This seems to just repeat the repugnant conclusion paradox in more graphic detail. Any paradox is such that one can make highly compelling arguments for either side. That’s why it’s called a paradox. But doing this won’t solve the problem. A quote from Robert Nozick:
Given two such compelling opposing arguments, it will not do to rest content with one’s belief that one knows what to do. Nor will it do to just repeat one of the arguments, loudly and slowly. One must also disarm the opposing argument; explain away its force while showing it due respect.
I think it doesn’t actually work for the repugnant conclusion—the buttons are supposed to just purely be to the good, and not have to deal with tradeoffs.
Once you start having to deal with tradeoffs, then you get into the aesthetics of population ethics—maybe you want each planet in the galaxy to have a vibrant civilization of happy humans, but past that more happy humans just seems a bit gauche—i.e. there is some value past which the raw marginal utility of cramming more humans into the universe is negative. Any a button promising an existing human extra life might be offered, but these humans are all immortal if they want to be anyhow, and their lives are so good it’s hard to identify one-size-fits-all benefits one could even in theory supply via button, without violating any conservation laws.
All of this is a totally reasonable way to want the future of the universe to be arranged, incompatible with the repugnant conclusion. And still compatible with rejecting the person-affecting view, and pressing the offered buttons in our current circumstances.
This seems to just repeat the repugnant conclusion paradox in more graphic detail. Any paradox is such that one can make highly compelling arguments for either side. That’s why it’s called a paradox. But doing this won’t solve the problem. A quote from Robert Nozick:
I think it doesn’t actually work for the repugnant conclusion—the buttons are supposed to just purely be to the good, and not have to deal with tradeoffs.
Once you start having to deal with tradeoffs, then you get into the aesthetics of population ethics—maybe you want each planet in the galaxy to have a vibrant civilization of happy humans, but past that more happy humans just seems a bit gauche—i.e. there is some value past which the raw marginal utility of cramming more humans into the universe is negative. Any a button promising an existing human extra life might be offered, but these humans are all immortal if they want to be anyhow, and their lives are so good it’s hard to identify one-size-fits-all benefits one could even in theory supply via button, without violating any conservation laws.
All of this is a totally reasonable way to want the future of the universe to be arranged, incompatible with the repugnant conclusion. And still compatible with rejecting the person-affecting view, and pressing the offered buttons in our current circumstances.
Well, sometimes getting a lot of arguments for a view should convince you of the view.