You’re not gonna die from donating a kidney. At worst you run the risk of some minor health issues. You’ll still be up and running to do more altruism for a long time—if you die a few years early, it will be at an age when your capacity to do altruism has greatly diminished.
Although you might right—among the capable, there are many who might lose more than the $2,500 dollars that Givewell things it takes to save one life by donating a kidney, due to time spent not working. Blood and bone marrow are probably a different story.
But even if you take the part about donating kidneys and bone marrow out...with a few exceptions for certain individuals with specialized skillsets you still have to single mindedly focus on making as much money as you can for donation.
There seems to be some confusion. I am saying that in addition to the altruistic trait prescribing acts like kidney donation (and much more) that trait also means that ending one’s own life in such a trade would be prohibited for the most people. (Unless they have life insurance on themselves for as much or more than the expected value of their future altruistic acts and an efficient charity as beneficiary. But I’d consider exceptions that make dying a good thing somewhat beyond the scope of the ethics question.)
You are saying that someone who lives a life of austere self-sacrifice would not trade themselves in the trolley problem because, since the people they are saving are probably not extreme altruists, they could contribute more net utility by remaining alive and allowing the others to die?
I guess I agree. It would hinge on how many people were being saved. I’m not sure what the average person’s net utility is (helping dependents such as children and spouse adds to the disutility resulting from death here), so I don’t know how many lives it takes to justify the death of an extreme altruist of average ability.
Also, this only applies to extreme altruists—the rest of us can’t use this as an excuse!
You are saying that someone who lives a life of austere self-sacrifice would not trade themselves in the trolley problem because, since the people they are saving are probably not extreme altruists, they could contribute more net utility by remaining alive and allowing the others to die?
Yes.
I guess I agree. It would hinge on how many people were being saved.
Yes. It would need to be more than you could save via earning as much money as possible and buying lives as cheaply as possible. Certainly more than 5 for most people (living in my country and most likely yours).
I’m not sure what the average person’s net utility is (helping dependents such as children and spouse adds to the disutility resulting from death here)
The average person’s net utility doesn’t matter, since so far we have only been comparing saving average people to saving more average people. What could matter is if for some reason we believed that the 5 people on the track had more net utility per person than the (statistical) people expected to be saved by future altruistic efforts.
Also, this only applies to extreme altruists—the rest of us can’t use this as an excuse!
For the extreme altruist this isn’t an excuse (any more than a paperclip maximiser needs an excuse to create paperclips). The rest of us don’t need an excuse (although given the extreme utility differences at play there are many people who both could use it as an excuse but would refrain from suicide even without it). I find that thinking in terms of ‘excuses’ is something of a hinderance. The wrong intuitions come into play (ie. the ones where we make up bullshit that sounds good to others instead of the ones where we make good decisions).
saving average people to saving more average people
Not so—we are comparing saving average people to saving people who would have died without aid.
It’s possible (and I’m not making this claim, just pointing out the possibility) that the type of person who’s life can be saved as cheaply as possible is contributing less net good to the lives of other people than the average person (who is self sufficient). In real-world terms, it is plausible that the latter is more likely to support a family or even donate money. I’m not saying that some people have more intrinsic value—but the deaths of some people might weigh more heavily on the survivors than the deaths of others.
Since humans are social animals, the total dis-utility resulting from the death of a human is {intrinsic value of human life} + {value that this individual contributes to other humans}. As I said before:
helping dependents such as children and spouse adds to the dis-utility resulting from death
I find that thinking in terms of ‘excuses’ is something of a hinderance.
I agree. I feel that people should never use excuses, at least never within their own minds—but the fact is that humans aren’t neat like utility functions, and do use excuses to negotiate clashing preferences within themselves. That is why I felt the need to point out that other people who are reading this conversation should not use the (correct) observation you made about extreme altruists and apply it to themselves - it’s quite conceivable that someone who was struggling with this moral dilemma would use it as a way to get out of admitting that they aren’t living up to their ideal of “good”.
It’s possible (and I’m not making this claim, just pointing out the possibility) that the type of person who’s life can be saved as cheaply as possible is contributing less net good to the lives of other people than the average person (who is self sufficient). In real-world terms, it is plausible that the latter is more likely to support a family or even donate money. I’m not saying that some people have more intrinsic value—but the deaths of some people might weigh more heavily on the survivors than the deaths of others.
