That’s true, but I intentionally wrote “if rationality is simply what you would most prefer” i.e. if it really is the case that it is the most preferred means to the end. In your spoon example, it really may be the case that a spoon is the means you would most prefer to eat something with. A quibble, but yes.
I agree there is also a normative epistemic aspect to rationality, which could either complicate or be subsumed by the slogan “rationality is winning”.
You were replying to someone new here, with statements that are very easy to read in very confused ways. So I attempted to reformulate them clearly, with a secondary objective of possibly catching something that you were also conflating in your own mind.
There is actually something directly relevant to flaritza’s question in an expanded definition of rationality, though not useful. If rationality comprises patterns of thought that help with cognition and its many purposes, and there is a cognition-related problem like emotions acting up in nonstandard ways, perhaps interfering with usual communication norms or objecting to usual communication norms, this calls for patterns of emotional rationality that improve the situation. This is not useful because I don’t have (references about) particular patterns of emotional rationality to offer. But there might be some discussion of this, and should be even if there isn’t.
That’s true, but I intentionally wrote “if rationality is simply what you would most prefer” i.e. if it really is the case that it is the most preferred means to the end. In your spoon example, it really may be the case that a spoon is the means you would most prefer to eat something with. A quibble, but yes.
I agree there is also a normative epistemic aspect to rationality, which could either complicate or be subsumed by the slogan “rationality is winning”.
You were replying to someone new here, with statements that are very easy to read in very confused ways. So I attempted to reformulate them clearly, with a secondary objective of possibly catching something that you were also conflating in your own mind.
There is actually something directly relevant to flaritza’s question in an expanded definition of rationality, though not useful. If rationality comprises patterns of thought that help with cognition and its many purposes, and there is a cognition-related problem like emotions acting up in nonstandard ways, perhaps interfering with usual communication norms or objecting to usual communication norms, this calls for patterns of emotional rationality that improve the situation. This is not useful because I don’t have (references about) particular patterns of emotional rationality to offer. But there might be some discussion of this, and should be even if there isn’t.