This is all fine, for how you understand the idea of free will. And I personally agree that it does not matter whether the world is unpredictable in principle or not. I am just saying that people who talk about libertarian free will, define it as being able to make choices, without those choices being deterministic. And that definition would be satisfied in a situation where people make choices, as they actually do, and their choices are not deterministic because of quantum mechanics (which may or may not be the case—as I said, I do not care.) And notice that this definition of free will would not be satisfied by stones, even if they are not deterministic, because they do not have the choice part.
In the previous comment, you seemed to be denying that this would satisfy the definition, which would mean that you would have to define libertarian free will in an idiosyncratic sense.
This is all fine, for how you understand the idea of free will. And I personally agree that it does not matter whether the world is unpredictable in principle or not. I am just saying that people who talk about libertarian free will, define it as being able to make choices, without those choices being deterministic. And that definition would be satisfied in a situation where people make choices, as they actually do, and their choices are not deterministic because of quantum mechanics (which may or may not be the case—as I said, I do not care.) And notice that this definition of free will would not be satisfied by stones, even if they are not deterministic, because they do not have the choice part.
In the previous comment, you seemed to be denying that this would satisfy the definition, which would mean that you would have to define libertarian free will in an idiosyncratic sense.