Is the reasoning for one-boxing for the magician identical to the reasoning for one-boxing for Omega, or is there some key difference that I’m missing?
If a magician is cheating than there a direct causal link between the subject choosing to one-box and the money being in the box.
Causality matters for philosophers who analyse Newcomb’s problem.
I don’t know whether one can meaningfully speak about decision theory for a world without causal links.
If your actions don’t cause anything how can one decision be better than another?
If I’m wet because it rains there a causal link between the two.
If I kick a ball and the ball moves there a causal link between me kicking the ball and the ball moving.
If a magician is cheating than there a direct causal link between the subject choosing to one-box and the money being in the box.
Causality matters for philosophers who analyse Newcomb’s problem.
So the magician can only cheat in worlds where causal links happen?
I don’t know whether one can meaningfully speak about decision theory for a world without causal links. If your actions don’t cause anything how can one decision be better than another?
So, if the magician is cheating there is a causal link between the decision and the contents of the box, and if he isn’t there is still a causal link.
How is that a difference?
If I’m wet because it rains there a causal link between the two. If I kick a ball and the ball moves there a causal link between me kicking the ball and the ball moving.
How’s that a difference?
Did you kick the ball because it was raining, or are you wet because you kicked the ball?