a lot of implicit assumptions have seeped into our consciousness. The most important one (shared with many other dystopian novels) is that dictatorships are stable forms of government.
we should refrain from assuming that dictatorships, whether party or individual, are somehow the default state, and conduct a much more evidence-based analysis of the matter.
My comment is unrelated to Orwell, but it is related to the stability of real-world political regimes.
I recently read The Dictator’s Handbook, an excellent book which essentially is a popular account of the selectorate theory. Let me attempt a TL;DR, or rather a list of key points relevant to the current discussion, from memory:
Nobody rules alone. Stalins, Genghis Khans and Clintons need supporters to keep them in power.
The key imperative of a ruler is his political survival, that is, staying in power.
The ruler stays in power by rewarding his essential supporters (referred to as ‘essentials’), that is, people whose support translates into staying in power.
Regimes where the coalition of essentials is small are referred to as autocracies. Regimes with large coalitions of essentials are referred to as democracies. The authors prefer to use these two terms instead of the usual definitions such as monarchy, dictature, theocracy, kleptocracy etc.
In an autocracy, where the number of essentials is small, it’s cheaper for the ruler to purchase their support with private rewards (money, security, palaces, yachts, de-facto immunity from the law etc.)
In a democracy, where the number of essentials is large, it’s cheaper for the ruler to purchase their support via public goods (usually in the form of good governance and policies, such as healthcare, education, etc.)
Statistically, the political survival of a ruler (defined via the probability of being ousted in the next two-year period) in an autocracy is significantly higher than in a democracy. That is, an autocracy is statistically more stable than a democracy.
Purchasing a foreign policy concession (demanded as a public-good reward by the coalition of essentials of the democratic ruler) from an autocracy is cheaper than purchasing it from a democracy. This is an external factor that pushes regimes towards autocracies and away from democracies.
Successful revolutions in autocracies occur when the ruler cannot reliably provide his essentials with private rewards, or won’t be able to do so in the near future. When the essentials understand that their flow of private rewards may cease soon, they begin to shop around for other options and may “fail” to protect the ruler from a promising challenger or a revolution.
The most stable autocracies are those where the ruler doesn’t need people as a source of resources for rewarding his coalition of essentials. For example, when a ruler has oil he doesn’t need to extract taxes from the populace, which means he isn’t compelled to provide public goods and policies that increase tax income, which in turn means that he is free to suppress his people in order to minimize the chances of a successful revolution.
So, to answer the question posed in the original post, autocracies (including dictatorships) are indeed more stable than democracies, at least according to the selectorate theory.
As for the book itself, I found it excellent. Aside from being a fascinating, eye-opening read in general, its section on modern Russia is more spot-on than anything I read in our political press back when I still consumed political news—I correctly predicted its content before reading it!
Statistically, the political survival of a ruler (defined via the probability of being ousted in the next two-year period) in an autocracy is significantly higher than in a democracy. That is, an autocracy is statistically more stable than a democracy.
By ousted, do they mean a revolution? Or does that also include the normal election cycles?
They mean losing power, regardless of causes. This statistic is over all types of regimes, so it applies to both autocracies where there are no meaningful election cycles, and to democracies, where election cycles are meaningful by definition.
Statistically, the political survival of a ruler (defined via the probability of being ousted in the next two-year period) in an autocracy is significantly higher than in a democracy. That is, an autocracy is statistically more stable than a democracy.
The bolded part isn’t using the same meaning of “stable” as most comparisons of forms of government. Most people are usually concerned with the stability of government institutions as a whole (because they provide services like public order, support the economy, etc.). So while a western-style democracy may be less “stable” for the ruler, change of ruler is much less likely to screw the institutions, compared to places like North Korea, or pre-revolutionary Libya.
The most stable autocracies are those where the ruler doesn’t need people as a source of resources for rewarding his coalition of essentials. For example, when a ruler has oil he doesn’t need to extract taxes from the populace, which means he isn’t compelled to provide public goods and policies that increase tax income, which in turn means that he is free to suppress his people in order to minimize the chances of a successful revolution.
The bolded part looks really fishy—how does providing public goods increase income? (I mean, it might increase it as bit, but not as much as the expense of public goods).
A more plausible explanation (that fits better with the rest of what you wrote!) would be that extracting money from a large population requires a big organization, many parts of which may revolt (so they are “essentials”), whereas extracting money from some oil fields requires a much smaller group of essentials.
The bolded part looks really fishy—how does providing public goods increase income? (I mean, it might increase it as bit, but not as much as the expense of public goods).
I wish Google could search inside Kindle books, so I could quote the relevant examples. Two specific examples the authors talk about is roads and freedom of speech.
