isn’t a good explicit rule of thumb, and I somewhat regret how I put this.
But it’s also true that a belief in someone’s good-faith engagement (including an onlooker’s), and in particular their openness to honest reconsideration, is an important factor in the motivational calculus, and for good reasons.
The structure of a conflict and motivation prompted by that structure functions in a symmetric way, with the same influence irrespective of whether the argument is right or wrong.
But the argument itself, once presented, is asymmetric, it’s all else equal stronger when correct than when it’s not. This is a reason to lean towards publishing things, perhaps even setting up weird mechanisms like encouraging people to ignore criticism they dislike in order to make its publication more likely.