I can only see a little from your links, but what I do see misses Gigerenzer’s point. Kahneman (and Tversky’s?) replies to Gigerenzer also miss the point. Also note that some of Gigerenzer’s studies contradict some of Tversky and Kahneman’s results, or at least the conclusions that are frequently drawn from those results. E.g., overconfidence disappearing when you use frequencies instead of subjective probabilities. That said, I generally like Stanovich, so I’ll look closer at what he says specifically.
I should note, it’s really unfortunate that this word “normative” isn’t tabooed more.
Also, Dawes is often totally out to lunch—you’ve seen a few reasons why in a highly upvoted comment on one of your posts. Do you agree that Dawes and his cadre of researchers are not trustworthy? (Note that Eliezer often recommends Dawes’ book, “Rational Choice in an Uncertain World”. I read an ’80s edition of that book and was horrified at the poor scholarship. Before then I’d had a high opinion of H&B.)
I’m interested in our disagreement, in my view it seems pretty important, because it shapes our priors for how much respect we should give to the common man’s opinion. I’ll read more from your links (e.g. buy or steal a book or two) and give you my updated opinion.
I would need more details in order to comment on specific studies or results. Which passages from Dawes reflect poor scholarship? Which Gigerenzer studies contradict K&H results or conclusions (stated in which papers)? I also look forward to a more specific explanation of what you think Gigerenzer’s point is, and why the articles I linked to fail to address it.
(For those who are interested, I believe the highly-upvoted comment Will refers to is this one.)
I can only see a little from your links, but what I do see misses Gigerenzer’s point. Kahneman (and Tversky’s?) replies to Gigerenzer also miss the point. Also note that some of Gigerenzer’s studies contradict some of Tversky and Kahneman’s results, or at least the conclusions that are frequently drawn from those results. E.g., overconfidence disappearing when you use frequencies instead of subjective probabilities. That said, I generally like Stanovich, so I’ll look closer at what he says specifically.
I should note, it’s really unfortunate that this word “normative” isn’t tabooed more.
Also, Dawes is often totally out to lunch—you’ve seen a few reasons why in a highly upvoted comment on one of your posts. Do you agree that Dawes and his cadre of researchers are not trustworthy? (Note that Eliezer often recommends Dawes’ book, “Rational Choice in an Uncertain World”. I read an ’80s edition of that book and was horrified at the poor scholarship. Before then I’d had a high opinion of H&B.)
I’m interested in our disagreement, in my view it seems pretty important, because it shapes our priors for how much respect we should give to the common man’s opinion. I’ll read more from your links (e.g. buy or steal a book or two) and give you my updated opinion.
I would need more details in order to comment on specific studies or results. Which passages from Dawes reflect poor scholarship? Which Gigerenzer studies contradict K&H results or conclusions (stated in which papers)? I also look forward to a more specific explanation of what you think Gigerenzer’s point is, and why the articles I linked to fail to address it.
(For those who are interested, I believe the highly-upvoted comment Will refers to is this one.)