saving average people to saving more average people
Not so—we are comparing saving average people to saving people who would have died without aid.
It’s possible (and I’m not making this claim, just pointing out the possibility) that the type of person who’s life can be saved as cheaply as possible is contributing less net good to the lives of other people than the average person (who is self sufficient). In real-world terms, it is plausible that the latter is more likely to support a family or even donate money. I’m not saying that some people have more intrinsic value—but the deaths of some people might weigh more heavily on the survivors than the deaths of others.
Since humans are social animals, the total dis-utility resulting from the death of a human is {intrinsic value of human life} + {value that this individual contributes to other humans}. As I said before:
helping dependents such as children and spouse adds to the dis-utility resulting from death
I find that thinking in terms of ‘excuses’ is something of a hinderance.
I agree. I feel that people should never use excuses, at least never within their own minds—but the fact is that humans aren’t neat like utility functions, and do use excuses to negotiate clashing preferences within themselves. That is why I felt the need to point out that other people who are reading this conversation should not use the (correct) observation you made about extreme altruists and apply it to themselves - it’s quite conceivable that someone who was struggling with this moral dilemma would use it as a way to get out of admitting that they aren’t living up to their ideal of “good”.
It’s possible (and I’m not making this claim, just pointing out the possibility) that the type of person who’s life can be saved as cheaply as possible is contributing less net good to the lives of other people than the average person (who is self sufficient). In real-world terms, it is plausible that the latter is more likely to support a family or even donate money. I’m not saying that some people have more intrinsic value—but the deaths of some people might weigh more heavily on the survivors than the deaths of others.
Please see the sentence after the one you quoted.
That is why I felt the need to point out that other people who are reading this conversation should not use the (correct) observation you made about extreme altruists and apply it to themselves
I felt (and feel) obliged to point out to the same people that it is often an error to be persuaded to do Y by someone telling you that “X is no excuse not to do Y”. Accepting that kind of framing can amount to allowing another to modify your preferences. Allowing others to change your preferences tends to be disadvantageous.
Not so—we are comparing saving average people to saving people who would have died without aid.
It’s possible (and I’m not making this claim, just pointing out the possibility) that the type of person who’s life can be saved as cheaply as possible is contributing less net good to the lives of other people than the average person (who is self sufficient). In real-world terms, it is plausible that the latter is more likely to support a family or even donate money. I’m not saying that some people have more intrinsic value—but the deaths of some people might weigh more heavily on the survivors than the deaths of others.
Since humans are social animals, the total dis-utility resulting from the death of a human is {intrinsic value of human life} + {value that this individual contributes to other humans}. As I said before:
I agree. I feel that people should never use excuses, at least never within their own minds—but the fact is that humans aren’t neat like utility functions, and do use excuses to negotiate clashing preferences within themselves. That is why I felt the need to point out that other people who are reading this conversation should not use the (correct) observation you made about extreme altruists and apply it to themselves - it’s quite conceivable that someone who was struggling with this moral dilemma would use it as a way to get out of admitting that they aren’t living up to their ideal of “good”.
Please see the sentence after the one you quoted.
I felt (and feel) obliged to point out to the same people that it is often an error to be persuaded to do Y by someone telling you that “X is no excuse not to do Y”. Accepting that kind of framing can amount to allowing another to modify your preferences. Allowing others to change your preferences tends to be disadvantageous.