Please see the sentence after the one you quoted.
That is why I felt the need to point out that other people who are reading this conversation should not use the (correct) observation you made about extreme altruists and apply it to themselves
I felt (and feel) obliged to point out to the same people that it is often an error to be persuaded to do Y by someone telling you that “X is no excuse not to do Y”. Accepting that kind of framing can amount to allowing another to modify your preferences. Allowing others to change your preferences tends to be disadvantageous.
You’re not gonna die from donating a kidney. At worst you run the risk of some minor health issues. You’ll still be up and running to do more altruism for a long time—if you die a few years early, it will be at an age when your capacity to do altruism has greatly diminished.
Although you might right—among the capable, there are many who might lose more than the $2,500 dollars that Givewell things it takes to save one life by donating a kidney, due to time spent not working. Blood and bone marrow are probably a different story.
But even if you take the part about donating kidneys and bone marrow out...with a few exceptions for certain individuals with specialized skillsets you still have to single mindedly focus on making as much money as you can for donation.
There seems to be some confusion. I am saying that in addition to the altruistic trait prescribing acts like kidney donation (and much more) that trait also means that ending one’s own life in such a trade would be prohibited for the most people. (Unless they have life insurance on themselves for as much or more than the expected value of their future altruistic acts and an efficient charity as beneficiary. But I’d consider exceptions that make dying a good thing somewhat beyond the scope of the ethics question.)
Oh, ok.
You are saying that someone who lives a life of austere self-sacrifice would not trade themselves in the trolley problem because, since the people they are saving are probably not extreme altruists, they could contribute more net utility by remaining alive and allowing the others to die?
I guess I agree. It would hinge on how many people were being saved. I’m not sure what the average person’s net utility is (helping dependents such as children and spouse adds to the disutility resulting from death here), so I don’t know how many lives it takes to justify the death of an extreme altruist of average ability.
Also, this only applies to extreme altruists—the rest of us can’t use this as an excuse!
Yes.
Yes. It would need to be more than you could save via earning as much money as possible and buying lives as cheaply as possible. Certainly more than 5 for most people (living in my country and most likely yours).
The average person’s net utility doesn’t matter, since so far we have only been comparing saving average people to saving more average people. What could matter is if for some reason we believed that the 5 people on the track had more net utility per person than the (statistical) people expected to be saved by future altruistic efforts.
For the extreme altruist this isn’t an excuse (any more than a paperclip maximiser needs an excuse to create paperclips). The rest of us don’t need an excuse (although given the extreme utility differences at play there are many people who both could use it as an excuse but would refrain from suicide even without it). I find that thinking in terms of ‘excuses’ is something of a hinderance. The wrong intuitions come into play (ie. the ones where we make up bullshit that sounds good to others instead of the ones where we make good decisions).
Not so—we are comparing saving average people to saving people who would have died without aid.
It’s possible (and I’m not making this claim, just pointing out the possibility) that the type of person who’s life can be saved as cheaply as possible is contributing less net good to the lives of other people than the average person (who is self sufficient). In real-world terms, it is plausible that the latter is more likely to support a family or even donate money. I’m not saying that some people have more intrinsic value—but the deaths of some people might weigh more heavily on the survivors than the deaths of others.
Since humans are social animals, the total dis-utility resulting from the death of a human is {intrinsic value of human life} + {value that this individual contributes to other humans}. As I said before:
I agree. I feel that people should never use excuses, at least never within their own minds—but the fact is that humans aren’t neat like utility functions, and do use excuses to negotiate clashing preferences within themselves. That is why I felt the need to point out that other people who are reading this conversation should not use the (correct) observation you made about extreme altruists and apply it to themselves - it’s quite conceivable that someone who was struggling with this moral dilemma would use it as a way to get out of admitting that they aren’t living up to their ideal of “good”.
Please see the sentence after the one you quoted.
I felt (and feel) obliged to point out to the same people that it is often an error to be persuaded to do Y by someone telling you that “X is no excuse not to do Y”. Accepting that kind of framing can amount to allowing another to modify your preferences. Allowing others to change your preferences tends to be disadvantageous.