This reminds me of a discussion a while back where I was interpreting Calvinist predestination as equivalent to Newcomb and Eliezer was interpreting it as equivalent to Smoking Lesion.
I think the difference involves whether the state is linked to a single urge or input, or whether it’s linked to your entire decision-making process.
In the smoking lesion problem, your genotype is linked to whether or not you feel an urge to smoke. Once you feel the urge, the interesting decision theoretic bit is done; you can then decide whether or not to smoke knowing that it can’t possibly affect your genotype.
In Newcomb’s problem, the money in the boxes is linked to your final decision, so changing your decision can (in theory) change the money you find in the box.
This seems more like Newcomb’s to me in that whether or not your genes are passed on is linked to whether or not you ultimately decide to reproduce—so I think the Newcombness of the problem is legitimate.
This seems more like Newcomb’s to me in that whether or not your genes are passed on is linked to whether or not you ultimately decide to reproduce—so I think the Newcombness of the problem is legitimate.
I might suggest that whether or not your genes are passed on is linked to whether or not you decide to gain status and have a lot of sex. At the scale where we consider Azathoth birth control barely comes into consideration.
In fact, when playing this game with Azathoth it may best to go ahead and submit to your every promiscuous desire while at the same time being practical with contraception. The ability to follow your instincts while hypocritically gaming the system is a trait that Azathoth holds in high esteem and if we care to anthropomorphise him at all we must consider him as if he thinks as though it was still some time in the past we know he doesn’t care much about condoms, pills and abortions. So it’s like primary school all over—punch him in the face and then you can be friends.
If what you’re saying is that genes directly affect promiscuity and sex drive, but are too low-resolution to directly affect things like whether or not you use condoms, that sounds like a good solution. Although it’s not the least convenient possible world and I’m still curious whether an alien being with stronger genetic determinism should take this argument into account.
Whether my genes are passed on after me is linked to whether I reproduce, much as (in the relevant versions of Newcomb) the money in Box B is linked to whether I take Box A. But whether my genes were passed on before me is not linked to whether I reproduced, much as (in the smoking-lesion problem) my cancer status is not linked to whether I smoke.
Think of this at the genetic level, not the personal level. Let’s say you have a gene G, which affects decision-making about reproduction. If G causes people to decide not to reproduce, then your ancestors possessing gene G will have not reproduced and you won’t exist. If G makes you decide to reproduce, then your ancestors will have reproduced and you will exist. If we interpret decisions as altering the output of the algorithm that produced them, then deciding not to reproduce can alter the effects of gene G and therefore affect your ancestors with the gene.
This reminds me of a discussion a while back where I was interpreting Calvinist predestination as equivalent to Newcomb and Eliezer was interpreting it as equivalent to Smoking Lesion.
I think the difference involves whether the state is linked to a single urge or input, or whether it’s linked to your entire decision-making process.
In the smoking lesion problem, your genotype is linked to whether or not you feel an urge to smoke. Once you feel the urge, the interesting decision theoretic bit is done; you can then decide whether or not to smoke knowing that it can’t possibly affect your genotype.
In Newcomb’s problem, the money in the boxes is linked to your final decision, so changing your decision can (in theory) change the money you find in the box.
This seems more like Newcomb’s to me in that whether or not your genes are passed on is linked to whether or not you ultimately decide to reproduce—so I think the Newcombness of the problem is legitimate.
I might suggest that whether or not your genes are passed on is linked to whether or not you decide to gain status and have a lot of sex. At the scale where we consider Azathoth birth control barely comes into consideration.
In fact, when playing this game with Azathoth it may best to go ahead and submit to your every promiscuous desire while at the same time being practical with contraception. The ability to follow your instincts while hypocritically gaming the system is a trait that Azathoth holds in high esteem and if we care to anthropomorphise him at all we must consider him as if he thinks as though it was still some time in the past we know he doesn’t care much about condoms, pills and abortions. So it’s like primary school all over—punch him in the face and then you can be friends.
If what you’re saying is that genes directly affect promiscuity and sex drive, but are too low-resolution to directly affect things like whether or not you use condoms, that sounds like a good solution. Although it’s not the least convenient possible world and I’m still curious whether an alien being with stronger genetic determinism should take this argument into account.
Whether my genes are passed on after me is linked to whether I reproduce, much as (in the relevant versions of Newcomb) the money in Box B is linked to whether I take Box A. But whether my genes were passed on before me is not linked to whether I reproduced, much as (in the smoking-lesion problem) my cancer status is not linked to whether I smoke.
Think of this at the genetic level, not the personal level. Let’s say you have a gene G, which affects decision-making about reproduction. If G causes people to decide not to reproduce, then your ancestors possessing gene G will have not reproduced and you won’t exist. If G makes you decide to reproduce, then your ancestors will have reproduced and you will exist. If we interpret decisions as altering the output of the algorithm that produced them, then deciding not to reproduce can alter the effects of gene G and therefore affect your ancestors with the gene.
This is false.
Even though G causes people to decide not to reproduce, my ancestors possessing gene G still reproduced, and I do exist.