CDT on Newcomb’s problem would, if possible, precommit to one-boxing as long as Omega’s prediction is based on observing the CDT agent after its commitment.
CDT in the marriage case would choose to leave once unhappy, absent specific precommitment.
So that exact mapping doesn’t work, but the problem does seem Newcomblike to me (like the transparent-boxes version, actually; which, I now realize, is like Kavka’s toxin puzzle without the vagueness of “intent”.) (ETA: assuming that Kate can reliably predict Joe, which I now see was the point under dispute to begin with.)
Would you care to share your reasoning? What is your mapping of strategies, and does it pass my sanity check? (EVT two-boxes on the transparent boxes variation.)
one-box ⇔ stay in marriage when unhappy two-box ⇔ leave marriage when unhappy precommit to one-boxing ⇔ precommit to staying in marriage
In both this problem and transparent-boxes Newcomb:
you don’t take the action under discussion (take boxes, leave or not) until you know whether you’ve won
if you would counterfactually take one of the choices if you were to win, you’ll lose
TDT and UDT win
CDT either precommits and wins or doesn’t and loses, as described in my previous comment
(I’m assuming that Kate can reliably predict Joe. I didn’t initially realize your objection might have more to do with that than the structure of the problem.)
CDT either precommits and wins or doesn’t and loses, as described in my previous comment
If Jack and Kate were already married it really would make no sense for Jack to not get a divorce just because Kate would have never married him had she suspected he would. CDT wins, here. The fact that CDT tells Jack to precommit now doesn’t make it Newcomblike. Precommiting is a rational strategy in lots of games that aren’t Newcomb like. The whole point of Newcomb is that even if you haven’t precommitted, CDT tells you the wrong thing to do once Omega shows up.
Even if that assumption is fair (since it obviously isn’t true I’m not sure why we would make it**) we’re still entering the scenario too early. It’s like being told Omega is going to offer you the boxes a year before he does. Jack now has the opportunity to precommit, but Omega doesn’t give you that chance.
** I’m sure glad my girlfriend isn’t a superintelligence that can predict my actions with perfect accuracy! Am I right guys?!
Point taken; the similarity is somewhat distant. (I made that assumption to show the problem’s broadly Newcomblike structure, since I wrongly read JGWeissman as saying that the problem never had Newcomblike structure. But as you say, there is another, more qualitative difference.)
(I’m assuming that Kate can reliably predict Joe. I didn’t initially realize your objection might have more to do with that than the structure of the problem.)
Yes, that is where my objection lies.
ETA: And the fact that in Newcomb’s problem, there is no opportunity after learning about the problem to precommit, the predictions of your behavior have already been made. So allowing precommitment in the marriage proposal problem sidesteps the problem that would be Newcomb like if Kate were a highly accurate predictor.
CDT on Newcomb’s problem would, if possible, precommit to one-boxing as long as Omega’s prediction is based on observing the CDT agent after its commitment.
CDT in the marriage case would choose to leave once unhappy, absent specific precommitment.
So that exact mapping doesn’t work, but the problem does seem Newcomblike to me (like the transparent-boxes version, actually; which, I now realize, is like Kavka’s toxin puzzle without the vagueness of “intent”.) (ETA: assuming that Kate can reliably predict Joe, which I now see was the point under dispute to begin with.)
Would you care to share your reasoning? What is your mapping of strategies, and does it pass my sanity check? (EVT two-boxes on the transparent boxes variation.)
one-box ⇔ stay in marriage when unhappy
two-box ⇔ leave marriage when unhappy
precommit to one-boxing ⇔ precommit to staying in marriage
In both this problem and transparent-boxes Newcomb:
you don’t take the action under discussion (take boxes, leave or not) until you know whether you’ve won
if you would counterfactually take one of the choices if you were to win, you’ll lose
TDT and UDT win
CDT either precommits and wins or doesn’t and loses, as described in my previous comment
(I’m assuming that Kate can reliably predict Joe. I didn’t initially realize your objection might have more to do with that than the structure of the problem.)
If Jack and Kate were already married it really would make no sense for Jack to not get a divorce just because Kate would have never married him had she suspected he would. CDT wins, here. The fact that CDT tells Jack to precommit now doesn’t make it Newcomblike. Precommiting is a rational strategy in lots of games that aren’t Newcomb like. The whole point of Newcomb is that even if you haven’t precommitted, CDT tells you the wrong thing to do once Omega shows up.
As I said, I assumed that Kate = Omega.
Even if that assumption is fair (since it obviously isn’t true I’m not sure why we would make it**) we’re still entering the scenario too early. It’s like being told Omega is going to offer you the boxes a year before he does. Jack now has the opportunity to precommit, but Omega doesn’t give you that chance.
** I’m sure glad my girlfriend isn’t a superintelligence that can predict my actions with perfect accuracy! Am I right guys?!
Point taken; the similarity is somewhat distant. (I made that assumption to show the problem’s broadly Newcomblike structure, since I wrongly read JGWeissman as saying that the problem never had Newcomblike structure. But as you say, there is another, more qualitative difference.)
Yes, that is where my objection lies.
ETA: And the fact that in Newcomb’s problem, there is no opportunity after learning about the problem to precommit, the predictions of your behavior have already been made. So allowing precommitment in the marriage proposal problem sidesteps the problem that would be Newcomb like if Kate were a highly accurate predictor.