I would suggest that the Categorical Imperative has been considered at some length by many, if not all members of Less Wrong, but doesn’t have much currency because in general nobody here is particularly impressed with it. That is, they don’t think that it either improves upon or accurately describes our native morality.
If you think that people on Less Wrong ought to take it seriously, demonstrating that it does one of those would be the way to go.
I was deliberately not playing along with your framing that the CI is wrong by default unless elaborately defended.
I would suggest that the Categorical Imperative has been considered at some length by many, if not all members of Less Wrong, but doesn’t have much currency because in general nobody here is particularly impressed with it.
I see no evidence of that. If it had been considered at length: if it had been people would be able to understand it (you keep complaining that you do not), and they would be able to write relevant critiques that address what it is actually about.
If you think that people on Less Wrong ought to take it seriously, demonstrating that it does one of those would be the way to go.
Again, I don’t have to put forward a steelmanned version of a theory to demonstrate that it should not be lightly dismissed. That is a false dichotomy.
I’m not complaining that I don’t understand it, I’m complaining that your explanations do not make sense to me. Your formulation seems to differ substantially from Kant’s (for instance, the blanket impermissibility of stealing was a case he was sufficiently confident in to use as an example, whereas you do not seem attached to that principle.)
You haven’t explained anything solid enough to make a substantial case that it should not be lightly dismissed; continuing to engage at all is more a bad habit of mine than a sign that you’re presenting something of sufficient use to merit feedback. If you’re not going to bother explaining anything with sufficient clarity to demonstrate both crucially that you have a genuinely coherent idea of what you yourself are talking about, and that it is something that we should take seriously, I am going to resolve not to engage any further as I should have done well before now.
I’m not complaining that I don’t understand it, I’m complaining that your explanations do not make sense to me.
If you understand, why do you need me to explain?
for instance, the blanket impermissibility of stealing was a case he was sufficiently confident in to use as an example, whereas you do not seem attached to that principle
I have no idea what you are referring to.
You haven’t explained anything solid enough to make a substantial case that it should not be lightly dismissed;
Because I think you don’t have a coherent idea of what you’re talking about, and if you tried to formulate it rigorously you’d either have to develop one, or realize that you don’t know how to express what you’re proposing as a workable system. Explaining things to others is how we solidify or confirm our own understanding, and if you resist taking that step, you should not be assured of your own understanding.
Now you know why I was bothering to participate in the first place, and it is time, unless you’re prepared to actually take that step, for me to stop.
Why should I repeat what is in the literature on the CI, instead of you reading it? It is clear from your other comments that you don’t in fact understand it. It is not as if you had read some encyclopedia article and said “I don’t get this bit”—a perfectly ordinary kind and level of misunderstanding. Instead, you have tried to shoe-horn it into some weird computing-programming metaphor which is entirely inappropriate.It is that layer of “let’s translate this into some entirely different discipline” that is is causing the problem for you and others.
Okay, I’m being really bad here, and I encourage anyone who’s following along to downvote me for my failure to disengage, but I might as well explain myself here to a point where you actually know what you’re arguing with.
I have already read Kant, and I wasn’t impressed; some intelligent people take the CI seriously, most, including most philosophers, do not. I think Kant was trying too hard to find ways he could get his formulation to seem like it worked, and not looking hard enough for ways he could get it to break down, and failed to grasp that he had insufficiently specified his core concepts in order to create a useful system (and also that he failed to prove that objective morality enters into the system on any level, but more or less took it for granted.)
I don’t particularly expect you to agree that piecewise rules like the ones I described qualify as “universal,” but I don’t think you or Kant have sufficiently specified the concept of “universal,” such that one can rigorously state what does or does not qualify, and I think that by trying to so specify, for an audience prepared to point out failures of rigor in the formulation, would lead you to the conclusion that it’s much, much harder to develop a moral framework which is rigorous and satisfying and coherent than you or Kant have made it out to be.
