I’m reading Benatar’s Better Never To Have Been and I noticed that the actual arguments for categorical antinatalism aren’t as strong as I thought and seem to hinge on either a pessimistic view of technological progress (which might well be justified)
I don’t think this is true. Benatar’s position is that any being that ever suffers is harmed by being created. This is not something that technological progress is very likely to relieve. Or are you thinking of some sort of wireheading?
I don’t think this is true. Benatar’s position is that any being that ever suffers is harmed by being created. This is not something that technological progress is very likely to relieve.
He has two main arguments. One is the asymmetry, which is the better one, but it has weird assumptions about personhood—reasonable views either seem to suggest immediate suicide (if there is no continuity of self and future person-moments are thus brought into existence, you are harming future-you by living) or need to rely on consent, but I see no reason why consent can’t be given without instantiating a person. (But I’m still confused about consent.)
The other argument is based on low expected value of any life. Specifically, he argues that life is much worse than commonly thought (plausible) and addresses why common approaches can’t justify the harm anyway. This relies on the assumption that the status quo will more-or-less continue. Justifiable, but unless he provides an argument to the contrary, transhumanists can still argue to you only need to engineer a world in which humans don’t suffer (or even can’t—the wireheading solution). If we all lived in a Post-Singularity Utopia, I’m sure his justifications for his specific comparison of harms and benefits would look much stranger to us.
One is the asymmetry, which is the better one, but it has weird assumptions about personhood—reasonable views either seem to suggest immediate suicide (if there is no continuity of self and future person-moments are thus brought into existence, you are harming future-you by living)
I’m not sure I remember his arguments relying on those assumptions in his asymmetry argument. Maybe he needs them to justify not committing suicide, but I thought the badness of suicide wasn’t central to his thesis.
I don’t think this is true. Benatar’s position is that any being that ever suffers is harmed by being created. This is not something that technological progress is very likely to relieve. Or are you thinking of some sort of wireheading?
That sounds like an interesting criticism.
He has two main arguments. One is the asymmetry, which is the better one, but it has weird assumptions about personhood—reasonable views either seem to suggest immediate suicide (if there is no continuity of self and future person-moments are thus brought into existence, you are harming future-you by living) or need to rely on consent, but I see no reason why consent can’t be given without instantiating a person. (But I’m still confused about consent.)
The other argument is based on low expected value of any life. Specifically, he argues that life is much worse than commonly thought (plausible) and addresses why common approaches can’t justify the harm anyway. This relies on the assumption that the status quo will more-or-less continue. Justifiable, but unless he provides an argument to the contrary, transhumanists can still argue to you only need to engineer a world in which humans don’t suffer (or even can’t—the wireheading solution). If we all lived in a Post-Singularity Utopia, I’m sure his justifications for his specific comparison of harms and benefits would look much stranger to us.
I’m not sure I remember his arguments relying on those assumptions in his asymmetry argument. Maybe he needs them to justify not committing suicide, but I thought the badness of suicide wasn’t central to his thesis.