There is nothing intrinsic to the action of “praying for a miracle” which “disagrees with reality”. It’s only when we view this action in the context of a decision theory which says e.g. “choose the action which leads to maximal expected utility under the Solomonoff prior” can we say the action is “irrational” because, in fact, it does not lead to maximal expected utility. But in order to make this argument you need to assume a decision theory.
There is nothing intrinsic to the action of “praying for a miracle” which “disagrees with reality”.
Given the definition of a miracle, I think there is, but anyway—I’m willing to go out on a limb, take the shortcut, and pronounce praying for a miracle to fail instrumental rationality. Without first constructing a rigorous mathematical model of the expected utility under the Solomonoff prior. YMMV, of course.
Ever heard of someone praying for a miracle?
Bollocks! I guess next you’ll be telling me I can not properly understand anything which is not expressed in numbers… :-P
There is nothing intrinsic to the action of “praying for a miracle” which “disagrees with reality”. It’s only when we view this action in the context of a decision theory which says e.g. “choose the action which leads to maximal expected utility under the Solomonoff prior” can we say the action is “irrational” because, in fact, it does not lead to maximal expected utility. But in order to make this argument you need to assume a decision theory.
Given the definition of a miracle, I think there is, but anyway—I’m willing to go out on a limb, take the shortcut, and pronounce praying for a miracle to fail instrumental rationality. Without first constructing a rigorous mathematical model of the expected utility under the Solomonoff prior. YMMV, of course.