I think that the Categorical Imperative fails to describe our intuitive sense of morality (I can offer explanations as to why if you wish, but I would be much more amenable to doing so if you would actually offer explanations for your positions when asked, rather than claiming it’s not your responsibility to do so,) fails to offer improvements of desirability over our intuitive morality on a society that runs on it from behind a veil of ignorance, and that there is not sound reason to think that it is somehow, in spite of these things, a True Objective Description of Morality, and absent such reason we should assume, as with any other hypothetical framework lacking such reason, that it’s not.
You may try to change my mind, but hopefully you will now have a better understanding of what it would take to do so, and why admonishments to go read the original literature are not going to further engage my interest.
I have already read Kant, and I wasn’t impressed; some intelligent people take the CI seriously, most, including most philosophers, do not.
Could that have been based on misunderstanding on your part?
he failed to prove that objective morality enters into the system on any level, but more or less took it for granted.
Was he supposed to prove that? Some think he is a constructivist.
I don’t think you or Kant have sufficiently specified the concept of “universal,” such that one can rigorously state what does or does not qualify,
I don;’t think he did either, and I don’t think that’s a good reason to give such trivial counterexamples. All the stuff you like started out non-rigourous as well.
I think that the Categorical Imperative fails to describe our intuitive sense of morality
And physics fails to describe folk-physics.
The problem is that you are rejecting one theory for being non-rigourous whilst tacitly accepting others that are also non-rigourous. Yoru intuitions being an extreme example.
Could that have been based on misunderstanding on your part?
Yes, but I don’t think I have more reason to believe so now than I did when this conversation began; I would need input of a rather different sort to start taking it more seriously.
Was he supposed to prove that? Some think he is a constructivist.
He made it rather clear that he intended to, although if you wish to offer your own explanation as to why I should believe otherwise, you are free to do so; referring me back to the original text is naturally not going to help here.
If you’re planning to refer me to some other philosopher offering a critique on him, I’d appreciate an explanation of why I should take this philosopher’s position seriously; as I’ve already said, I was unimpressed with Kant, and for that matter, with most philosophers whose work I’ve read (in college, I started out with a double major in philosophy, but eventually dropped it because it required me to spend so much time on philosophers whose work I felt didn’t deserve it, so I’m very much not predisposed to spring into more philosophers’ work without good information to narrow down someone I’m likely to find worth taking seriously.)
I don;’t think he did either, and I don’t think that’s a good reason to give such trivial counterexamples. All the stuff you like started out non-rigourous as well.
What stuff do you think I like? The reason I was giving “trivial counterexamples” was to try and encourage you to offer a formulation that would make it clear what should or should not qualify as a counterexample. I don’t think the problem with the Categorical Imperative is that there are clear examples where it’s wrong, so much as I think that it’s not formulated clearly enough that one could even say whether something qualifies as a counterexample or not.
And physics fails to describe folk-physics.
The problem is that you are rejecting one theory for being non-rigourous whilst tacitly accepting others that are also non-rigourous. Yoru intuitions being an extreme example.
I don’t accept my moral intuitions as an acceptable moral framework. What do you think it is that I tacitly accept which is not rigorous?
If the distinction between physics and folk physics is that the former is an objective description of reality while the latter is a rough intuitive approximation of it, what reason do we have to suspect that the distinction between the Categorical Imperative and intuitive morality is in any way analogous to this?
The reason I was giving “trivial counterexamples” was to try and encourage you to offer a formulation that would make it clear what should or should not qualify as a counterexample.
Makes it clear to whom? The points you are missing are so basic, it can only be that you don’t want to understand.
I don’t think the problem with the Categorical Imperative is that there are clear examples where it’s wrong, so much as I think that it’s not formulated clearly enough that one could even say whether something qualifies as a counterexample or not.
Would you accept a law—an actual legal law—that exempts a named individual for no particular reason, as being a fair and just law? Come on, this is just common-sense reasoning.
Would you accept a law—an actual legal law—that exempts a named individual for no particular reason, as being a fair and just law? Come on, this is just common-sense reasoning.
