Well, you originally said ” violating them strongly feels like making an error. ” I said that “feels like” is a weak point. You asked for an alternative. I suggested mismatch with reality. As in “violating X leads to results which do not agree with what we know of reality”.
This is a nice motto, but how do you make a mathematical model out of it?
We were talking about how would a human qualify as a “rational agent”. I see no need to make mathematical models here.
...”violating X leads to results which are do not agree with what we know of reality”.
This only makes sense in epistemic context, not in instrumental one. How can a way of making decisions “not agree with what we know of reality”? Note that I’m making a normative statement (what one should do), not a descriptive statement (“people usually behave in such-and-such way”).
We were talking about how would a human qualify as a “rational agent”. I see no need to make mathematical models here.
There is always a need to make mathematical models since before you have a mathematical model your understanding is imprecise. For example, a mathematical model allows you to prove than under certain assumptions diversifying donations is irrational.
There is nothing intrinsic to the action of “praying for a miracle” which “disagrees with reality”. It’s only when we view this action in the context of a decision theory which says e.g. “choose the action which leads to maximal expected utility under the Solomonoff prior” can we say the action is “irrational” because, in fact, it does not lead to maximal expected utility. But in order to make this argument you need to assume a decision theory.
There is nothing intrinsic to the action of “praying for a miracle” which “disagrees with reality”.
Given the definition of a miracle, I think there is, but anyway—I’m willing to go out on a limb, take the shortcut, and pronounce praying for a miracle to fail instrumental rationality. Without first constructing a rigorous mathematical model of the expected utility under the Solomonoff prior. YMMV, of course.
Well, you originally said ” violating them strongly feels like making an error. ” I said that “feels like” is a weak point. You asked for an alternative. I suggested mismatch with reality. As in “violating X leads to results which do not agree with what we know of reality”.
We were talking about how would a human qualify as a “rational agent”. I see no need to make mathematical models here.
This only makes sense in epistemic context, not in instrumental one. How can a way of making decisions “not agree with what we know of reality”? Note that I’m making a normative statement (what one should do), not a descriptive statement (“people usually behave in such-and-such way”).
There is always a need to make mathematical models since before you have a mathematical model your understanding is imprecise. For example, a mathematical model allows you to prove than under certain assumptions diversifying donations is irrational.
Ever heard of someone praying for a miracle?
Bollocks! I guess next you’ll be telling me I can not properly understand anything which is not expressed in numbers… :-P
There is nothing intrinsic to the action of “praying for a miracle” which “disagrees with reality”. It’s only when we view this action in the context of a decision theory which says e.g. “choose the action which leads to maximal expected utility under the Solomonoff prior” can we say the action is “irrational” because, in fact, it does not lead to maximal expected utility. But in order to make this argument you need to assume a decision theory.
Given the definition of a miracle, I think there is, but anyway—I’m willing to go out on a limb, take the shortcut, and pronounce praying for a miracle to fail instrumental rationality. Without first constructing a rigorous mathematical model of the expected utility under the Solomonoff prior. YMMV, of course.