The 538 article is exactly the kind of context-free argument that justly gives ‘statistics’ and ‘rationalism’ a bad name. Yes, in game-theoretic terms you want to pass a certain amount of the time. Yes, there is a good argument for calling pass on that specific down. But the issue is not whether ‘pass’ in the abstract was a good decision, but whether the specific play-calling actions in their particular context were good. And they were not. They were indefensible.
Firstly, Seattle went out in a 3 WR group, thinking that this would get New England out of goal-line defense (and thus make it easier for the run play). This didn’t work, and they were foolish to think it would. This put Seattle in an awkward position where they would either have to run without enough blockers, or put the ball in the hands of poor players.
Secondly, Seattle ran the play out of the shotgun, making clear their intention to pass. There was no play-action or roll-out. This gives up all the game-theoretic part. If you are going to inform the opponent of your choice, you need to go with your strongest possible choice, whereas...
Thirdly, Seattle ignored their most favourable matchup. Seattle were the second-best offense in power-rushing playing the worst defense in stopping power runs. And instead...
Fourthly, Seattle went with a very unfavourable matchup in very unfavourable circumstances. They asked a receiver known for his downfield speed (and not much else) to fight for the ball on the goal-line. With the centre of the field cluttered, and all the defenders short, they called a quick slant into the centre of the field.
Yes, that play normally doesn’t result in an interception. Yes, there’s an element of bad luck there. But it’s also an example of really poor decision-making that ended up with Seattle essentially running the play New England would have chosen for them. They screwed up, and it’s embarrassing seeing the lengths people go to to defend the indefensible.
I would recommend this article highly for more depth.
The 538 article is exactly the kind of context-free argument that justly gives ‘statistics’ and ‘rationalism’ a bad name.
Are you sure? That sounds exaggerated. It definitely wasn’t context-free. Some examples:
“Let’s spot the Pats some yards, then, and assume the Patriots win1 about as often as a typical team in the AFA model would2 if they started on the 40-yard line. That would give them a 14 percent chance. Maybe that’s generous, but we’re looking for an upper bound.”
“But the Seahawks don’t have an average rusher; they have Beast Mode...”
Firstly, Seattle went out in a 3 WR group, thinking that this would get New England out of goal-line defense (and thus make it easier for the run play). This didn’t work, and they were foolish to think it would. This put Seattle in an awkward position where they would either have to run without enough blockers, or put the ball in the hands of poor players.
An awkward position? They couldn’t have ran on all three plays and if you have to have a pass play, 3 WR against a goal line defense is a good place to use your passing play.
Are you sure? That sounds exaggerated. It definitely wasn’t context-free. Some examples:
None of which consider the specific pass play that they chose to run, nor the specifics of the personnel matchup.
An awkward position? They couldn’t have ran on all three plays and if you have to have a pass play, 3 WR against a goal line defense is a good place to use your passing play.
In a vacuum, it could be a good place! But in the specific context it wasn’t, because New England still easily overmatched the Seattle receivers. Neither Baldwin or Kearse was ever going to get open against that coverage (and they didn’t), which meant that Wilson had one viable target—a downfield specialist not a possession receiver, covered by a specialist corner, running an inside slant (possibly the riskiest possible route in that situation). And all this from the shotgun, meaning there was no worry about a run. Carroll and Bevell knew all this before the snap, but they still chose to run that play. I think they must have known they’d been out-thought, but didn’t want to call a timeout there, and so went ahead anyway.
Suppose Seattle had done the kind of thing teams normally do when they pass from the 1-yard-line—come out showing run, then run a play-action, say with Wilson rolling out, with one tight end and one receiver to look for plus the chance of running it in himself, plus the easy option of throwing the ball away. Then 538′s analysis would make sense. But that’s not at all what happened. 538 doesn’t mention the passing numbers in that situation from shotgun formation. It’s like putting your money in penny stocks, and then defending your decision with the generic claim that equities are a good investment.
I see. I thought that you meant context as in Seattle/NE but it seems that you mean the formation and stuff. I think that what you’re saying makes sense now.
