Note that I was speaking of “Bayesianism” as practiced on LW, not of Bayesian statistics the academic field. I do not believe these are the same.
I think that’s absurd if that’s what he really means. Just because we are not daily posting new research papers employing model-averaging or non-parametric Bayesian statistics does not mean that we do not think those techniques are useful and incorporated in our epistemology or that we would consider the standard answers correct, and this argument can be applied to any area of knowledge that LWers might draw upon or consider correct. If we criticize p-values as a form of building knowledge, is that not a part of ‘Bayesian epistemology’ because we are drawing arguments from Jaynes or Ioannidis and did not invent them ab initio?
‘Your physics can’t deal with modeling subatomic interactions, and so sadly your entire epistemology is erroneous.’ ‘??? There’s a huge and extremely successful area of physics devoted to that, and I have no freaking idea what you are talking about. Are you really as ignorant and superficial as you sound like, in listing as a weakness something which is actually a major strength of the physics viewpoint?’ ‘Oh, but I meant physics as practiced on LessWrong! Clearly that other physics is simply not relevant. Come back when LW has built its own LHC and replicated all the standard results in the field, and then I’ll admit that particle physics as practiced on LW is the same thing as particle physics the academic field, because otherwise I refuse to believe they can be the same.’
I think you’re not being charitable again. Consider the difference between physics as practiced by quantum woo mystics, and physics as practiced by physicists or even engineers. I think that simplicio is referring to a similar (though less striking) tendency for the representative LWer to quasi-religiously misapply and oversell probability theory (which may or may not be the case, but should be argued with something other than uncharitable ridicule).
I think you may be extrapolating much too far from the quote I posted. Also, my statistics level is well below both yours and Chapman’s so I am not a good interlocutor for you.
I think you may be extrapolating much too far from the quote I posted.
I don’t think I am. It’s a very simple quote: “here is a list of n items Bayesian statistics and hence epistemology cannot handle; therefore, it cannot be right.” And it’s dead wrong because all n items are handled just fine.
I think you are being uncharitable. The list was of different types of uncertainty that Bayesians treat as the same, with a side of skepticism that they should be handled the same, not things you can’t model with bayesian epistemology.
The question is not whether Bayes can handle those different types of uncertainty, it’s whether they should be handled by a unified probability theory.
I think the position that we shouldn’t (or don’t yet) have a unified uncertainty model is wrong, but I don’t think it’s so stupid as to be worth getting heated about and being uncivil.
I think the position that we shouldn’t (or don’t yet) have a unified uncertainty model is wrong
Did somebody solve the problem of logical uncertainty while I wasn’t looking?
but I don’t think it’s so stupid as to be worth getting heated about and being uncivil.
I disagree that Gwern is being uncivil. I don’t think Chapman has any ground to criticize LW-style epistemology when he’s made it abundantly clear he has no idea what it is supposed to be. (Indeed, that’s his principal criticism: the people he’s talked to about it tell him different things.)
It’d be like if Berkeley asked a bunch of Weierstrass’ first students about their “supposed” fix for infinitesimals. Because the students hadn’t completely grasped it yet, they gave Berkeley a rope, a rubber hose, and a burlap sack instead of giving him the elephant. Then Berkeley goes and writes a sequel to the Analyst disparaging this “new Calculus” for being incoherent.
In that world, I think Berkeley’s the one being uncivil.
Note that I was speaking of “Bayesianism” as practiced on LW, not of Bayesian statistics the academic field. I do not believe these are the same.
I believe Chapman is writing a more detailed critique of what he sees here; I will be sure to link you to it when it comes.
I think that’s absurd if that’s what he really means. Just because we are not daily posting new research papers employing model-averaging or non-parametric Bayesian statistics does not mean that we do not think those techniques are useful and incorporated in our epistemology or that we would consider the standard answers correct, and this argument can be applied to any area of knowledge that LWers might draw upon or consider correct. If we criticize p-values as a form of building knowledge, is that not a part of ‘Bayesian epistemology’ because we are drawing arguments from Jaynes or Ioannidis and did not invent them ab initio?
‘Your physics can’t deal with modeling subatomic interactions, and so sadly your entire epistemology is erroneous.’ ‘??? There’s a huge and extremely successful area of physics devoted to that, and I have no freaking idea what you are talking about. Are you really as ignorant and superficial as you sound like, in listing as a weakness something which is actually a major strength of the physics viewpoint?’ ‘Oh, but I meant physics as practiced on LessWrong! Clearly that other physics is simply not relevant. Come back when LW has built its own LHC and replicated all the standard results in the field, and then I’ll admit that particle physics as practiced on LW is the same thing as particle physics the academic field, because otherwise I refuse to believe they can be the same.’
I think you’re not being charitable again. Consider the difference between physics as practiced by quantum woo mystics, and physics as practiced by physicists or even engineers. I think that simplicio is referring to a similar (though less striking) tendency for the representative LWer to quasi-religiously misapply and oversell probability theory (which may or may not be the case, but should be argued with something other than uncharitable ridicule).
I think you may be extrapolating much too far from the quote I posted. Also, my statistics level is well below both yours and Chapman’s so I am not a good interlocutor for you.
I don’t think I am. It’s a very simple quote: “here is a list of n items Bayesian statistics and hence epistemology cannot handle; therefore, it cannot be right.” And it’s dead wrong because all n items are handled just fine.
I think you are being uncharitable. The list was of different types of uncertainty that Bayesians treat as the same, with a side of skepticism that they should be handled the same, not things you can’t model with bayesian epistemology.
The question is not whether Bayes can handle those different types of uncertainty, it’s whether they should be handled by a unified probability theory.
I think the position that we shouldn’t (or don’t yet) have a unified uncertainty model is wrong, but I don’t think it’s so stupid as to be worth getting heated about and being uncivil.
Did somebody solve the problem of logical uncertainty while I wasn’t looking?
I disagree that Gwern is being uncivil. I don’t think Chapman has any ground to criticize LW-style epistemology when he’s made it abundantly clear he has no idea what it is supposed to be. (Indeed, that’s his principal criticism: the people he’s talked to about it tell him different things.)
It’d be like if Berkeley asked a bunch of Weierstrass’ first students about their “supposed” fix for infinitesimals. Because the students hadn’t completely grasped it yet, they gave Berkeley a rope, a rubber hose, and a burlap sack instead of giving him the elephant. Then Berkeley goes and writes a sequel to the Analyst disparaging this “new Calculus” for being incoherent.
In that world, I think Berkeley’s the one being uncivil.