So in Eliezer’s meta-ethics he talks about the abstract computation called “right”, whereas in e.g. CEV he talks about stuff like reflective endorsement. So in other words in one place he’s talking about goodness as a formal cause and in another he’s talking about goodness as a final cause. Does he argue anywhere that these should be expected to be the same thing? I realize that postulating their equivalence is not an unreasonable guess but it’s definitely not immediately or logically obvious, non? I suspect that Eliezer’s just not making a clear distinction between formal and final causes because his model of causality sees them as two sides of the same Platonic timeless coin, but as far as philosophy goes I think he’d need to flesh out his intuitions more before it’s clear if that makes sense; is this fleshing out to be found or hinted at anywhere in the sequences?
So in Eliezer’s meta-ethics he talks about the abstract computation called “right”, whereas in e.g. CEV he talks about stuff like reflective endorsement. So in other words in one place he’s talking about goodness as a formal cause and in another he’s talking about goodness as a final cause. Does he argue anywhere that these should be expected to be the same thing?
Not explicitly. He does in various places talk about why alternative considerations of abstract ‘rightness’ - some sort of objective morality or something—are absurd. He does give some details on his reductionist moral realism about the place but I don’t recall where.
Incidentally I haven’t seen Eliezer talk about formal or final causes about anything, ever. (And they don’t seem to be especially useful concepts to me.)
Incidentally I haven’t seen Eliezer talk about formal or final causes about anything, ever. (And they don’t seem to be especially useful concepts to me.)
Aren’t “formal cause” and “final cause” just synonyms for “shape” and “purpose”, respectively?
Sweet phrase, thanks. Maybe there should be a suite of these? I’ve noticed naive physical realism and naive philosophical (especially metaphysical) realism.
They’re not the same. CEV is an attempt to define a procedure that can infer morality by examining the workings of a big bunch of sometimes confused human brains just like you might try to infer mathematical truths by examining the workings of a big bunch of sometimes buggy calculators. The hope is that CEV finds morality, but it’s not the same as morality, any more than math is defined to be the output of a certain really well made calculator.
So in Eliezer’s meta-ethics he talks about the abstract computation called “right”, whereas in e.g. CEV he talks about stuff like reflective endorsement. So in other words in one place he’s talking about goodness as a formal cause and in another he’s talking about goodness as a final cause. Does he argue anywhere that these should be expected to be the same thing? I realize that postulating their equivalence is not an unreasonable guess but it’s definitely not immediately or logically obvious, non? I suspect that Eliezer’s just not making a clear distinction between formal and final causes because his model of causality sees them as two sides of the same Platonic timeless coin, but as far as philosophy goes I think he’d need to flesh out his intuitions more before it’s clear if that makes sense; is this fleshing out to be found or hinted at anywhere in the sequences?
Not explicitly. He does in various places talk about why alternative considerations of abstract ‘rightness’ - some sort of objective morality or something—are absurd. He does give some details on his reductionist moral realism about the place but I don’t recall where.
Incidentally I haven’t seen Eliezer talk about formal or final causes about anything, ever. (And they don’t seem to be especially useful concepts to me.)
Aren’t “formal cause” and “final cause” just synonyms for “shape” and “purpose”, respectively?
Basically, but Aristotle applied naive philosophical realism to them, and Will might have additional connotations in mind.
Sweet phrase, thanks. Maybe there should be a suite of these? I’ve noticed naive physical realism and naive philosophical (especially metaphysical) realism.
They’re not the same. CEV is an attempt to define a procedure that can infer morality by examining the workings of a big bunch of sometimes confused human brains just like you might try to infer mathematical truths by examining the workings of a big bunch of sometimes buggy calculators. The hope is that CEV finds morality, but it’s not the same as morality, any more than math is defined to be the output of a certain really well made calculator.