Personally I’d give more weight to:
The threat of running it from the shotgun.
The chances that a SEA receiver gets open vs. that goal line defense.
… and so I still don’t think it’s an awful decision. I think Wilson should have understood the situation and only made a really safe throw, and so the play call wasn’t that risky. But I do agree with you that play action would have been better, especially with a roll out.
The 538 article is exactly the kind of context-free argument that justly gives ‘statistics’ and ‘rationalism’ a bad name. Yes, in game-theoretic terms you want to pass a certain amount of the time. Yes, there is a good argument for calling pass on that specific down. But the issue is not whether ‘pass’ in the abstract was a good decision, but whether the specific play-calling actions in their particular context were good. And they were not. They were indefensible.
Firstly, Seattle went out in a 3 WR group, thinking that this would get New England out of goal-line defense (and thus make it easier for the run play). This didn’t work, and they were foolish to think it would. This put Seattle in an awkward position where they would either have to run without enough blockers, or put the ball in the hands of poor players.
Secondly, Seattle ran the play out of the shotgun, making clear their intention to pass. There was no play-action or roll-out. This gives up all the game-theoretic part. If you are going to inform the opponent of your choice, you need to go with your strongest possible choice, whereas...
Thirdly, Seattle ignored their most favourable matchup. Seattle were the second-best offense in power-rushing playing the worst defense in stopping power runs. And instead...
Fourthly, Seattle went with a very unfavourable matchup in very unfavourable circumstances. They asked a receiver known for his downfield speed (and not much else) to fight for the ball on the goal-line. With the centre of the field cluttered, and all the defenders short, they called a quick slant into the centre of the field.
Yes, that play normally doesn’t result in an interception. Yes, there’s an element of bad luck there. But it’s also an example of really poor decision-making that ended up with Seattle essentially running the play New England would have chosen for them. They screwed up, and it’s embarrassing seeing the lengths people go to to defend the indefensible.
I would recommend this article highly for more depth.
Are you sure? That sounds exaggerated. It definitely wasn’t context-free. Some examples:
“Let’s spot the Pats some yards, then, and assume the Patriots win1 about as often as a typical team in the AFA model would2 if they started on the 40-yard line. That would give them a 14 percent chance. Maybe that’s generous, but we’re looking for an upper bound.”
“But the Seahawks don’t have an average rusher; they have Beast Mode...”
An awkward position? They couldn’t have ran on all three plays and if you have to have a pass play, 3 WR against a goal line defense is a good place to use your passing play.
None of which consider the specific pass play that they chose to run, nor the specifics of the personnel matchup.
In a vacuum, it could be a good place! But in the specific context it wasn’t, because New England still easily overmatched the Seattle receivers. Neither Baldwin or Kearse was ever going to get open against that coverage (and they didn’t), which meant that Wilson had one viable target—a downfield specialist not a possession receiver, covered by a specialist corner, running an inside slant (possibly the riskiest possible route in that situation). And all this from the shotgun, meaning there was no worry about a run. Carroll and Bevell knew all this before the snap, but they still chose to run that play. I think they must have known they’d been out-thought, but didn’t want to call a timeout there, and so went ahead anyway.
Suppose Seattle had done the kind of thing teams normally do when they pass from the 1-yard-line—come out showing run, then run a play-action, say with Wilson rolling out, with one tight end and one receiver to look for plus the chance of running it in himself, plus the easy option of throwing the ball away. Then 538′s analysis would make sense. But that’s not at all what happened. 538 doesn’t mention the passing numbers in that situation from shotgun formation. It’s like putting your money in penny stocks, and then defending your decision with the generic claim that equities are a good investment.
I see. I thought that you meant context as in Seattle/NE but it seems that you mean the formation and stuff. I think that what you’re saying makes sense now.
Personally I’d give more weight to:
The threat of running it from the shotgun.
The chances that a SEA receiver gets open vs. that goal line defense.
… and so I still don’t think it’s an awful decision. I think Wilson should have understood the situation and only made a really safe throw, and so the play call wasn’t that risky. But I do agree with you that play action would have been better, especially with a roll out.