If it’s “just common sense reasoning,” then your common sense is doing all the work, which is awfully unhelpful when you run into an agent whose common sense says differently.
Let’s say I think it would be a good law. Can you explain to me why I should think otherwise, while tabooing “fair” and “common sense?”
People have been falling back on “common sense” for thousands of years, and it made for lousy science and lousy philosophy. It’s when we can deconstruct our intuitions that we start to make progress.
ETA: Since you’ve not been inclined to actually follow along and offer arguments for your positions so far, I’ll make it clear that this is not a position I’m putting forward out of sheer contrarianism, I have an actual moral philosophy in mind which has been propounded by real people, under which I think that such a law could be a positive good.
Let’s say I think it would be a good law. Can you explain to me why I should think otherwise, while tabooing “fair” and “common sense?”
I’ll take a crack at this.
Laws are essentially code that gets executed by an enforcement and judicial system. Each particular law/statute is a module or subroutine within that code; its implementation will have consequences for the implementation of other modules / subroutines within that system.
So, let’s say we insert a specific exception into our legal system for a particular person. Which person? Why that person, rather than another? Why only one person?
Projecting myself into the mindset of someone who wants a specific exception for themselves, let’s go with the simplest answers first:
“Me. Because I’m that person. Because I don’t want competition.”
Now, remember that laws are just code; they still have to be executed by the people who make up the enforcement and judicial systems of the society they’re passed for. What’s in it for those people, to enforce your law?
If you can provide an incentive for people to make a privileged exception for you, then you de facto have your own law, even if it isn’t on the books. If you CAN’T provide such an incentive, then you de facto don’t have your own law, even if you DO get it written into the law books.
Now, without any “particular reason”, why would people adopt and execute such a law?
If there IS such a reason—say, the privileged entity has a private army, or mind-control lasers, or wild popular support—then the actual law isn’t “Such-and-such entity is privileged”, even if that’s what’s written in the law books. The ACTUAL law is “Any entity with a private army larger than the state can comfortably disarm is privileged”, or “any entity with mind-control lasers is privileged”, or “any entity with too much popular support is privileged”, all of which are circumstances that might change. And the moment they do, the reality will change, regardless of what laws might be on the books.
It’s really the same with personal ethics. When you say, “I should steal and people shouldn’t punish me for it, even though most people should be punished for stealing”, you’re actually (at least partially) encoding “I think I can get away with stealing”. Most primate psychology has rather specific conditions for when that belief is true or not.
If I want to increase the chance that “I can get away with stealing” is true, setting a categorical law of “If Brent Dill, then cheat, otherwise don’t cheat” won’t actually help me Win nearly as much as wild popular support, or a personal army, or mind control lasers would.
And no, I am not bypassing the original question of “should I have such a law?”—I’m distilling it down, while tabooing “fair” and “common sense”, to the only thing that’s left—“can I get away with having such a law?”
The ACTUAL law is “Any entity with a private army larger than the state can comfortably disarm is privileged”,
Which explain, albeit in a weird and disturbing way, the principle at work. There is a difference between having universal (fair, impartial) laws for multiple reference classes, and laws that apply to a reference class, but make exceptions. There is a difference between “minors should have different laws” and “the law shouldn’t apply to me”. The difference is that reference classes are defined by shared properties—which can rationally justify the use of different rules—but individuals aren’t. What’s is it about mean that means I can be allowed to steal?
This is a familiar idea. For instance, in physics, we expect different laws to apply to, eg, charged and uncharged particles. But we don’t expect electron #34568239 to follow some special laws of its own.
The difference is that reference classes are defined by shared properties—which can rationally justify the use of different rules—but individuals aren’t.
I’m pretty sure I can define a set of properties which specifies a particular individual.
What’s is it about [me] that means I can be allowed to steal?
That you’re in a class and the class is a class for which the rule spits out “is allowed to steal”.
It may not be rule that you expect the CI to apply to, but it’s certainly a rule.
