I wonder if people here realize how anti-utilitarianism this quote is :-)
You seem to be implying that people here should care about things being anti-utilitarianism. They shouldn’t. Utilitarianism refers to a group of largely abhorrent and arbitrary value systems.
It is also contrary to virtually all consequentialist value systems of the kind actually held by people here or extrapolatable from humans. All consequentialist systems that match the quote’s criteria for not being ‘Fucked’ are abhorrent.
It is not. “Murder and children crying” here are not means to an end, they are consequences as well. Maybe not intended consequences, maybe side effects (“collateral damage”), but still consequences.
I see no self-contradiction in a consequentialist approach which just declares certain consequences (e.g. “murder and children crying”) be be unacceptable.
There is nothing about consequentialism which distinguishes means from ends. Anything that happens is an “end” of the series of actions which produced it, even if it is not a terminal step, even if it is not intended.
When wedrifid says that the quote is “anti-consequentialism”, they are saying that it refuses to weigh all of the consequences—including the good ones. The negativity of children made to cry does not obliterate the positivity of children prevented from crying, but rather must be weighed against it, to produce a sum which can be negative or positive.
To declare a consequence “unacceptable” is to say that you refuse to be consequentialist where that particular outcome is involved; you are saying that such a consequence crashes your computation of value, as if it were infinitely negative and demanded some other method of valuation, which did not use such finicky things as numbers.
But even if there is a value which is negative, and 3^^^3 times greater in magnitude than any other value, positive or negative, its negation will always be of equal and opposite value, allowing things to be weighed against each other once again. In this example, a murder might be worth −3^^^3 utilons—but preventing two murders by committing one results in a net sum of +3^^^3 utilons.
The only possible world in which one could reject every possible cause which ends in murder or children crying is one in which it is conveniently impossible for such a cause to lead to positive consequences which outweigh the negative ones. And frankly, the world we live in is not so convenient as to divide itself perfectly into positive and negative acts in such a way.
There is nothing about consequentialism which distinguishes means from ends.
Wikipedia: Consequentialism is the class of normative ethical theories holding that the consequences of one’s conduct are the ultimate basis for any judgment about the rightness of that conduct. … Consequentialism is usually distinguished from deontological ethics (or deontology), in that deontology derives the rightness or wrongness of one’s conduct from the character of the behaviour itself rather than the outcomes of the conduct.
The “character of the behaviour” is means.
To declare a consequence “unacceptable” is to say that you refuse to be consequentialist where that particular outcome is involved; you are saying that such a consequence crashes your computation of value
Consequentialism does not demand “computation of value”. It only says that what matters it outcomes, it does not require that the outcomes be comparable or summable. I don’t see that saying that certain outcomes are unacceptable, full stop (= have negative infinity value) contradicts consequentialism.
You have a point, there are means and ends. I was using the term “means” as synonymous with “methods used to achieve instrumental ends”, which I realize was vague and misleading. I suppose it would be better to say that consequentialism does not concern itself with means at all, and rather considers every outcome, including those which are the result of means, to be an end.
As for your other point, I’m afraid that I find it rather odd. Consequentialism does not need to be implemented as having implicitly summable values, much as rational assessment does not require the computation of exact probabilities, but any moral system must be able to implement comparisons of some kind. Even the simplest deontologies must be able to distinguish “good” from “bad” moral actions, even if all “good” actions are equal, and all “bad” actions likewise.
Without the ability to compare outcomes, there is no way to compare the goodness of choices and select a good plan of action, regardless of how one defines “good”. And if a given outcome has infinitely negative value, than its negation must have infinitely positive value—which means that the negation is just as desirable as the original outcome is undesirable.
I see no self-contradiction in a consequentialist approach which just declares certain consequences (e.g. “murder and children crying”) be be unacceptable.
Pardon me. I left off the technical qualifier for the sake of terseness. I have previously observed that all deontologial value systems can be emulated by (suitably contrived) consequentialist value systems and vice-versa so I certainly don’t intend to imply that it is impossible to construct a consequentialist morality implementing this particular injunction. Edited to fix.
It is also contrary to virtually all consequentialist value systems of the kind actually held by people here or extrapolatable from humans. All consequentialist systems that match this criteria are abhorrent.
Your point is perfectly valid, I think. Every action-guiding set of principles is ultimately all about consequences. Deontologies can be “consequentialized”, i.e. expressed only through a maximization (or minimization) rule of some goal-function, by a mere semantic transformation. The reason why this is rarely done is, I suspect, because people get confused by words, and perhaps also because consequentializing some deontologies makes it more obvious that the goals are arbitrary or silly.
The traditional distinction between consequentialism and non-consequentialism does not come down to the former only counting consequences—both do! The difference is rather about what sort of consequences count. Deontology also counts how consequences are brought about, that becomes part of the “consequences” that matter, part of whatever you’re trying to minimize. “Me murdering someone” gets a different weight than “someone else murdering someone”, which in turn gets a different weight from “letting someone else die through ‘natural causes’ when it could be easily prevented”.
