The doomsday assumption makes the assumptions that:
We are randomly selected from all the observers who will ever exist.
The observers increase expoentially, such that there are 2⁄3 of those who have ever lived at any particular generation
They are wiped out by a catastrophic event, rather than slowly dwindling or other
(Now those assumptions are a bit dubious—things change if for instance, we develop life extension tech or otherwise increase rate of growth, and a higher than 2⁄3 proportion will live in future generations (eg if the next generation is immortal, they’re guaranteed to be the last, and we’re much less likely depending on how long people are likely to survive after that. Alternatively growth could plateau or fluctuate around the carrying capacity of a planet if most potential observers never expand beyond this) However, assuming they hold, I think the argument is valid.
I don’t think your situation alters the argument, it just changes some of the assumptions. At point D, it reverts back to the original doomsday scenario, and the odds switch back.
At D, the point you’re made aware, you know that you’re in the proportion of people who live. Only 50% of the people who ever existed in this scenario learn this, and 99% of them are blue-doors. Only looking at the people at this point is changing the selection criteria—you’re only picking from survivors, never from those who are now dead despite the fact that they are real people we could have been. If those could be included in the selection (as they are if you give them the information and ask them before they would have died), the situation would remain as in A-C.
Making creating the losing potential people makes this more explicit. If we’re randomly selecting from people who ever exist, we’ll only ever pick those who get created, who will be predominantly blue-doors if we run the experiment multiple times.
The doomsday assumption makes the assumptions that:
We are randomly selected from all the observers who will ever exist.
Actually, it requires that we be selected from a small subset of these observers, such as “humans” or “conscious entities” or, perhaps most appropriate, “beings capable of reflecting on this problem”.
They are wiped out by a catastrophic event, rather than slowly dwindling
Well, for the numbers to work out, there would have to be a sharp drop-off before the slow-dwindling, which is roughly as worrisome as a “pure doomsday”.
At D, the point you’re made aware, you know that you’re in the proportion of people who live.
Then what about introducing a C’ between C and D: You are told the initial rules. Then, later you are told about the killing, and then, even later, that the killing had already happened and that you were spared.
Thinking this through a bit more, you’re right—this really makes no difference. (And in fact, re-reading my post, my reasoning is rather confused - I think I ended up agreeing with the conclusion while also (incorrectly) disagreeing with the argument.)
The doomsday assumption makes the assumptions that:
We are randomly selected from all the observers who will ever exist.
The observers increase expoentially, such that there are 2⁄3 of those who have ever lived at any particular generation
They are wiped out by a catastrophic event, rather than slowly dwindling or other
(Now those assumptions are a bit dubious—things change if for instance, we develop life extension tech or otherwise increase rate of growth, and a higher than 2⁄3 proportion will live in future generations (eg if the next generation is immortal, they’re guaranteed to be the last, and we’re much less likely depending on how long people are likely to survive after that. Alternatively growth could plateau or fluctuate around the carrying capacity of a planet if most potential observers never expand beyond this) However, assuming they hold, I think the argument is valid.
I don’t think your situation alters the argument, it just changes some of the assumptions. At point D, it reverts back to the original doomsday scenario, and the odds switch back.
At D, the point you’re made aware, you know that you’re in the proportion of people who live. Only 50% of the people who ever existed in this scenario learn this, and 99% of them are blue-doors. Only looking at the people at this point is changing the selection criteria—you’re only picking from survivors, never from those who are now dead despite the fact that they are real people we could have been. If those could be included in the selection (as they are if you give them the information and ask them before they would have died), the situation would remain as in A-C.
Making creating the losing potential people makes this more explicit. If we’re randomly selecting from people who ever exist, we’ll only ever pick those who get created, who will be predominantly blue-doors if we run the experiment multiple times.
Actually, it requires that we be selected from a small subset of these observers, such as “humans” or “conscious entities” or, perhaps most appropriate, “beings capable of reflecting on this problem”.
Well, for the numbers to work out, there would have to be a sharp drop-off before the slow-dwindling, which is roughly as worrisome as a “pure doomsday”.
Then what about introducing a C’ between C and D: You are told the initial rules. Then, later you are told about the killing, and then, even later, that the killing had already happened and that you were spared.
What would you say the odds were there?
Thinking this through a bit more, you’re right—this really makes no difference. (And in fact, re-reading my post, my reasoning is rather confused - I think I ended up agreeing with the conclusion while also (incorrectly) disagreeing with the argument.)