Loosely speaking, epistemic and instrumental rationality are prescriptions for the two sides of the is/ought gap. While ‘ought statements’ generally need to make reference to ‘is statements’, they cannot be entirely reduced to them.
If epistemic rationality is implementation of any of a set of reliable procedures for making true statements about reality, and instrumental rationality is use of any of a set of reliable procedures for achieving goals, then the latter is contained in the former, since reliably achieving goals entails possession of some kind of high-fidelity model of reality.
One possible goal is to have false beliefs about reality; another is to have no impact on reality. (For humans in particular, there are unquestionably some facts that are both true and harmful (i.e. instrumentally irrational) to learn.)
Furthermore, what kind of rationality does not pursue goals?
Epistemic rationality.
(I assume that you mean ‘isn’t about pursuing goals.’ Otherwise, epistemic rationality might pursue the goal of matching the map to the territory.)
Perhaps some explanation is in order. (I thought it was quite a witty thought experiment, but apparently it’s not appreciated.)
If it is in principle impossible to explain why one ought to do something, then what is the function of the word “ought”? Straightforwardly, it can have none, and we gain nothing by its existence in our vocabulary.
Alternatively, if it is not in principle impossible, then trivially the condition ‘ought’ (the condition of oughting?) rests entirely upon real facts about the universe, and the position of Randaly is false.
I know there is some philosophical pedigree behind this old notion, but my investigations yield that it is not possible, under valid reasoning (without butchering the word ‘ought’), to assert that ought statements cannot be entirely reduced to is statements, and simultaneously to assert that one ought to believe this, which seems to present a dilemma.
I’m glad that Randaly explicitly chose this way of reasoning, as it is intimately linked with my interest in commenting on this post. Everyone accepts that questions relating to the life cycles of stars are questions of fact about the universe (questions of epistemic rationality), but the philosophical pedigree rejects the idea that questions about what is an appropriate way for a person to behave are similar (instrumental rationality) - it seems that people are somehow not part of the universe, according to this wisdom.
If it is in principle impossible to explain why one ought to do something, then what is the function of the word “ought”? Straightforwardly, it can have none, and we gain nothing by its existence in our vocabulary.
People are more complicated than you’re modeling them as. People have numerous conflicting urges/desires/values/modules. Classicists would say that ‘ought’ refers to going with the virtuous action; Freudians the superego; Hansonians your far-mode. All of these groups would separately endorse the interactionist (psychology) viewpoint that ‘ought’ also refers to social pressures to take pro-social actions.
(On a side note: it is completely possible to explain why one ought to do something; it merely requires that a specific morality be taken as a given. In practice, all humans’ morality tends to be similar, especially in the same culture; and since our morality is not exactly like a utility function, in so far as it has conflicting, non-instrospectively available and changing parts, moral debate is still possible.)
simultaneously to assert that one ought to believe this
Well, yes, one would need the additional claim that one ought to believe the truth. Among humans, for specific cases, this usually goes without saying.
Everyone accepts that questions relating to the life cycles of stars are questions of fact about the universe (questions of epistemic rationality), but the philosophical pedigree rejects the idea that questions about what is an appropriate way for a person to behave are similar (instrumental rationality) - it seems that people are somehow not part of the universe, according to this wisdom.
No. Would you also argue that you universe is not part of the universe, because some people think it’s pretty and others don’t?
Loosely speaking, epistemic and instrumental rationality are prescriptions for the two sides of the is/ought gap. While ‘ought statements’ generally need to make reference to ‘is statements’, they cannot be entirely reduced to them.
One possible goal is to have false beliefs about reality; another is to have no impact on reality. (For humans in particular, there are unquestionably some facts that are both true and harmful (i.e. instrumentally irrational) to learn.)
Epistemic rationality.
(I assume that you mean ‘isn’t about pursuing goals.’ Otherwise, epistemic rationality might pursue the goal of matching the map to the territory.)
Please explain why this is so. Then please explain why you ought to believe this.
Perhaps some explanation is in order. (I thought it was quite a witty thought experiment, but apparently it’s not appreciated.)
If it is in principle impossible to explain why one ought to do something, then what is the function of the word “ought”? Straightforwardly, it can have none, and we gain nothing by its existence in our vocabulary.
Alternatively, if it is not in principle impossible, then trivially the condition ‘ought’ (the condition of oughting?) rests entirely upon real facts about the universe, and the position of Randaly is false.
I know there is some philosophical pedigree behind this old notion, but my investigations yield that it is not possible, under valid reasoning (without butchering the word ‘ought’), to assert that ought statements cannot be entirely reduced to is statements, and simultaneously to assert that one ought to believe this, which seems to present a dilemma.
I’m glad that Randaly explicitly chose this way of reasoning, as it is intimately linked with my interest in commenting on this post. Everyone accepts that questions relating to the life cycles of stars are questions of fact about the universe (questions of epistemic rationality), but the philosophical pedigree rejects the idea that questions about what is an appropriate way for a person to behave are similar (instrumental rationality) - it seems that people are somehow not part of the universe, according to this wisdom.
People are more complicated than you’re modeling them as. People have numerous conflicting urges/desires/values/modules. Classicists would say that ‘ought’ refers to going with the virtuous action; Freudians the superego; Hansonians your far-mode. All of these groups would separately endorse the interactionist (psychology) viewpoint that ‘ought’ also refers to social pressures to take pro-social actions.
(On a side note: it is completely possible to explain why one ought to do something; it merely requires that a specific morality be taken as a given. In practice, all humans’ morality tends to be similar, especially in the same culture; and since our morality is not exactly like a utility function, in so far as it has conflicting, non-instrospectively available and changing parts, moral debate is still possible.)
Well, yes, one would need the additional claim that one ought to believe the truth. Among humans, for specific cases, this usually goes without saying.
No. Would you also argue that you universe is not part of the universe, because some people think it’s pretty and others don’t?