Inferring causality from a time-series of various economic variables is incoherent. There first needs to be a deductive understanding of what the causal relationships are between economic variables. That is what is meant by “first principles” here—perhaps the disagreement is semantic.
If I replace “economic variables” with “astronomy” what part of this sentence changes in implication? Why is this incoherent for some fields? The level of rigor cannot be the only difference: Physics and astronomy have become more rigorous over time, not by discussing first principles, even when moving from Aristotle to Medieval physics to Newtonian physics, but rather by adopting principles based on the empirical data. The same goes for the switch from Ptolemaic systems to Copernicus and then Kepler. It is the empirical data that matters, the apparent time-series of planetary and stellar motion.
Thus, the first principles analysis: What is an economy?
So that’s true, but until the late 1700s (essentially post Newton) no one had any capacity to do so (because no ideas anyone had connected the two at all in a useful way). Would this sort of claim then been valid in 1650?
Re the Q about rent-paying: Yes. You should rightly be skeptical now, but please read the Economics sub-section at Moldbuggery with an open mind. Or if you prefer, start with Rothbard’s ‘Man Economy and State’.
Economics—of all subjects—pays rent.
This doesn’t answer the question. Note that no one is arguing that economics doesn’t pay rent. The question was whether arguing over ’”what is an economy” pays rent or not.
I misunderstood the Q. In my opinion, yes. It is, I think, the intuitive way to get a sound (ie, based on sheer deductive coherence) grasp of the subject.
Well, in a sense every definition carries an implicit assertion that the described object corresponds to a cluster in thing space. See also 37 ways that words can be wrong.
Re Physics, please correct me as required but in the way I use the phrase “first principles” here, Physics does not have any first principles.
Yes it does. They’re just so implicit in our intuition about how the world works that we don’t notice them. For example, consider all the implicit assumptions necessary for statements like “these two sticks have the same length” to be meaningful.
If I replace “economic variables” with “astronomy” what part of this sentence changes in implication? Why is this incoherent for some fields? The level of rigor cannot be the only difference: Physics and astronomy have become more rigorous over time, not by discussing first principles, even when moving from Aristotle to Medieval physics to Newtonian physics, but rather by adopting principles based on the empirical data. The same goes for the switch from Ptolemaic systems to Copernicus and then Kepler. It is the empirical data that matters, the apparent time-series of planetary and stellar motion.
Does arguing over this definition pay any rent?
One can do controlled experiments in physics here on Earth and apply the results to astronomy.
So that’s true, but until the late 1700s (essentially post Newton) no one had any capacity to do so (because no ideas anyone had connected the two at all in a useful way). Would this sort of claim then been valid in 1650?
This doesn’t answer the question. Note that no one is arguing that economics doesn’t pay rent. The question was whether arguing over ’”what is an economy” pays rent or not.
So, can you explain how arguing over the definition of a word can ever pay rent?
Well, in a sense every definition carries an implicit assertion that the described object corresponds to a cluster in thing space. See also 37 ways that words can be wrong.
Yes it does. They’re just so implicit in our intuition about how the world works that we don’t notice them. For example, consider all the implicit assumptions necessary for statements like “these two sticks have the same length” to be meaningful.
So, why does physics have no such first principles but economics does?