Believing that a particular principle led to an observed result helps make future predictions about that result when the principle that we believe is relevant;
If we believe that the street magician is cheating, but he claims to be predicting, is each case in which we see the prediction and result match evidence that he is predicting or evidence that he is cheating? Is it evidence that when our turn comes up, we should one-box, or is it evidence that the players before us are colluding with the magician?
If we believe that Omega is a perfect predictor, does that change the direction in which the evidence points?
Is it just that we have a much higher prior that everybody we see is colluding with the magician (or that the magician is cheating in some other way) than that everybody is colluding with Omega, or that Omega is cheating?
Suppose that the magician is known to be playing with house money, and is getting paid based on how accurately rewards are allocated to contestants (leaving the question open as to whether he is cheating or predicting, but keeping the payoff matrix the same). Is the reasoning for one-boxing for the magician identical to the reasoning for one-boxing for Omega, or is there some key difference that I’m missing?
Is the reasoning for one-boxing for the magician identical to the reasoning for one-boxing for Omega, or is there some key difference that I’m missing?
If a magician is cheating than there a direct causal link between the subject choosing to one-box and the money being in the box.
Causality matters for philosophers who analyse Newcomb’s problem.
I don’t know whether one can meaningfully speak about decision theory for a world without causal links.
If your actions don’t cause anything how can one decision be better than another?
If I’m wet because it rains there a causal link between the two.
If I kick a ball and the ball moves there a causal link between me kicking the ball and the ball moving.
Believing that a particular principle led to an observed result helps make future predictions about that result when the principle that we believe is relevant;
If we believe that the street magician is cheating, but he claims to be predicting, is each case in which we see the prediction and result match evidence that he is predicting or evidence that he is cheating? Is it evidence that when our turn comes up, we should one-box, or is it evidence that the players before us are colluding with the magician?
If we believe that Omega is a perfect predictor, does that change the direction in which the evidence points?
Is it just that we have a much higher prior that everybody we see is colluding with the magician (or that the magician is cheating in some other way) than that everybody is colluding with Omega, or that Omega is cheating?
Suppose that the magician is known to be playing with house money, and is getting paid based on how accurately rewards are allocated to contestants (leaving the question open as to whether he is cheating or predicting, but keeping the payoff matrix the same). Is the reasoning for one-boxing for the magician identical to the reasoning for one-boxing for Omega, or is there some key difference that I’m missing?
If a magician is cheating than there a direct causal link between the subject choosing to one-box and the money being in the box.
Causality matters for philosophers who analyse Newcomb’s problem.
So the magician can only cheat in worlds where causal links happen?
I don’t know whether one can meaningfully speak about decision theory for a world without causal links. If your actions don’t cause anything how can one decision be better than another?
So, if the magician is cheating there is a causal link between the decision and the contents of the box, and if he isn’t there is still a causal link.
How is that a difference?
If I’m wet because it rains there a causal link between the two. If I kick a ball and the ball moves there a causal link between me kicking the ball and the ball moving.
How’s that a difference?
Did you kick the ball because it was raining, or are you wet because you kicked the ball?