If an angry empty crack pipe demands you stop daydreaming, then it should be thought more likely than before that the memory isn’t of something that really happened.
If you are thinking that you are thinking of something, you could be wrong. Thinking the thought “Mouse” is what it feels like to think of a mouse, thinking “I’m thinking of a mouse” is what it feels like to think of thinking of a mouse.
Ideally, whenever you discover that you have mis-remembered something, you should lower your overall confidence in the accuracy of your memories.
Or perhaps you mean it in the sense of “What is the probably that I (the person hearing this sentence in an internal monologue) exist?”. That one is tricky. But, however you resolve the anthropic dilemma there, you still shouldn’t assign it a probability of 1, if only because, very occasionally, other things that seemed just as ludicrously obviously true in the past have later been shown to be false.
You misunderstood, not that the stimulus correlated to anything, but that I myself experienced the memory of the stimulus. This does not mean i had the stimulus, nor that I hallucinated it, simply that I now have the experience of having remembered the stimulus. How could I be wrong about that? What sense does it make to question if you recall something? Again, not if you recall it accurately, but if you recall it all. How might I think I remember one stimulus, and find that i actually remembered another?
Okay, so you mean something like from my second paragraph, right?
The reason you shouldn’t assign a probability of exactly 1 to any belief, even to things that you can’t imagine being wrong about, is that in the past, intelligent and well-educated people have also believed things that they also couldn’t imagine being wrong about. And then later, been wrong. Usually because they were making some assumption that they weren’t even aware of.
Setting a probability of 1, for a Bayesian, is saying “I will never ever ever adjust my subjective probability for this belief downwards, no matter what.” Putting yourself in that position is not a good idea.
Furthermore, the belief in question has a lot to do with consciousness and internal experience. This is a poorly understood field, so beliefs in this area deserve special scrutiny.
What evidence could I observe that would lower my probability that I remember a stimulus?
If an angry empty crack pipe demands you stop daydreaming, then it should be thought more likely than before that the memory isn’t of something that really happened.
If you are thinking that you are thinking of something, you could be wrong. Thinking the thought “Mouse” is what it feels like to think of a mouse, thinking “I’m thinking of a mouse” is what it feels like to think of thinking of a mouse.
If you can demonstrate that I can be wrong about thinking I’m thinking something I’ll retract my OP.
Of course that I remember the appearance of the crack pipe, does not need for it to be that there was a crack pipe.
Ideally, whenever you discover that you have mis-remembered something, you should lower your overall confidence in the accuracy of your memories.
Or perhaps you mean it in the sense of “What is the probably that I (the person hearing this sentence in an internal monologue) exist?”. That one is tricky. But, however you resolve the anthropic dilemma there, you still shouldn’t assign it a probability of 1, if only because, very occasionally, other things that seemed just as ludicrously obviously true in the past have later been shown to be false.
You misunderstood, not that the stimulus correlated to anything, but that I myself experienced the memory of the stimulus. This does not mean i had the stimulus, nor that I hallucinated it, simply that I now have the experience of having remembered the stimulus. How could I be wrong about that? What sense does it make to question if you recall something? Again, not if you recall it accurately, but if you recall it all. How might I think I remember one stimulus, and find that i actually remembered another?
Okay, so you mean something like from my second paragraph, right?
The reason you shouldn’t assign a probability of exactly 1 to any belief, even to things that you can’t imagine being wrong about, is that in the past, intelligent and well-educated people have also believed things that they also couldn’t imagine being wrong about. And then later, been wrong. Usually because they were making some assumption that they weren’t even aware of.
Setting a probability of 1, for a Bayesian, is saying “I will never ever ever adjust my subjective probability for this belief downwards, no matter what.” Putting yourself in that position is not a good idea.
Furthermore, the belief in question has a lot to do with consciousness and internal experience. This is a poorly understood field, so beliefs in this area deserve special scrutiny.