Naive introspection is an epistemic process; it’s one kind of algorithm you can run to figure out aspects of the world, in this case your mind. Because it’s an epistemic process we know that there are many, many ways it can be suboptimal. (Cognitive biases come to mind, of course; Robin Hanson writes a lot about how naive introspection and actual reasons are very divergent. But sheer boundedness is also a consideration; we’re just not very good Bayesians.) Thus, when you say “one of your preferences, based on naive introspection, is not to have preferences that are based on naive introspection,” I think:
If my values are what I think they are, I desire to believe that my values are what I think they are; If my values aren’t what I think they are, I desire to believe that my values aren’t what I think they are; Let me not become attached to values that may not be.
Naive introspection is an epistemic process; it’s one kind of algorithm you can run to figure out aspects of the world, in this case your mind. Because it’s an epistemic process we know that there are many, many ways it can be suboptimal. (Cognitive biases come to mind, of course; Robin Hanson writes a lot about how naive introspection and actual reasons are very divergent. But sheer boundedness is also a consideration; we’re just not very good Bayesians.) Thus, when you say “one of your preferences, based on naive introspection, is not to have preferences that are based on naive introspection,” I think:
If my values are what I think they are,
I desire to believe that my values are what I think they are;
If my values aren’t what I think they are,
I desire to believe that my values aren’t what I think they are;
Let me not become attached to values that may not be.