Edit: I found the part about the roads, but Amazon makes it impossible to copy/paste text from its books. However, the example about the roads is so good that I decided to post it via a screenshot: http://i.imgur.com/uBZHzqz.png?1
A more plausible explanation (that fits better with the rest of what you wrote!) would be that extracting money from a large population requires a big organization, many parts of which may revolt (so they are “essentials”), whereas extracting money from some oil fields requires a much smaller group of essentials.
With the exception of the revolt part, the authors explicitly acknowledge the above.
Your point about 7 seems exactly right, less sure about your objection to 10. Building roads, providing education and so on is probably a good investment.
My comment is unrelated to Orwell, but it is related to the stability of real-world political regimes.
I recently read The Dictator’s Handbook, an excellent book which essentially is a popular account of the selectorate theory. Let me attempt a TL;DR, or rather a list of key points relevant to the current discussion, from memory:
Nobody rules alone. Stalins, Genghis Khans and Clintons need supporters to keep them in power.
The key imperative of a ruler is his political survival, that is, staying in power.
The ruler stays in power by rewarding his essential supporters (referred to as ‘essentials’), that is, people whose support translates into staying in power.
Regimes where the coalition of essentials is small are referred to as autocracies. Regimes with large coalitions of essentials are referred to as democracies. The authors prefer to use these two terms instead of the usual definitions such as monarchy, dictature, theocracy, kleptocracy etc.
In an autocracy, where the number of essentials is small, it’s cheaper for the ruler to purchase their support with private rewards (money, security, palaces, yachts, de-facto immunity from the law etc.)
In a democracy, where the number of essentials is large, it’s cheaper for the ruler to purchase their support via public goods (usually in the form of good governance and policies, such as healthcare, education, etc.)
Statistically, the political survival of a ruler (defined via the probability of being ousted in the next two-year period) in an autocracy is significantly higher than in a democracy. That is, an autocracy is statistically more stable than a democracy.
Purchasing a foreign policy concession (demanded as a public-good reward by the coalition of essentials of the democratic ruler) from an autocracy is cheaper than purchasing it from a democracy. This is an external factor that pushes regimes towards autocracies and away from democracies.
Successful revolutions in autocracies occur when the ruler cannot reliably provide his essentials with private rewards, or won’t be able to do so in the near future. When the essentials understand that their flow of private rewards may cease soon, they begin to shop around for other options and may “fail” to protect the ruler from a promising challenger or a revolution.
The most stable autocracies are those where the ruler doesn’t need people as a source of resources for rewarding his coalition of essentials. For example, when a ruler has oil he doesn’t need to extract taxes from the populace, which means he isn’t compelled to provide public goods and policies that increase tax income, which in turn means that he is free to suppress his people in order to minimize the chances of a successful revolution.
So, to answer the question posed in the original post, autocracies (including dictatorships) are indeed more stable than democracies, at least according to the selectorate theory.
As for the book itself, I found it excellent. Aside from being a fascinating, eye-opening read in general, its section on modern Russia is more spot-on than anything I read in our political press back when I still consumed political news—I correctly predicted its content before reading it!
By ousted, do they mean a revolution? Or does that also include the normal election cycles?
They mean losing power, regardless of causes. This statistic is over all types of regimes, so it applies to both autocracies where there are no meaningful election cycles, and to democracies, where election cycles are meaningful by definition.
The bolded part isn’t using the same meaning of “stable” as most comparisons of forms of government. Most people are usually concerned with the stability of government institutions as a whole (because they provide services like public order, support the economy, etc.). So while a western-style democracy may be less “stable” for the ruler, change of ruler is much less likely to screw the institutions, compared to places like North Korea, or pre-revolutionary Libya.
The bolded part looks really fishy—how does providing public goods increase income? (I mean, it might increase it as bit, but not as much as the expense of public goods).
A more plausible explanation (that fits better with the rest of what you wrote!) would be that extracting money from a large population requires a big organization, many parts of which may revolt (so they are “essentials”), whereas extracting money from some oil fields requires a much smaller group of essentials.
I wish Google could search inside Kindle books, so I could quote the relevant examples. Two specific examples the authors talk about is roads and freedom of speech.
Edit: I found the part about the roads, but Amazon makes it impossible to copy/paste text from its books. However, the example about the roads is so good that I decided to post it via a screenshot: http://i.imgur.com/uBZHzqz.png?1
With the exception of the revolt part, the authors explicitly acknowledge the above.
Your point about 7 seems exactly right, less sure about your objection to 10. Building roads, providing education and so on is probably a good investment.