Why does this have 12 upvotes? The fact that this is slightly funny and for our “side” doesn’t make it good logic. We’ve no reason to think snakebites and deities ought to be correlated at all. Reversed stupidity is not intelligence and all that. This ought to be below the visibility threshold.
If a snake handler supposes that their ability to safely handle snakes is evidence that they’re protected by the Christian god as a disciple of Jesus, then they must suppose in turn that their inability to handle snakes safely is evidence that they aren’t protected by the Christian god as a disciple of Jesus. At least some part of the edifice has to take a hit.
I don’t know if any non-Christian religion uses snake handling as a religious ritual. In Christianity, it’s practiced in some minor denominations as an interpretation of a specific line.
Yes, but it is entirely consistent for a snake handler to think that handled snakes not biting is very strong evidence for the existence of a Christian god while also thinking that handled snakes biting is very weak evidence against the existence of a Christian god, weak enough not to significantly dent their faith. So Maher’s argument as stated doesn’t work. “Doing the math” here might just mean very very slightly reducing your credence in God’s existence.
I don’t disagree with this and am not arguing against it. My point is, there’s lots of people (including probably a very large majority of christians) who don’t conceive of god as caring particularly one way or the other about snake handlers. For these people, Maher’s argument doesn’t hold at all.
Of course, the snake handlers themselves should update (modulo what pragmatist said).
That seems like a lot of comments you made there. Are you saying that if people consistently held poisonous snakes without getting bitten, and on inspection only their vocal faith distinguished them from other people, you personally would not increase your belief in literal god(s) one whit? If so, how do you justify this seemingly anti-Bayesian position?
All pro-snake-handling gods are gods, but not all gods are pro-snake-handling gods.
Evidence against pro-snake-handling gods is evidence against such a tiny slice of god-space that I’m calling it a rounding error.
Evidence in the other direction would have a drastically different effect, of course. In the hypothetical world where snake handling ability was perfectly correlated with stated beliefe and all confounding factors have been accounted for, I would massively increase the probability mass I give to pro-snake-handling gods (and consequently, gods in general).
Why does this have 12 upvotes? The fact that this is slightly funny and for our “side” doesn’t make it good logic. We’ve no reason to think snakebites and deities ought to be correlated at all. Reversed stupidity is not intelligence and all that. This ought to be below the visibility threshold.
But if you do think that snakebites and deities are correlated, then the correlation has to run both ways.
I didn’t upvote since it’s more politics than rationality, but there is a useful lesson there.
Sure, it has to go both ways. And it is evidence against some sort of snake-handling god. But not against gods in general.
If a snake handler supposes that their ability to safely handle snakes is evidence that they’re protected by the Christian god as a disciple of Jesus, then they must suppose in turn that their inability to handle snakes safely is evidence that they aren’t protected by the Christian god as a disciple of Jesus. At least some part of the edifice has to take a hit.
I don’t know if any non-Christian religion uses snake handling as a religious ritual. In Christianity, it’s practiced in some minor denominations as an interpretation of a specific line.
Yes, but it is entirely consistent for a snake handler to think that handled snakes not biting is very strong evidence for the existence of a Christian god while also thinking that handled snakes biting is very weak evidence against the existence of a Christian god, weak enough not to significantly dent their faith. So Maher’s argument as stated doesn’t work. “Doing the math” here might just mean very very slightly reducing your credence in God’s existence.
I don’t disagree with this and am not arguing against it. My point is, there’s lots of people (including probably a very large majority of christians) who don’t conceive of god as caring particularly one way or the other about snake handlers. For these people, Maher’s argument doesn’t hold at all.
Of course, the snake handlers themselves should update (modulo what pragmatist said).
That seems like a lot of comments you made there. Are you saying that if people consistently held poisonous snakes without getting bitten, and on inspection only their vocal faith distinguished them from other people, you personally would not increase your belief in literal god(s) one whit? If so, how do you justify this seemingly anti-Bayesian position?
All pro-snake-handling gods are gods, but not all gods are pro-snake-handling gods.
Evidence against pro-snake-handling gods is evidence against such a tiny slice of god-space that I’m calling it a rounding error.
Evidence in the other direction would have a drastically different effect, of course. In the hypothetical world where snake handling ability was perfectly correlated with stated beliefe and all confounding factors have been accounted for, I would massively increase the probability mass I give to pro-snake-handling gods (and consequently, gods in general).
Is that still true at the limit of zero gods existing? It certainly precludes a counter-example!
Does it help if I add the qualifier “hypothetical” or “possible”?
I.e., All possible pro-snake-handling gods are gods, but not all possible gods are pro-snake-handling gods.
Otherwise I’m not sure I follow what you’re saying...
Yes. (And I only mentioned the exception because it surprised me that the near tautology had a counterexample.)