What you’re doing is adding extra qualifications which define good rules and bad rules. The “shared property” one doesn’t work well, but I’m sure that eventually you could come up with something which adequately describes what rules we should accept and what rules we shouldn’t.
The trouble with doing this is that your qualifications would be doing all the work of the Categorical Imperative—you’re not using the CI to distinguish between good and bad rules, you have a separate list that essentially does the same thing independently and the CI is just tacked on. The CI is about as useful as a store sign which says “Prices up to 50% off or more!”
I’m pretty sure I can define a set of properties which specifies a particular individual.
I think you will find that defining a set of properties that picks out only one individual, and always defines the same individual under any circumstances is extremely difficult.
What’s is it about [me] that means I can be allowed to steal?
That you’re in a class and the class is a class for which the rule spits out “is allowed to steal”.
And if I stop being in that class, or other people join it, there is nothing (relevantly) special about me. But that is not what you are supposed to be defending. You are supposed to be defending the claim that:
″ is allowed to steal”
is equivalent to
″ are allowed to steal”.
I say they are not because there is no rigid relationship between names and properties (and, therefore, class membership).
The trouble with doing this is that your qualifications would be doing all the work of the Categorical I
imperative—you’re not using the CI to distinguish between good and bad rules,
No, I can still say that rules that do not apply impartially to all members of a class are bad.
I say they are not because there is no rigid relationship between names and properties (and, therefore, class membership).
Being “the person named by ___” is itself a property.
I can still say that rules that do not apply impartially to all members of a class are bad.
Then you’re shoving all the nuance into your definitions of “impartially” or “class” (depending on what grounds you exclude the examples you want to exclude) and the CI itself still does nothing meaningful. Otherwise I could say that “people who are Jiro” is a class or that applying an algorithm that spits out a different result for different people is impartial.
Being “the person named by _” is itself a property.
What instrument do you use to detect it? Do an entitiy’s properties change when you rename it?
Then you’re shoving all the nuance into your definitions of “impartially” or “class” (depending on what grounds you exclude the examples you want to exclude) and the CI itself still does nothing meaningful.
If I expand out the CI in terms of “impartiality” and “class” it is doing something meaningful.
A property does not mean something that is (nontrivially) detectable by an instrument.
If I expand out the CI in terms of “impartiality” and “class” it is doing something meaningful.
No it’s not. It’s like saying you shouldn’t do bad things and claiming that that’s a useful moral principle. It isn’t one unless you define “bad things”, and then all the meaningful content is really in that, not in the original principle. Likewise for the CI. All its useful meaning is in the clarifications, not in the principle.
A property does not mean something that is (nontrivially) detectable by an instrument.
That’s a matter of opinion. IMO, the usual alternative, treating any predicate as a property, is a source of map-territory confusions.
No it’s not. It’s like saying you shouldn’t do bad things and claiming that that’s a useful moral principle. It isn’t one unless you define “bad things”, and then all the meaningful content is really in that, not in the original principle. Likewise for the CI.
Clearly that could apply to any other abstract term … so much for reductionism, physicalism, etc.
I can’t see how my appeals to common sense are worse than your appeals to intuition. And it is not a case of my defending the C I but of my explaining to you how to understand it. You can understand it by assuming it is saying something commonsensical. You keep trying to read it as though it is a rigorous specification of something arbitrary and unguessable , like an acontextual line of program code. It’s not rigorous, and that doesn’t matter because it’s non arbitrary and it is understandable in terms of non rigorous nations you already have.e
There’s some chance that Derstopa is mistaken about absolutely anything. What evidence do you have to persuade Derstopa is misunderstanding the categorical imperative?
I think it is a feasible approach which is part of a family of arguments which have never been properly considered on LW.
That doesn’t answer my question.
I would suggest that the Categorical Imperative has been considered at some length by many, if not all members of Less Wrong, but doesn’t have much currency because in general nobody here is particularly impressed with it. That is, they don’t think that it either improves upon or accurately describes our native morality.
If you think that people on Less Wrong ought to take it seriously, demonstrating that it does one of those would be the way to go.
