So...if Prometheus created you to one-box, and you should one-box anyway...why not one-box? “Too much useless information” alarm bells are ringing in my head.
But you should only one-box if you think that the prediction of you one-boxing is tied to whether or not there is more money in the box.
In this case, as near as I can tell, Prometheus believes that you will one-box. Go ahead and two-box and collect the money. Unless we think Omega is lying, there’s no reason to believe that one-boxing is superior in this problem.
I agree, and I don’t see why the problem needs to be difficult. Two-boxing is obviously the most profitable choice, and based on the way the problem is phrased it doesn’t seem like you are prevented from two-boxing. If anything, your choice to two-box would merely suggest that Prometheus is more error-prone than Omega claimed.
Er...right. I accidentally filled in the first bit with the actual Newcomb’s Problem. (In this post, I find the word ‘Newcomb’ in the title to be misleading unless there’s some Newcomb-like aspect that I’m missing.)
So, upon rereading the first bit, I think that two-boxing is definitely optimal in this case. The Prometheus part seems irrelevant. Powerful being A created you to do Z does not mean that you will somehow cease to exist if you do Y instead of Z, nor does it have any impact on your decision unless you also know that the powerful being is benevolent with regard to your utility function.
(In this post, I find the word ‘Newcomb’ in the title to be misleading unless there’s some Newcomb-like aspect that I’m missing.)
Whether or not it’s truly Newcomb-like is the question. The way I’m suggesting you see it is that in addition to the $100, you are in Box B if and only if you one-box. Otherwise, you’re nowhere. You don’t cease to exist, you cease to have ever existed (which might be better or worse than dying, but certainly sounds bad).
You don’t cease to exist, you cease to have ever existed (which might be better or worse than dying, but certainly sounds bad).
You applied this to evolution as if this was a grave concern of yours. Surely you don’t believe that the universe will un-exist you for failing to have lots of children?!
The very idea of having never existed makes no sense! In a simulation, the masters could run back time and start again without you, but you still existed in the first run of the simulation. Once you’ve existed, that’s it. You can believe that your future existence is in jeopardy, but I don’t see how you can believe that you will cease to never have existed, much less how one can actually cease to have ever existed.
Modify the scenario to include MWI. Maybe in THIS universe you will continue to exist if you two-box, in then in the overwhelming majority of universes you will have never been created. If you one-box, then it’s likely that in the overwhelming majority of universes you do exist.
If you one-box, then it’s likely that in the overwhelming majority of universes you do exist.
This is incorrect, but I understand the spirit of what you’re trying to say (that the number of universes that I exist in is overwhelmingly larger—no matter what, I exist in an infinitesimally small number of universes).
Regardless, this interpretation still doesn’t make you cease to have ever existed. Maybe you exist less, whatever that means, but you still exist. Personally, I don’t care about existing less frequently.
Lastly, do you think this interpretation allows the problem to pertain to evolution? I still don’t think so, but the reasons are more nuanced than the reasons I think the original problem doesn’t.
I think it may. I’m still not convinced that MWI universes differ in any appreciable way at the macro level. It may be that every other instance of me lived an identical life except with slightly different atoms making up his molecules.
But in either case, I prefer maximizing meme-similar persons, not gene-similar ones, so my actions are self-consistent regardless. I’m acausally trading with an entity other than Azathoth.
I’m acausally trading with an entity other than Azathoth.
which entity are you trading with? We haven’t gone back to talking about Prometheus, have we?
I might like to increase the number of meme-similar persons in my universe, but I don’t really care about meme-similar persons in universes that can’t influence mine. Even this is something I feel relatively weakly about. It’s also just a personal difference in values, and I can reason pretending I share yours.
But that’s not true? I already exist. There’s nothing acausal going on here. I can pick whatever I want, and it just makes Prometheus wrong.
(Similarly, if Omega presented me with the same problem, but said that he (omniscient) had only created me if I would one-box this problem, I would still (assuming I am not hit by a meteor or something from outside the problem affects my brain) two-box. It would just make Omega wrong. If that contradicts the problem, well, then the problem was paradoxical to begin with.)
But you should only one-box if you think that the prediction of you one-boxing is tied to whether or not there is more money in the box.
It is not money we care about, it is utility. In both cases the predictor is long gone.
In this case, as near as I can tell, Prometheus believes that you will one-box. Go ahead and two-box and collect the money. Unless we think Omega is lying, there’s no reason to believe that one-boxing is superior in this problem.
When Prometheus is preparing his choice he doesn’t know whether you will one box—once he does know he is more or less done deciding and just the implementation is left. Now he believes that you will one box—but he is long gone.