And sometimes it gets even weirder, the doctrine of double effect for instance draws a morally significant line between a harmful consequence being necessary for the execution of your (well-intended) aim, or a “mere” foreseen—but still necessary(!) -- side-effect of it. So sometimes certain intentions, when acted upon, are flagged with negative value as well.
And as you note below, deontologies sometimes attribute infinite negative value to certain consequences.
You seem to be implying that people here should care about things being anti-utilitarianism. They shouldn’t. Utilitarianism refers to a group of largely abhorrent and arbitrary value systems.
It is also contrary to virtually all consequentialist value systems of the kind actually held by people here or extrapolatable from humans. All consequentialist systems that match the quote’s criteria for not being ‘Fucked’ are abhorrent.
It is not. “Murder and children crying” here are not means to an end, they are consequences as well. Maybe not intended consequences, maybe side effects (“collateral damage”), but still consequences.
I see no self-contradiction in a consequentialist approach which just declares certain consequences (e.g. “murder and children crying”) be be unacceptable.
There is nothing about consequentialism which distinguishes means from ends. Anything that happens is an “end” of the series of actions which produced it, even if it is not a terminal step, even if it is not intended.
When wedrifid says that the quote is “anti-consequentialism”, they are saying that it refuses to weigh all of the consequences—including the good ones. The negativity of children made to cry does not obliterate the positivity of children prevented from crying, but rather must be weighed against it, to produce a sum which can be negative or positive.
To declare a consequence “unacceptable” is to say that you refuse to be consequentialist where that particular outcome is involved; you are saying that such a consequence crashes your computation of value, as if it were infinitely negative and demanded some other method of valuation, which did not use such finicky things as numbers.
But even if there is a value which is negative, and 3^^^3 times greater in magnitude than any other value, positive or negative, its negation will always be of equal and opposite value, allowing things to be weighed against each other once again. In this example, a murder might be worth −3^^^3 utilons—but preventing two murders by committing one results in a net sum of +3^^^3 utilons.
The only possible world in which one could reject every possible cause which ends in murder or children crying is one in which it is conveniently impossible for such a cause to lead to positive consequences which outweigh the negative ones. And frankly, the world we live in is not so convenient as to divide itself perfectly into positive and negative acts in such a way.
Wikipedia: Consequentialism is the class of normative ethical theories holding that the consequences of one’s conduct are the ultimate basis for any judgment about the rightness of that conduct. … Consequentialism is usually distinguished from deontological ethics (or deontology), in that deontology derives the rightness or wrongness of one’s conduct from the character of the behaviour itself rather than the outcomes of the conduct.
The “character of the behaviour” is means.
Consequentialism does not demand “computation of value”. It only says that what matters it outcomes, it does not require that the outcomes be comparable or summable. I don’t see that saying that certain outcomes are unacceptable, full stop (= have negative infinity value) contradicts consequentialism.
You have a point, there are means and ends. I was using the term “means” as synonymous with “methods used to achieve instrumental ends”, which I realize was vague and misleading. I suppose it would be better to say that consequentialism does not concern itself with means at all, and rather considers every outcome, including those which are the result of means, to be an end.
As for your other point, I’m afraid that I find it rather odd. Consequentialism does not need to be implemented as having implicitly summable values, much as rational assessment does not require the computation of exact probabilities, but any moral system must be able to implement comparisons of some kind. Even the simplest deontologies must be able to distinguish “good” from “bad” moral actions, even if all “good” actions are equal, and all “bad” actions likewise.
Without the ability to compare outcomes, there is no way to compare the goodness of choices and select a good plan of action, regardless of how one defines “good”. And if a given outcome has infinitely negative value, than its negation must have infinitely positive value—which means that the negation is just as desirable as the original outcome is undesirable.
Pardon me. I left off the technical qualifier for the sake of terseness. I have previously observed that all deontologial value systems can be emulated by (suitably contrived) consequentialist value systems and vice-versa so I certainly don’t intend to imply that it is impossible to construct a consequentialist morality implementing this particular injunction. Edited to fix.
Your point is perfectly valid, I think. Every action-guiding set of principles is ultimately all about consequences. Deontologies can be “consequentialized”, i.e. expressed only through a maximization (or minimization) rule of some goal-function, by a mere semantic transformation. The reason why this is rarely done is, I suspect, because people get confused by words, and perhaps also because consequentializing some deontologies makes it more obvious that the goals are arbitrary or silly.
The traditional distinction between consequentialism and non-consequentialism does not come down to the former only counting consequences—both do! The difference is rather about what sort of consequences count. Deontology also counts how consequences are brought about, that becomes part of the “consequences” that matter, part of whatever you’re trying to minimize. “Me murdering someone” gets a different weight than “someone else murdering someone”, which in turn gets a different weight from “letting someone else die through ‘natural causes’ when it could be easily prevented”.
And sometimes it gets even weirder, the doctrine of double effect for instance draws a morally significant line between a harmful consequence being necessary for the execution of your (well-intended) aim, or a “mere” foreseen—but still necessary(!) -- side-effect of it. So sometimes certain intentions, when acted upon, are flagged with negative value as well.
And as you note below, deontologies sometimes attribute infinite negative value to certain consequences.