I was deliberately not playing along with your framing that the CI is wrong by default unless elaborately defended.
I see no evidence of that. If it had been considered at length: if it had been people would be able to understand it (you keep complaining that you do not), and they would be able to write relevant critiques that address what it is actually about.
Again, I don’t have to put forward a steelmanned version of a theory to demonstrate that it should not be lightly dismissed. That is a false dichotomy.
I’m not complaining that I don’t understand it, I’m complaining that your explanations do not make sense to me. Your formulation seems to differ substantially from Kant’s (for instance, the blanket impermissibility of stealing was a case he was sufficiently confident in to use as an example, whereas you do not seem attached to that principle.)
You haven’t explained anything solid enough to make a substantial case that it should not be lightly dismissed; continuing to engage at all is more a bad habit of mine than a sign that you’re presenting something of sufficient use to merit feedback. If you’re not going to bother explaining anything with sufficient clarity to demonstrate both crucially that you have a genuinely coherent idea of what you yourself are talking about, and that it is something that we should take seriously, I am going to resolve not to engage any further as I should have done well before now.
If you understand, why do you need me to explain?
I have no idea what you are referring to.
Again: that is not the default.
Because I think you don’t have a coherent idea of what you’re talking about, and if you tried to formulate it rigorously you’d either have to develop one, or realize that you don’t know how to express what you’re proposing as a workable system. Explaining things to others is how we solidify or confirm our own understanding, and if you resist taking that step, you should not be assured of your own understanding.
Now you know why I was bothering to participate in the first place, and it is time, unless you’re prepared to actually take that step, for me to stop.
Why should I repeat what is in the literature on the CI, instead of you reading it? It is clear from your other comments that you don’t in fact understand it. It is not as if you had read some encyclopedia article and said “I don’t get this bit”—a perfectly ordinary kind and level of misunderstanding. Instead, you have tried to shoe-horn it into some weird computing-programming metaphor which is entirely inappropriate.It is that layer of “let’s translate this into some entirely different discipline” that is is causing the problem for you and others.
Okay, I’m being really bad here, and I encourage anyone who’s following along to downvote me for my failure to disengage, but I might as well explain myself here to a point where you actually know what you’re arguing with.
I have already read Kant, and I wasn’t impressed; some intelligent people take the CI seriously, most, including most philosophers, do not. I think Kant was trying too hard to find ways he could get his formulation to seem like it worked, and not looking hard enough for ways he could get it to break down, and failed to grasp that he had insufficiently specified his core concepts in order to create a useful system (and also that he failed to prove that objective morality enters into the system on any level, but more or less took it for granted.)
I don’t particularly expect you to agree that piecewise rules like the ones I described qualify as “universal,” but I don’t think you or Kant have sufficiently specified the concept of “universal,” such that one can rigorously state what does or does not qualify, and I think that by trying to so specify, for an audience prepared to point out failures of rigor in the formulation, would lead you to the conclusion that it’s much, much harder to develop a moral framework which is rigorous and satisfying and coherent than you or Kant have made it out to be.
I think that the Categorical Imperative fails to describe our intuitive sense of morality (I can offer explanations as to why if you wish, but I would be much more amenable to doing so if you would actually offer explanations for your positions when asked, rather than claiming it’s not your responsibility to do so,) fails to offer improvements of desirability over our intuitive morality on a society that runs on it from behind a veil of ignorance, and that there is not sound reason to think that it is somehow, in spite of these things, a True Objective Description of Morality, and absent such reason we should assume, as with any other hypothetical framework lacking such reason, that it’s not.
You may try to change my mind, but hopefully you will now have a better understanding of what it would take to do so, and why admonishments to go read the original literature are not going to further engage my interest.
Could that have been based on misunderstanding on your part?
Was he supposed to prove that? Some think he is a constructivist.
I don;’t think he did either, and I don’t think that’s a good reason to give such trivial counterexamples. All the stuff you like started out non-rigourous as well.
And physics fails to describe folk-physics.
