(In this post, I find the word ‘Newcomb’ in the title to be misleading unless there’s some Newcomb-like aspect that I’m missing.)
Whether or not it’s truly Newcomb-like is the question. The way I’m suggesting you see it is that in addition to the $100, you are in Box B if and only if you one-box. Otherwise, you’re nowhere. You don’t cease to exist, you cease to have ever existed (which might be better or worse than dying, but certainly sounds bad).
You don’t cease to exist, you cease to have ever existed (which might be better or worse than dying, but certainly sounds bad).
You applied this to evolution as if this was a grave concern of yours. Surely you don’t believe that the universe will un-exist you for failing to have lots of children?!
The very idea of having never existed makes no sense! In a simulation, the masters could run back time and start again without you, but you still existed in the first run of the simulation. Once you’ve existed, that’s it. You can believe that your future existence is in jeopardy, but I don’t see how you can believe that you will cease to never have existed, much less how one can actually cease to have ever existed.
Modify the scenario to include MWI. Maybe in THIS universe you will continue to exist if you two-box, in then in the overwhelming majority of universes you will have never been created. If you one-box, then it’s likely that in the overwhelming majority of universes you do exist.
If you one-box, then it’s likely that in the overwhelming majority of universes you do exist.
This is incorrect, but I understand the spirit of what you’re trying to say (that the number of universes that I exist in is overwhelmingly larger—no matter what, I exist in an infinitesimally small number of universes).
Regardless, this interpretation still doesn’t make you cease to have ever existed. Maybe you exist less, whatever that means, but you still exist. Personally, I don’t care about existing less frequently.
Lastly, do you think this interpretation allows the problem to pertain to evolution? I still don’t think so, but the reasons are more nuanced than the reasons I think the original problem doesn’t.
I think it may. I’m still not convinced that MWI universes differ in any appreciable way at the macro level. It may be that every other instance of me lived an identical life except with slightly different atoms making up his molecules.
But in either case, I prefer maximizing meme-similar persons, not gene-similar ones, so my actions are self-consistent regardless. I’m acausally trading with an entity other than Azathoth.
I’m acausally trading with an entity other than Azathoth.
which entity are you trading with? We haven’t gone back to talking about Prometheus, have we?
I might like to increase the number of meme-similar persons in my universe, but I don’t really care about meme-similar persons in universes that can’t influence mine. Even this is something I feel relatively weakly about. It’s also just a personal difference in values, and I can reason pretending I share yours.
But that’s not true? I already exist. There’s nothing acausal going on here. I can pick whatever I want, and it just makes Prometheus wrong.
(Similarly, if Omega presented me with the same problem, but said that he (omniscient) had only created me if I would one-box this problem, I would still (assuming I am not hit by a meteor or something from outside the problem affects my brain) two-box. It would just make Omega wrong. If that contradicts the problem, well, then the problem was paradoxical to begin with.)
Whether or not it’s truly Newcomb-like is the question. The way I’m suggesting you see it is that in addition to the $100, you are in Box B if and only if you one-box. Otherwise, you’re nowhere. You don’t cease to exist, you cease to have ever existed (which might be better or worse than dying, but certainly sounds bad).
You applied this to evolution as if this was a grave concern of yours. Surely you don’t believe that the universe will un-exist you for failing to have lots of children?!
The very idea of having never existed makes no sense! In a simulation, the masters could run back time and start again without you, but you still existed in the first run of the simulation. Once you’ve existed, that’s it. You can believe that your future existence is in jeopardy, but I don’t see how you can believe that you will cease to never have existed, much less how one can actually cease to have ever existed.
Modify the scenario to include MWI. Maybe in THIS universe you will continue to exist if you two-box, in then in the overwhelming majority of universes you will have never been created. If you one-box, then it’s likely that in the overwhelming majority of universes you do exist.
This is incorrect, but I understand the spirit of what you’re trying to say (that the number of universes that I exist in is overwhelmingly larger—no matter what, I exist in an infinitesimally small number of universes).
Regardless, this interpretation still doesn’t make you cease to have ever existed. Maybe you exist less, whatever that means, but you still exist. Personally, I don’t care about existing less frequently.
Lastly, do you think this interpretation allows the problem to pertain to evolution? I still don’t think so, but the reasons are more nuanced than the reasons I think the original problem doesn’t.
I think it may. I’m still not convinced that MWI universes differ in any appreciable way at the macro level. It may be that every other instance of me lived an identical life except with slightly different atoms making up his molecules.
But in either case, I prefer maximizing meme-similar persons, not gene-similar ones, so my actions are self-consistent regardless. I’m acausally trading with an entity other than Azathoth.
I followed you until
which entity are you trading with? We haven’t gone back to talking about Prometheus, have we?
I might like to increase the number of meme-similar persons in my universe, but I don’t really care about meme-similar persons in universes that can’t influence mine. Even this is something I feel relatively weakly about. It’s also just a personal difference in values, and I can reason pretending I share yours.
I dunno, whichever entity can be considered the meme-equivalent of Azathoth. “Entity” should probably be in scare-quotes.
I don’t see any evidence for that hypothesis in the scenario itself. Could you explain why one would draw that from the narrative?
Assume MWI
But that’s not true? I already exist. There’s nothing acausal going on here. I can pick whatever I want, and it just makes Prometheus wrong.
(Similarly, if Omega presented me with the same problem, but said that he (omniscient) had only created me if I would one-box this problem, I would still (assuming I am not hit by a meteor or something from outside the problem affects my brain) two-box. It would just make Omega wrong. If that contradicts the problem, well, then the problem was paradoxical to begin with.)