The ACTUAL law is “Any entity with a private army larger than the state can comfortably disarm is privileged”,
Which explain, albeit in a weird and disturbing way, the principle at work. There is a difference between having universal (fair, impartial) laws for multiple reference classes, and laws that apply to a reference class, but make exceptions. There is a difference between “minors should have different laws” and “the law shouldn’t apply to me”. The difference is that reference classes are defined by shared properties—which can rationally justify the use of different rules—but individuals aren’t. What’s is it about mean that means I can be allowed to steal?
This is a familiar idea. For instance, in physics, we expect different laws to apply to, eg, charged and uncharged particles. But we don’t expect electron #34568239 to follow some special laws of its own.
The difference is that reference classes are defined by shared properties—which can rationally justify the use of different rules—but individuals aren’t.
I’m pretty sure I can define a set of properties which specifies a particular individual.
What’s is it about [me] that means I can be allowed to steal?
That you’re in a class and the class is a class for which the rule spits out “is allowed to steal”.
It may not be rule that you expect the CI to apply to, but it’s certainly a rule.
What you’re doing is adding extra qualifications which define good rules and bad rules. The “shared property” one doesn’t work well, but I’m sure that eventually you could come up with something which adequately describes what rules we should accept and what rules we shouldn’t.
The trouble with doing this is that your qualifications would be doing all the work of the Categorical Imperative—you’re not using the CI to distinguish between good and bad rules, you have a separate list that essentially does the same thing independently and the CI is just tacked on. The CI is about as useful as a store sign which says “Prices up to 50% off or more!”
I’m pretty sure I can define a set of properties which specifies a particular individual.
I think you will find that defining a set of properties that picks out only one individual, and always defines the same individual under any circumstances is extremely difficult.
What’s is it about [me] that means I can be allowed to steal?
That you’re in a class and the class is a class for which the rule spits out “is allowed to steal”.
And if I stop being in that class, or other people join it, there is nothing (relevantly) special about me. But that is not what you are supposed to be defending. You are supposed to be defending the claim that:
″ is allowed to steal”
is equivalent to
″ are allowed to steal”.
I say they are not because there is no rigid relationship between names and properties (and, therefore, class membership).
The trouble with doing this is that your qualifications would be doing all the work of the Categorical I
imperative—you’re not using the CI to distinguish between good and bad rules,
No, I can still say that rules that do not apply impartially to all members of a class are bad.
I say they are not because there is no rigid relationship between names and properties (and, therefore, class membership).
Being “the person named by ___” is itself a property.
I can still say that rules that do not apply impartially to all members of a class are bad.
Then you’re shoving all the nuance into your definitions of “impartially” or “class” (depending on what grounds you exclude the examples you want to exclude) and the CI itself still does nothing meaningful. Otherwise I could say that “people who are Jiro” is a class or that applying an algorithm that spits out a different result for different people is impartial.
Being “the person named by _” is itself a property.
What instrument do you use to detect it? Do an entitiy’s properties change when you rename it?
Then you’re shoving all the nuance into your definitions of “impartially” or “class” (depending on what grounds you exclude the examples you want to exclude) and the CI itself still does nothing meaningful.
If I expand out the CI in terms of “impartiality” and “class” it is doing something meaningful.
A property does not mean something that is (nontrivially) detectable by an instrument.
If I expand out the CI in terms of “impartiality” and “class” it is doing something meaningful.
No it’s not. It’s like saying you shouldn’t do bad things and claiming that that’s a useful moral principle. It isn’t one unless you define “bad things”, and then all the meaningful content is really in that, not in the original principle. Likewise for the CI. All its useful meaning is in the clarifications, not in the principle.
A property does not mean something that is (nontrivially) detectable by an instrument.
That’s a matter of opinion. IMO, the usual alternative, treating any predicate as a property, is a source of map-territory confusions.
No it’s not. It’s like saying you shouldn’t do bad things and claiming that that’s a useful moral principle. It isn’t one unless you define “bad things”, and then all the meaningful content is really in that, not in the original principle. Likewise for the CI.
Clearly that could apply to any other abstract term … so much for reductionism, physicalism, etc.
Which explain, albeit in a weird and disturbing way, the principle at work. There is a difference between having universal (fair, impartial) laws for multiple reference classes, and laws that apply to a reference class, but make exceptions. There is a difference between “minors should have different laws” and “the law shouldn’t apply to me”. The difference is that reference classes are defined by shared properties—which can rationally justify the use of different rules—but individuals aren’t. What’s is it about mean that means I can be allowed to steal?
This is a familiar idea. For instance, in physics, we expect different laws to apply to, eg, charged and uncharged particles. But we don’t expect electron #34568239 to follow some special laws of its own.
I’m pretty sure I can define a set of properties which specifies a particular individual.
That you’re in a class and the class is a class for which the rule spits out “is allowed to steal”.
It may not be rule that you expect the CI to apply to, but it’s certainly a rule.
What you’re doing is adding extra qualifications which define good rules and bad rules. The “shared property” one doesn’t work well, but I’m sure that eventually you could come up with something which adequately describes what rules we should accept and what rules we shouldn’t.
The trouble with doing this is that your qualifications would be doing all the work of the Categorical Imperative—you’re not using the CI to distinguish between good and bad rules, you have a separate list that essentially does the same thing independently and the CI is just tacked on. The CI is about as useful as a store sign which says “Prices up to 50% off or more!”
I think you will find that defining a set of properties that picks out only one individual, and always defines the same individual under any circumstances is extremely difficult.
And if I stop being in that class, or other people join it, there is nothing (relevantly) special about me. But that is not what you are supposed to be defending. You are supposed to be defending the claim that:
″ is allowed to steal”
is equivalent to
″ are allowed to steal”.
I say they are not because there is no rigid relationship between names and properties (and, therefore, class membership).
No, I can still say that rules that do not apply impartially to all members of a class are bad.
Being “the person named by ___” is itself a property.
Then you’re shoving all the nuance into your definitions of “impartially” or “class” (depending on what grounds you exclude the examples you want to exclude) and the CI itself still does nothing meaningful. Otherwise I could say that “people who are Jiro” is a class or that applying an algorithm that spits out a different result for different people is impartial.
What instrument do you use to detect it? Do an entitiy’s properties change when you rename it?
If I expand out the CI in terms of “impartiality” and “class” it is doing something meaningful.
A property does not mean something that is (nontrivially) detectable by an instrument.
No it’s not. It’s like saying you shouldn’t do bad things and claiming that that’s a useful moral principle. It isn’t one unless you define “bad things”, and then all the meaningful content is really in that, not in the original principle. Likewise for the CI. All its useful meaning is in the clarifications, not in the principle.
That’s a matter of opinion. IMO, the usual alternative, treating any predicate as a property, is a source of map-territory confusions.
Clearly that could apply to any other abstract term … so much for reductionism, physicalism, etc.