The problem is that you are rejecting one theory for being non-rigourous whilst tacitly accepting others that are also non-rigourous. Yoru intuitions being an extreme example.
Yes, but I don’t think I have more reason to believe so now than I did when this conversation began; I would need input of a rather different sort to start taking it more seriously.
He made it rather clear that he intended to, although if you wish to offer your own explanation as to why I should believe otherwise, you are free to do so; referring me back to the original text is naturally not going to help here.
If you’re planning to refer me to some other philosopher offering a critique on him, I’d appreciate an explanation of why I should take this philosopher’s position seriously; as I’ve already said, I was unimpressed with Kant, and for that matter, with most philosophers whose work I’ve read (in college, I started out with a double major in philosophy, but eventually dropped it because it required me to spend so much time on philosophers whose work I felt didn’t deserve it, so I’m very much not predisposed to spring into more philosophers’ work without good information to narrow down someone I’m likely to find worth taking seriously.)
What stuff do you think I like? The reason I was giving “trivial counterexamples” was to try and encourage you to offer a formulation that would make it clear what should or should not qualify as a counterexample. I don’t think the problem with the Categorical Imperative is that there are clear examples where it’s wrong, so much as I think that it’s not formulated clearly enough that one could even say whether something qualifies as a counterexample or not.
I don’t accept my moral intuitions as an acceptable moral framework. What do you think it is that I tacitly accept which is not rigorous?
If the distinction between physics and folk physics is that the former is an objective description of reality while the latter is a rough intuitive approximation of it, what reason do we have to suspect that the distinction between the Categorical Imperative and intuitive morality is in any way analogous to this?
Everyone likes soemething.
Makes it clear to whom? The points you are missing are so basic, it can only be that you don’t want to understand.
Would you accept a law—an actual legal law—that exempts a named individual for no particular reason, as being a fair and just law? Come on, this is just common-sense reasoning.
If it’s “just common sense reasoning,” then your common sense is doing all the work, which is awfully unhelpful when you run into an agent whose common sense says differently.
Let’s say I think it would be a good law. Can you explain to me why I should think otherwise, while tabooing “fair” and “common sense?”
People have been falling back on “common sense” for thousands of years, and it made for lousy science and lousy philosophy. It’s when we can deconstruct our intuitions that we start to make progress.
ETA: Since you’ve not been inclined to actually follow along and offer arguments for your positions so far, I’ll make it clear that this is not a position I’m putting forward out of sheer contrarianism, I have an actual moral philosophy in mind which has been propounded by real people, under which I think that such a law could be a positive good.
I’ll take a crack at this.
Laws are essentially code that gets executed by an enforcement and judicial system. Each particular law/statute is a module or subroutine within that code; its implementation will have consequences for the implementation of other modules / subroutines within that system.
So, let’s say we insert a specific exception into our legal system for a particular person. Which person? Why that person, rather than another? Why only one person?
Projecting myself into the mindset of someone who wants a specific exception for themselves, let’s go with the simplest answers first:
“Me. Because I’m that person. Because I don’t want competition.”
Now, remember that laws are just code; they still have to be executed by the people who make up the enforcement and judicial systems of the society they’re passed for. What’s in it for those people, to enforce your law?
If you can provide an incentive for people to make a privileged exception for you, then you de facto have your own law, even if it isn’t on the books. If you CAN’T provide such an incentive, then you de facto don’t have your own law, even if you DO get it written into the law books.
Now, without any “particular reason”, why would people adopt and execute such a law?
If there IS such a reason—say, the privileged entity has a private army, or mind-control lasers, or wild popular support—then the actual law isn’t “Such-and-such entity is privileged”, even if that’s what’s written in the law books. The ACTUAL law is “Any entity with a private army larger than the state can comfortably disarm is privileged”, or “any entity with mind-control lasers is privileged”, or “any entity with too much popular support is privileged”, all of which are circumstances that might change. And the moment they do, the reality will change, regardless of what laws might be on the books.