In both cases there is always going to be the $1,000 in the little box. In both cases you are always going to take the big box.
So...if Prometheus created you to one-box, and you should one-box anyway...why not one-box? “Too much useless information” alarm bells are ringing in my head.
Edit: Italics to quotes.
Edit2: I failed to read. See this comment
But you should only one-box if you think that the prediction of you one-boxing is tied to whether or not there is more money in the box.
In this case, as near as I can tell, Prometheus believes that you will one-box. Go ahead and two-box and collect the money. Unless we think Omega is lying, there’s no reason to believe that one-boxing is superior in this problem.
I agree, and I don’t see why the problem needs to be difficult. Two-boxing is obviously the most profitable choice, and based on the way the problem is phrased it doesn’t seem like you are prevented from two-boxing. If anything, your choice to two-box would merely suggest that Prometheus is more error-prone than Omega claimed.
Er...right. I accidentally filled in the first bit with the actual Newcomb’s Problem. (In this post, I find the word ‘Newcomb’ in the title to be misleading unless there’s some Newcomb-like aspect that I’m missing.)
So, upon rereading the first bit, I think that two-boxing is definitely optimal in this case. The Prometheus part seems irrelevant. Powerful being A created you to do Z does not mean that you will somehow cease to exist if you do Y instead of Z, nor does it have any impact on your decision unless you also know that the powerful being is benevolent with regard to your utility function.
Whether or not it’s truly Newcomb-like is the question. The way I’m suggesting you see it is that in addition to the $100, you are in Box B if and only if you one-box. Otherwise, you’re nowhere. You don’t cease to exist, you cease to have ever existed (which might be better or worse than dying, but certainly sounds bad).
You applied this to evolution as if this was a grave concern of yours. Surely you don’t believe that the universe will un-exist you for failing to have lots of children?!
The very idea of having never existed makes no sense! In a simulation, the masters could run back time and start again without you, but you still existed in the first run of the simulation. Once you’ve existed, that’s it. You can believe that your future existence is in jeopardy, but I don’t see how you can believe that you will cease to never have existed, much less how one can actually cease to have ever existed.
Modify the scenario to include MWI. Maybe in THIS universe you will continue to exist if you two-box, in then in the overwhelming majority of universes you will have never been created. If you one-box, then it’s likely that in the overwhelming majority of universes you do exist.
This is incorrect, but I understand the spirit of what you’re trying to say (that the number of universes that I exist in is overwhelmingly larger—no matter what, I exist in an infinitesimally small number of universes).
Regardless, this interpretation still doesn’t make you cease to have ever existed. Maybe you exist less, whatever that means, but you still exist. Personally, I don’t care about existing less frequently.
Lastly, do you think this interpretation allows the problem to pertain to evolution? I still don’t think so, but the reasons are more nuanced than the reasons I think the original problem doesn’t.
I think it may. I’m still not convinced that MWI universes differ in any appreciable way at the macro level. It may be that every other instance of me lived an identical life except with slightly different atoms making up his molecules.
But in either case, I prefer maximizing meme-similar persons, not gene-similar ones, so my actions are self-consistent regardless. I’m acausally trading with an entity other than Azathoth.
I followed you until
which entity are you trading with? We haven’t gone back to talking about Prometheus, have we?
I might like to increase the number of meme-similar persons in my universe, but I don’t really care about meme-similar persons in universes that can’t influence mine. Even this is something I feel relatively weakly about. It’s also just a personal difference in values, and I can reason pretending I share yours.
I dunno, whichever entity can be considered the meme-equivalent of Azathoth. “Entity” should probably be in scare-quotes.
I don’t see any evidence for that hypothesis in the scenario itself. Could you explain why one would draw that from the narrative?
Assume MWI
But that’s not true? I already exist. There’s nothing acausal going on here. I can pick whatever I want, and it just makes Prometheus wrong.
(Similarly, if Omega presented me with the same problem, but said that he (omniscient) had only created me if I would one-box this problem, I would still (assuming I am not hit by a meteor or something from outside the problem affects my brain) two-box. It would just make Omega wrong. If that contradicts the problem, well, then the problem was paradoxical to begin with.)
It is not money we care about, it is utility. In both cases the predictor is long gone.
When Prometheus is preparing his choice he doesn’t know whether you will one box—once he does know he is more or less done deciding and just the implementation is left. Now he believes that you will one box—but he is long gone.
In both cases there is always going to be the $1,000 in the little box. In both cases you are always going to take the big box.