You misunderstood, not that the stimulus correlated to anything, but that I myself experienced the memory of the stimulus. This does not mean i had the stimulus, nor that I hallucinated it, simply that I now have the experience of having remembered the stimulus. How could I be wrong about that? What sense does it make to question if you recall something? Again, not if you recall it accurately, but if you recall it all. How might I think I remember one stimulus, and find that i actually remembered another?
Okay, so you mean something like from my second paragraph, right?
The reason you shouldn’t assign a probability of exactly 1 to any belief, even to things that you can’t imagine being wrong about, is that in the past, intelligent and well-educated people have also believed things that they also couldn’t imagine being wrong about. And then later, been wrong. Usually because they were making some assumption that they weren’t even aware of.
Setting a probability of 1, for a Bayesian, is saying “I will never ever ever adjust my subjective probability for this belief downwards, no matter what.” Putting yourself in that position is not a good idea.
Furthermore, the belief in question has a lot to do with consciousness and internal experience. This is a poorly understood field, so beliefs in this area deserve special scrutiny.
You misunderstood, not that the stimulus correlated to anything, but that I myself experienced the memory of the stimulus. This does not mean i had the stimulus, nor that I hallucinated it, simply that I now have the experience of having remembered the stimulus. How could I be wrong about that? What sense does it make to question if you recall something? Again, not if you recall it accurately, but if you recall it all. How might I think I remember one stimulus, and find that i actually remembered another?
Okay, so you mean something like from my second paragraph, right?
The reason you shouldn’t assign a probability of exactly 1 to any belief, even to things that you can’t imagine being wrong about, is that in the past, intelligent and well-educated people have also believed things that they also couldn’t imagine being wrong about. And then later, been wrong. Usually because they were making some assumption that they weren’t even aware of.
Setting a probability of 1, for a Bayesian, is saying “I will never ever ever adjust my subjective probability for this belief downwards, no matter what.” Putting yourself in that position is not a good idea.
Furthermore, the belief in question has a lot to do with consciousness and internal experience. This is a poorly understood field, so beliefs in this area deserve special scrutiny.