It’s really the same with personal ethics. When you say, “I should steal and people shouldn’t punish me for it, even though most people should be punished for stealing”, you’re actually (at least partially) encoding “I think I can get away with stealing”. Most primate psychology has rather specific conditions for when that belief is true or not.
If I want to increase the chance that “I can get away with stealing” is true, setting a categorical law of “If Brent Dill, then cheat, otherwise don’t cheat” won’t actually help me Win nearly as much as wild popular support, or a personal army, or mind control lasers would.
And no, I am not bypassing the original question of “should I have such a law?”—I’m distilling it down, while tabooing “fair” and “common sense”, to the only thing that’s left—“can I get away with having such a law?”
Which explain, albeit in a weird and disturbing way, the principle at work. There is a difference between having universal (fair, impartial) laws for multiple reference classes, and laws that apply to a reference class, but make exceptions. There is a difference between “minors should have different laws” and “the law shouldn’t apply to me”. The difference is that reference classes are defined by shared properties—which can rationally justify the use of different rules—but individuals aren’t. What’s is it about mean that means I can be allowed to steal?
This is a familiar idea. For instance, in physics, we expect different laws to apply to, eg, charged and uncharged particles. But we don’t expect electron #34568239 to follow some special laws of its own.
I’m pretty sure I can define a set of properties which specifies a particular individual.
That you’re in a class and the class is a class for which the rule spits out “is allowed to steal”.
It may not be rule that you expect the CI to apply to, but it’s certainly a rule.
What you’re doing is adding extra qualifications which define good rules and bad rules. The “shared property” one doesn’t work well, but I’m sure that eventually you could come up with something which adequately describes what rules we should accept and what rules we shouldn’t.
The trouble with doing this is that your qualifications would be doing all the work of the Categorical Imperative—you’re not using the CI to distinguish between good and bad rules, you have a separate list that essentially does the same thing independently and the CI is just tacked on. The CI is about as useful as a store sign which says “Prices up to 50% off or more!”
I think you will find that defining a set of properties that picks out only one individual, and always defines the same individual under any circumstances is extremely difficult.
And if I stop being in that class, or other people join it, there is nothing (relevantly) special about me. But that is not what you are supposed to be defending. You are supposed to be defending the claim that:
″ is allowed to steal”
is equivalent to
″ are allowed to steal”.
I say they are not because there is no rigid relationship between names and properties (and, therefore, class membership).
No, I can still say that rules that do not apply impartially to all members of a class are bad.
Being “the person named by ___” is itself a property.
Then you’re shoving all the nuance into your definitions of “impartially” or “class” (depending on what grounds you exclude the examples you want to exclude) and the CI itself still does nothing meaningful. Otherwise I could say that “people who are Jiro” is a class or that applying an algorithm that spits out a different result for different people is impartial.
What instrument do you use to detect it? Do an entitiy’s properties change when you rename it?
If I expand out the CI in terms of “impartiality” and “class” it is doing something meaningful.
A property does not mean something that is (nontrivially) detectable by an instrument.
No it’s not. It’s like saying you shouldn’t do bad things and claiming that that’s a useful moral principle. It isn’t one unless you define “bad things”, and then all the meaningful content is really in that, not in the original principle. Likewise for the CI. All its useful meaning is in the clarifications, not in the principle.
That’s a matter of opinion. IMO, the usual alternative, treating any predicate as a property, is a source of map-territory confusions.
Clearly that could apply to any other abstract term … so much for reductionism, physicalism, etc.
I can’t see how my appeals to common sense are worse than your appeals to intuition. And it is not a case of my defending the C I but of my explaining to you how to understand it. You can understand it by assuming it is saying something commonsensical. You keep trying to read it as though it is a rigorous specification of something arbitrary and unguessable , like an acontextual line of program code. It’s not rigorous, and that doesn’t matter because it’s non arbitrary and it is understandable in terms of non rigorous nations you already have.e
There’s some chance that Derstopa is mistaken about absolutely anything. What evidence do you have to persuade Derstopa is misunderstanding the categorical imperative?