I think you are being uncharitable. The list was of different types of uncertainty that Bayesians treat as the same, with a side of skepticism that they should be handled the same, not things you can’t model with bayesian epistemology.
The question is not whether Bayes can handle those different types of uncertainty, it’s whether they should be handled by a unified probability theory.
I think the position that we shouldn’t (or don’t yet) have a unified uncertainty model is wrong, but I don’t think it’s so stupid as to be worth getting heated about and being uncivil.
I think the position that we shouldn’t (or don’t yet) have a unified uncertainty model is wrong
Did somebody solve the problem of logical uncertainty while I wasn’t looking?
but I don’t think it’s so stupid as to be worth getting heated about and being uncivil.
I disagree that Gwern is being uncivil. I don’t think Chapman has any ground to criticize LW-style epistemology when he’s made it abundantly clear he has no idea what it is supposed to be. (Indeed, that’s his principal criticism: the people he’s talked to about it tell him different things.)
It’d be like if Berkeley asked a bunch of Weierstrass’ first students about their “supposed” fix for infinitesimals. Because the students hadn’t completely grasped it yet, they gave Berkeley a rope, a rubber hose, and a burlap sack instead of giving him the elephant. Then Berkeley goes and writes a sequel to the Analyst disparaging this “new Calculus” for being incoherent.
In that world, I think Berkeley’s the one being uncivil.
I think you are being uncharitable. The list was of different types of uncertainty that Bayesians treat as the same, with a side of skepticism that they should be handled the same, not things you can’t model with bayesian epistemology.
The question is not whether Bayes can handle those different types of uncertainty, it’s whether they should be handled by a unified probability theory.
I think the position that we shouldn’t (or don’t yet) have a unified uncertainty model is wrong, but I don’t think it’s so stupid as to be worth getting heated about and being uncivil.
Did somebody solve the problem of logical uncertainty while I wasn’t looking?
I disagree that Gwern is being uncivil. I don’t think Chapman has any ground to criticize LW-style epistemology when he’s made it abundantly clear he has no idea what it is supposed to be. (Indeed, that’s his principal criticism: the people he’s talked to about it tell him different things.)
It’d be like if Berkeley asked a bunch of Weierstrass’ first students about their “supposed” fix for infinitesimals. Because the students hadn’t completely grasped it yet, they gave Berkeley a rope, a rubber hose, and a burlap sack instead of giving him the elephant. Then Berkeley goes and writes a sequel to the Analyst disparaging this “new Calculus” for being incoherent.
In that world, I think Berkeley’s the one being uncivil.