The basic point here is that Bayesians lose zero sum games in the long term. Which is to be expected, because Bayesianism is a non adversarial epistemology. (Adversarial Bayesianism is simply game theory)
This sentence is surprising, though: “It is a truth more fundamental than Bayes’ Law that money will flow from the unclever to the clever”.
Clearly, what wins zero sum games wins zero sum games, but what wins zero sum games need not correspond to collective epistemology.
As a foundation for epistemology, many things are superior to “might makes right”, including Bayes’ rule (despite its limitations).
Legislating Bayesianism in an adversarial context is futile; mechanism design is what is needed.
I think legislating Bayesianism is just actually a bad idea (even if we could get around the excessive-paperwork-to-show-all-your-evidence problem). I don’t think prediction markets are a perfect mechanism, but I think the non-Bayesianism highlighted here is a feature, not a bug. But all my actual arguments for that are in my Radical Probabilism post.
I’m curious what alternative mechanism design you might propose.
The basic point here is that Bayesians lose zero sum games in the long term. Which is to be expected, because Bayesianism is a non adversarial epistemology. (Adversarial Bayesianism is simply game theory)
This sentence is surprising, though: “It is a truth more fundamental than Bayes’ Law that money will flow from the unclever to the clever”.
Clearly, what wins zero sum games wins zero sum games, but what wins zero sum games need not correspond to collective epistemology.
As a foundation for epistemology, many things are superior to “might makes right”, including Bayes’ rule (despite its limitations).
Legislating Bayesianism in an adversarial context is futile; mechanism design is what is needed.
Did you read radical probabilism yet?
I think legislating Bayesianism is just actually a bad idea (even if we could get around the excessive-paperwork-to-show-all-your-evidence problem). I don’t think prediction markets are a perfect mechanism, but I think the non-Bayesianism highlighted here is a feature, not a bug. But all my actual arguments for that are in my Radical Probabilism post.
I’m curious what alternative mechanism design you might propose.