All pro-snake-handling gods are gods, but not all gods are pro-snake-handling gods.
Evidence against pro-snake-handling gods is evidence against such a tiny slice of god-space that I’m calling it a rounding error.
Evidence in the other direction would have a drastically different effect, of course. In the hypothetical world where snake handling ability was perfectly correlated with stated beliefe and all confounding factors have been accounted for, I would massively increase the probability mass I give to pro-snake-handling gods (and consequently, gods in general).
All pro-snake-handling gods are gods, but not all gods are pro-snake-handling gods.
Evidence against pro-snake-handling gods is evidence against such a tiny slice of god-space that I’m calling it a rounding error.
Evidence in the other direction would have a drastically different effect, of course. In the hypothetical world where snake handling ability was perfectly correlated with stated beliefe and all confounding factors have been accounted for, I would massively increase the probability mass I give to pro-snake-handling gods (and consequently, gods in general).
Is that still true at the limit of zero gods existing? It certainly precludes a counter-example!
Does it help if I add the qualifier “hypothetical” or “possible”?
I.e., All possible pro-snake-handling gods are gods, but not all possible gods are pro-snake-handling gods.
Otherwise I’m not sure I follow what you’re saying...
Yes. (And I only mentioned the exception because it surprised me that the near tautology had a counterexample.)