Then we can say that the consequences of “me choosing option A” is the logical consequences of all objects with the same subjective experiences/memories as me choosing option A.
Not exactly… Me and Bob may have identical experiences/memories, but I have a hidden rootkit installed that makes me defect, and Bob doesn’t.
Maybe it would make more sense to inspect the line of reasoning that leads to my defection, and ask a) would this line of reasoning likely occur to Bob? b) would he find it overwhelmingly convincing? This is kinda like quining, because the line of reasoning must refer to a copy of itself in Bob’s mind.
This just considers the “line of reasoning” as a whole agent (part of the original agent, but not controlled by the original agent), and again assumes perfect self-knowledge by that “line of reasoning” sub-agent (supplied by the bigger agent, perhaps, but taken on faith by the sub-agent).
Not exactly… Me and Bob may have identical experiences/memories, but I have a hidden rootkit installed that makes me defect, and Bob doesn’t.
Maybe it would make more sense to inspect the line of reasoning that leads to my defection, and ask a) would this line of reasoning likely occur to Bob? b) would he find it overwhelmingly convincing? This is kinda like quining, because the line of reasoning must refer to a copy of itself in Bob’s mind.
This just considers the “line of reasoning” as a whole agent (part of the original agent, but not controlled by the original agent), and again assumes perfect self-knowledge by that “line of reasoning” sub-agent (supplied by the bigger agent, perhaps, but taken on faith by the sub-agent).