I’m completely confused now. I thought CEV was right by definition? If “80% of humanity turns out to be selfish bastards” then it will extrapolate on that. If we start to cherry pick certain outcomes according to our current perception, why run CEV at all?
I’m completely confused now. I thought CEV was right by definition? If “80% of humanity turns out to be selfish bastards” then it will extrapolate on that.
No, CEV is right by definition. When CEV is used as shorthand for “the coherent extrapolated volitions of all of humanity” as is the case there then it is quite probably not right at all. Because many humans, to put it extremely politely, have preferences that are distinctly different to what I would call ‘right’.
If we start to cherry pick certain outcomes according to our current perception, why run CEV at all?
Yes, that would be pointless, it would be far better to compare the outcomes to CEV<group_I_identify_with_sufficiently> (then just use the latter!) The purpose of doing CEV at all is for signalling and cooperation.
Before or after extrapolation? If the former then why does that matter, if the latter then how do you know?
Former in as much as it allows inferences about the latter. I don’t need to know with any particular confidence for the purposes of the point. The point was to illustrate possible (and overwhelmingly obvious) failure modes.
Hoping that CEV is desirable rather than outright unfriendly isn’t a particularly good reason to consider it. It is going to result in outcomes that are worse from the perspective of whoever is running the GAI than CEV and CEV.
The purpose of doing CEV at all is for signalling and cooperation (or, possibly, outright confusion).
CEV is not right by definition, it’s only well-defined given certain assumptions that can fail. It should be designed so that if it doesn’t shut down, then it’s probably right.
Sincere question: Why would “80% of humanity turns out to be selfish bastards” violate one of those assumptions? Is the problem the “selfish bastard” part? Or is it that the “80%” part implies less homogeneity among humans than CEV assumes?
Why would “80% of humanity turns out to be selfish bastards” violate one of those assumptions?
It would certainly seem that 80% of humanity turning out to be selfish bastards is compatible with CEV being well defined, but not with being ‘right’. This does not technically contradict anything in the grandparent (which is why I didn’t reply with the same question myself). It does, perhaps, go against the theme of Nesov’s comments.
Basically, and as you suggest, either it must be acknowledged that ‘not well defined’ and ‘possibly evil’ are two entirely different problems or something that amounts to ‘humans do not want things that suck’ must be one of the assumptions.
I still don’t get what kind of ‘right’ people are talking about.
Very similar to your right, for all practical purposes. A slight difference in how it is described though. You describe (if I recall), ‘right’ as being “in accordance with XiXiDu’s preferences”. Using Eliezer’s style of terminology you would instead describe ‘right’ as more like a photograph of what XiXiDu’s preferences are, without them necessarily including any explicit reference to XiXiDu.
In most cases it doesn’t really matter. It starts to matter once people start saying things like “But what if XiXiDu could take a pill that made him prefer that he eat babies? Would that mean it became right? Should XiXiDu take the pill?”
By the way, ‘right’ would also mean what the photo looks like after it has been airbrushed a bit in photoshop by an agent better at understanding what we actually want than we are at introspection and communication. So it’s an abstract representation of what you would want if you were smarter and more rational but still had your preferences.
Also note that Eliezer sometimes blurs the line between ‘right’ meaning what he would want and what some abstract “all of humanity” would want.
I’m completely confused now. I thought CEV was right by definition? If “80% of humanity turns out to be selfish bastards” then it will extrapolate on that. If we start to cherry pick certain outcomes according to our current perception, why run CEV at all?
No, CEV is right by definition. When CEV is used as shorthand for “the coherent extrapolated volitions of all of humanity” as is the case there then it is quite probably not right at all. Because many humans, to put it extremely politely, have preferences that are distinctly different to what I would call ‘right’.
Yes, that would be pointless, it would be far better to compare the outcomes to CEV<group_I_identify_with_sufficiently> (then just use the latter!) The purpose of doing CEV at all is for signalling and cooperation.
Before or after extrapolation? If the former then why does that matter, if the latter then how do you know?
Former in as much as it allows inferences about the latter. I don’t need to know with any particular confidence for the purposes of the point. The point was to illustrate possible (and overwhelmingly obvious) failure modes.
Hoping that CEV is desirable rather than outright unfriendly isn’t a particularly good reason to consider it. It is going to result in outcomes that are worse from the perspective of whoever is running the GAI than CEV and CEV.
The purpose of doing CEV at all is for signalling and cooperation (or, possibly, outright confusion).
Do you mean it is simply an SIAI marketing strategy and that it is not what they are actually going to do?
Signalling and cooperation can include actual behavior.
CEV is not right by definition, it’s only well-defined given certain assumptions that can fail. It should be designed so that if it doesn’t shut down, then it’s probably right.
Sincere question: Why would “80% of humanity turns out to be selfish bastards” violate one of those assumptions? Is the problem the “selfish bastard” part? Or is it that the “80%” part implies less homogeneity among humans than CEV assumes?
It would certainly seem that 80% of humanity turning out to be selfish bastards is compatible with CEV being well defined, but not with being ‘right’. This does not technically contradict anything in the grandparent (which is why I didn’t reply with the same question myself). It does, perhaps, go against the theme of Nesov’s comments.
Basically, and as you suggest, either it must be acknowledged that ‘not well defined’ and ‘possibly evil’ are two entirely different problems or something that amounts to ‘humans do not want things that suck’ must be one of the assumptions.
I suppose you have to comprehend Yudkowsky’s metaethics to understand that sentence. I still don’t get what kind of ‘right’ people are talking about.
Very similar to your right, for all practical purposes. A slight difference in how it is described though. You describe (if I recall), ‘right’ as being “in accordance with XiXiDu’s preferences”. Using Eliezer’s style of terminology you would instead describe ‘right’ as more like a photograph of what XiXiDu’s preferences are, without them necessarily including any explicit reference to XiXiDu.
In most cases it doesn’t really matter. It starts to matter once people start saying things like “But what if XiXiDu could take a pill that made him prefer that he eat babies? Would that mean it became right? Should XiXiDu take the pill?”
By the way, ‘right’ would also mean what the photo looks like after it has been airbrushed a bit in photoshop by an agent better at understanding what we actually want than we are at introspection and communication. So it’s an abstract representation of what you would want if you were smarter and more rational but still had your preferences.
Also note that Eliezer sometimes blurs the line between ‘right’ meaning what he would want and what some abstract “all of humanity” would want.