I’m reading Benatar’s Better Never To Have Been and I noticed that the actual arguments for categorical antinatalism aren’t as strong as I thought and seem to hinge on either a pessimistic view of technological progress (which might well be justified) or confusions about identity and personhood. But I’m currently confused about the relevant philosophy, so I’m collecting the arguments and justifications, and will turn this basically into an antinatalism FAQ and reference. A lot of people seem to dismiss Benatar without actually reading him, so writing a more accurate overview of his and related arguments might help.
Of more questionable importance, I’m also finally writing an Early Christianity FAQ. I’m working through Price’s work on the New Testament and have a hard time keeping all the different characters and weird theories straight, so I’m writing an overview from a perspective of higher criticism. It seems to me that a lot of good insights in the field are too strongly compartmentalized, so just getting them all into one place should make things clearer. It’s mostly for my own use, though, and intended as supplement material for my own crackpot theories, but it’s a lot of fun.
I’m also writing/researching an introduction to Solomonoff Induction etc. and hope to get my first draft of a (German) student paper done by the end of the year. I’ll probably write a less formal (English) version at the same time. I can’t think without writing, so I basically get a rough draft for free and might as well clean it up a little. (However, I have abandoned overviews before once I understood everything and got bored, so yeah.)
(I’m also working on a student project about performance estimates of embedded systems, but I’m kinda tired of SystemC and wrestling with weird platforms. Should’ve stayed with that theology degree after all.)
I’m reading Benatar’s Better Never To Have Been and I noticed that the actual arguments for categorical antinatalism aren’t as strong as I thought and seem to hinge on either a pessimistic view of technological progress (which might well be justified)
I don’t think this is true. Benatar’s position is that any being that ever suffers is harmed by being created. This is not something that technological progress is very likely to relieve. Or are you thinking of some sort of wireheading?
I don’t think this is true. Benatar’s position is that any being that ever suffers is harmed by being created. This is not something that technological progress is very likely to relieve.
He has two main arguments. One is the asymmetry, which is the better one, but it has weird assumptions about personhood—reasonable views either seem to suggest immediate suicide (if there is no continuity of self and future person-moments are thus brought into existence, you are harming future-you by living) or need to rely on consent, but I see no reason why consent can’t be given without instantiating a person. (But I’m still confused about consent.)
The other argument is based on low expected value of any life. Specifically, he argues that life is much worse than commonly thought (plausible) and addresses why common approaches can’t justify the harm anyway. This relies on the assumption that the status quo will more-or-less continue. Justifiable, but unless he provides an argument to the contrary, transhumanists can still argue to you only need to engineer a world in which humans don’t suffer (or even can’t—the wireheading solution). If we all lived in a Post-Singularity Utopia, I’m sure his justifications for his specific comparison of harms and benefits would look much stranger to us.
One is the asymmetry, which is the better one, but it has weird assumptions about personhood—reasonable views either seem to suggest immediate suicide (if there is no continuity of self and future person-moments are thus brought into existence, you are harming future-you by living)
I’m not sure I remember his arguments relying on those assumptions in his asymmetry argument. Maybe he needs them to justify not committing suicide, but I thought the badness of suicide wasn’t central to his thesis.
I’m currently working on several FAQs/overviews.
I’m reading Benatar’s Better Never To Have Been and I noticed that the actual arguments for categorical antinatalism aren’t as strong as I thought and seem to hinge on either a pessimistic view of technological progress (which might well be justified) or confusions about identity and personhood. But I’m currently confused about the relevant philosophy, so I’m collecting the arguments and justifications, and will turn this basically into an antinatalism FAQ and reference. A lot of people seem to dismiss Benatar without actually reading him, so writing a more accurate overview of his and related arguments might help.
Of more questionable importance, I’m also finally writing an Early Christianity FAQ. I’m working through Price’s work on the New Testament and have a hard time keeping all the different characters and weird theories straight, so I’m writing an overview from a perspective of higher criticism. It seems to me that a lot of good insights in the field are too strongly compartmentalized, so just getting them all into one place should make things clearer. It’s mostly for my own use, though, and intended as supplement material for my own crackpot theories, but it’s a lot of fun.
I’m also writing/researching an introduction to Solomonoff Induction etc. and hope to get my first draft of a (German) student paper done by the end of the year. I’ll probably write a less formal (English) version at the same time. I can’t think without writing, so I basically get a rough draft for free and might as well clean it up a little. (However, I have abandoned overviews before once I understood everything and got bored, so yeah.)
(I’m also working on a student project about performance estimates of embedded systems, but I’m kinda tired of SystemC and wrestling with weird platforms. Should’ve stayed with that theology degree after all.)
I don’t think this is true. Benatar’s position is that any being that ever suffers is harmed by being created. This is not something that technological progress is very likely to relieve. Or are you thinking of some sort of wireheading?
That sounds like an interesting criticism.
He has two main arguments. One is the asymmetry, which is the better one, but it has weird assumptions about personhood—reasonable views either seem to suggest immediate suicide (if there is no continuity of self and future person-moments are thus brought into existence, you are harming future-you by living) or need to rely on consent, but I see no reason why consent can’t be given without instantiating a person. (But I’m still confused about consent.)
The other argument is based on low expected value of any life. Specifically, he argues that life is much worse than commonly thought (plausible) and addresses why common approaches can’t justify the harm anyway. This relies on the assumption that the status quo will more-or-less continue. Justifiable, but unless he provides an argument to the contrary, transhumanists can still argue to you only need to engineer a world in which humans don’t suffer (or even can’t—the wireheading solution). If we all lived in a Post-Singularity Utopia, I’m sure his justifications for his specific comparison of harms and benefits would look much stranger to us.
I’m not sure I remember his arguments relying on those assumptions in his asymmetry argument. Maybe he needs them to justify not committing suicide, but I thought the badness of suicide wasn’t central to his thesis.