If this argument does not give “free will” to stones, it shouldn’t be used as an explanation of “free will” in humans, because it is not valid in general.
This is like saying that if physics does not result in consciousness in stones, we shouldn’t admit that it results in consciousness in humans.
I have no particular reason to think that we have libertarian free will. But we do make choices, and if those choices are indeterminate, then we have libertarian free will. If those choices are indeterminate, it will in fact be because of the indeterminacy of the underlying matter.
If your argument is correct, something more is needed for libertarian free will besides choices which are indeterminate. What is that extra component that you are positing as necessary for free will?
This is like saying that if physics does not result in consciousness in stones, we shouldn’t admit that it results in consciousness in humans.
My point exactly. If physics does not result in consciousness in stones, then “physics” is not an explanation of consciousness in humans.
And neither is “quantum physics” an explanation of free will in humans (as long as we use any definition of “free will” which does not also apply to stones).
What is that extra component that you are positing as necessary for free will?
Well, the philosophers are supposed to have some superior insights, so I am waiting for someone to communicate them clearly. Preferably without invoking quantum physics in the explanation.
My guess is that “free will” belongs to the realm of psychology. We can talk about when we mean when we feel that other people (or animals, or hypothetical machines) have “free will”, and what we mean when we feel that we have “free will”. That’s all there is about “free will”. Start with the experiences that caused us to create the expression “free will” in the first place, and follow the chain of causality backwards (what in the world caused us to have these experiences? how exactly does that work?). Don’t have a bottom line of “X, in principle” first.
So… what would make me feel that someone or something has a free will? I guess “not completely predictable”, “not completely random”, “seems to follow some goals” and “can somewhat adapt to changes in its environment” are among the key components, but maybe I forgot something just as important.
But whether something seems predictable or unpredictable to me, that is a fact about my ability to predict, not about the observed thing. I mean, if something is “unpredictable in principle”, that would of course explain my inability to predict it. But there are also other reasonable explanations for my inability to predict—some of them so obvious that they are probably low-status to mention—such as me not having enough information, or not having enough computing power. I don’t see the atoms in other people’s brains, I couldn’t compute their movements fast enough anyway, so I can’t predict other people’s thoughts or actions precisely enough. Thus, other people are “not completely predictable” to me.
I see no need to posit that this unpredictability exists “in principle”, in the territory. That assumption is not necessary for explaining my inability to predict. If there is no reason why something should exist in the territory, we should avoid talking about it like it necessarily exists there. The quantum physics is a red herring here. My inability to predict systems reaches far beyond what the Heisenberg’s uncertainty would make me concede. The vast majority of my inability to predict complex systems such as human brains—and therefore the vast majority of my perception of “free will”—is completely unrelated to quantum physics. (Saying that the quantum noise is the only thing that prevents me from reading the contents of your brain and simulating them in real time would be completely delusional. Probably no respected philosopher holds this position explicitly, but all that hand-waving about “quantum physics” is pointing suggestively in this direction. I am saying it’s a wrong direction.)
And how I believe in my own “free will”? Similarly, I can’t sufficiently observe and predict the working of my own brain either. (Again, the quantum noise is the least of my problems here.)
Adding to my previous comment, to explain the point about stones more fully:
I understand libertarian free will to mean, “the ability to make choices, in such a way that those choices are not completely deterministic in advance.”
We know from experience that people have the ability to make choices. We do not know from experience if they are deterministic in advance or not. And personally I do not know or care.
Your objection about the second part seems to be, “if the second part of the definition is satisfied, but only by reason of something which also exists in stones, that says nothing special about people.”
I agree, it says nothing special about people. That does not prevent the definition from being satisfied. And it is not satisfied by stones, since stones do not have the first part, whether or not they have the second.
My point exactly. If physics does not result in consciousness in stones, then “physics” is not an explanation of consciousness in humans.
Generic physics doesn’t even even account for toasters. You need to plug in structure.
And neither is “quantum physics” an explanation of free will in humans (as long as we use any definition of “free will” which does not also apply to stones).
An explanation all in itself. or a potential part of an explanation , including other things, such as structure.
My guess is that “free will” belongs to the realm of psychology. We can talk about when we mean when we feel that other people (or animals, or hypothetical machines) have “free will”, and what we mean when we feel that we have “free will”. That’s all there is about “free will”. Start with the experiences that caused us to create the expression “free will” in the first place, and follow the chain of causality backwards (what in the world caused us to have these experiences? how exactly does that work?). Don’t have a bottom line of “X, in principle” first
Tracing the feeling back might result in a mechanism that produces a false impression of freedom, or a mechanism
that results in freedom. What you are suggesting leaves the question open.
I see no need to posit that this unpredictability exists “in principle”, in the territory.
Who do yo think is doing that? The claim is hypothetical..that if indeterminism exists in the territory, then it could provide the basis for non-illusory FW. And if we investigate that, we can resolve the question you left open above.
This is all fine, for how you understand the idea of free will. And I personally agree that it does not matter whether the world is unpredictable in principle or not. I am just saying that people who talk about libertarian free will, define it as being able to make choices, without those choices being deterministic. And that definition would be satisfied in a situation where people make choices, as they actually do, and their choices are not deterministic because of quantum mechanics (which may or may not be the case—as I said, I do not care.) And notice that this definition of free will would not be satisfied by stones, even if they are not deterministic, because they do not have the choice part.
In the previous comment, you seemed to be denying that this would satisfy the definition, which would mean that you would have to define libertarian free will in an idiosyncratic sense.
This is like saying that if physics does not result in consciousness in stones, we shouldn’t admit that it results in consciousness in humans.
I have no particular reason to think that we have libertarian free will. But we do make choices, and if those choices are indeterminate, then we have libertarian free will. If those choices are indeterminate, it will in fact be because of the indeterminacy of the underlying matter.
If your argument is correct, something more is needed for libertarian free will besides choices which are indeterminate. What is that extra component that you are positing as necessary for free will?
My point exactly. If physics does not result in consciousness in stones, then “physics” is not an explanation of consciousness in humans.
And neither is “quantum physics” an explanation of free will in humans (as long as we use any definition of “free will” which does not also apply to stones).
Well, the philosophers are supposed to have some superior insights, so I am waiting for someone to communicate them clearly. Preferably without invoking quantum physics in the explanation.
My guess is that “free will” belongs to the realm of psychology. We can talk about when we mean when we feel that other people (or animals, or hypothetical machines) have “free will”, and what we mean when we feel that we have “free will”. That’s all there is about “free will”. Start with the experiences that caused us to create the expression “free will” in the first place, and follow the chain of causality backwards (what in the world caused us to have these experiences? how exactly does that work?). Don’t have a bottom line of “X, in principle” first.
So… what would make me feel that someone or something has a free will? I guess “not completely predictable”, “not completely random”, “seems to follow some goals” and “can somewhat adapt to changes in its environment” are among the key components, but maybe I forgot something just as important.
But whether something seems predictable or unpredictable to me, that is a fact about my ability to predict, not about the observed thing. I mean, if something is “unpredictable in principle”, that would of course explain my inability to predict it. But there are also other reasonable explanations for my inability to predict—some of them so obvious that they are probably low-status to mention—such as me not having enough information, or not having enough computing power. I don’t see the atoms in other people’s brains, I couldn’t compute their movements fast enough anyway, so I can’t predict other people’s thoughts or actions precisely enough. Thus, other people are “not completely predictable” to me.
I see no need to posit that this unpredictability exists “in principle”, in the territory. That assumption is not necessary for explaining my inability to predict. If there is no reason why something should exist in the territory, we should avoid talking about it like it necessarily exists there. The quantum physics is a red herring here. My inability to predict systems reaches far beyond what the Heisenberg’s uncertainty would make me concede. The vast majority of my inability to predict complex systems such as human brains—and therefore the vast majority of my perception of “free will”—is completely unrelated to quantum physics. (Saying that the quantum noise is the only thing that prevents me from reading the contents of your brain and simulating them in real time would be completely delusional. Probably no respected philosopher holds this position explicitly, but all that hand-waving about “quantum physics” is pointing suggestively in this direction. I am saying it’s a wrong direction.)
And how I believe in my own “free will”? Similarly, I can’t sufficiently observe and predict the working of my own brain either. (Again, the quantum noise is the least of my problems here.)
Adding to my previous comment, to explain the point about stones more fully:
I understand libertarian free will to mean, “the ability to make choices, in such a way that those choices are not completely deterministic in advance.”
We know from experience that people have the ability to make choices. We do not know from experience if they are deterministic in advance or not. And personally I do not know or care.
Your objection about the second part seems to be, “if the second part of the definition is satisfied, but only by reason of something which also exists in stones, that says nothing special about people.”
I agree, it says nothing special about people. That does not prevent the definition from being satisfied. And it is not satisfied by stones, since stones do not have the first part, whether or not they have the second.
Generic physics doesn’t even even account for toasters. You need to plug in structure.
An explanation all in itself. or a potential part of an explanation , including other things, such as structure.
Tracing the feeling back might result in a mechanism that produces a false impression of freedom, or a mechanism that results in freedom. What you are suggesting leaves the question open.
Who do yo think is doing that? The claim is hypothetical..that if indeterminism exists in the territory, then it could provide the basis for non-illusory FW. And if we investigate that, we can resolve the question you left open above.
This is all fine, for how you understand the idea of free will. And I personally agree that it does not matter whether the world is unpredictable in principle or not. I am just saying that people who talk about libertarian free will, define it as being able to make choices, without those choices being deterministic. And that definition would be satisfied in a situation where people make choices, as they actually do, and their choices are not deterministic because of quantum mechanics (which may or may not be the case—as I said, I do not care.) And notice that this definition of free will would not be satisfied by stones, even if they are not deterministic, because they do not have the choice part.
In the previous comment, you seemed to be denying that this would satisfy the definition, which would mean that you would have to define libertarian free will in an idiosyncratic sense.