we punish those who steal from old ladies, because the stealing is wrong.
I would say we punish those who steal from old ladies because we would prefer the old ladies not be stolen from. It is that preference, the subjective value we all (except the thief of course) place on a society where the meek are not abused by criminals, that causes us to call that behavior “wrong”.
The evolutionary origins of that preference seem pretty obvious. In any group of social animals there will be one or two top physical competitors, and the remainder would be subject to their will. Of those many weaker individuals, the ones who survived to procreate were those who banded together to make bully-free tribes.
Ok, so I punish so as to achieve my preference that old ladies not be stolen from. Yet I do not punish to achieve my preferences in other matters. For that matter, I do not punish to transfer funds from healthy young males to impoverished old ladies who have not been stolen from, though the consequentialist results seem so parallel. I would prefer that old ladies not be impoverished, regardless of whether they became impoverished by theft.
So, if you can explain why I feel the urge to punish in one case but not the others, you are on your way to “solving metaethics’.
I do not punish to transfer funds from healthy young males to impoverished old ladies who have not been stolen from, though the consequentialist results seem so parallel.
I would think that this is usually referred to as “taxation”, and is actually practiced on a fairly regular basis?
The extreme point where we try to make sure everyone receives according to their needs, and provides according to their ability, is “communism”, and seems to be widely considered as a failure state.
“Socialism” seems to have emerged as a compromise between the goal of taxation, and the desire to avoid the communist failure state.
I feel like I’m obviously trivializing something complex here, but I’m genuinely not sure what I’m missing.
I feel like I’m obviously trivializing something complex here, but I’m genuinely not sure what I’m missing.
One difference is that “Perplexed” is talking about anger as an individual emotional response, and you’re finding it analogous to taxation which is something that happens in society, rather than individually, and generally doesn’t have strong emotions with it.
I’m always inclined to classify things like this as psychology. “Perplexed” has an emotional response, that’s fine, we can ask a psychologist to explain it, but I don’t see an useful role of metaethics in that, perhaps because I don’t really know a referent for the word “metaethics”.
One difference is that “Perplexed” is talking about anger as an individual emotional response …
Uh, no I’m not. I haven’t even mentioned anger. I’m talking about punishment. Which, as a moral realist, I’m claiming is a moral issue. And, given my particular flavor of moral realism, that means that there is a closely related practical issue (involving deterence, etc.).
I am not interested in explaining anger as an instinctive signal that it is time to punish—though I’m sure evolutionary psychologists can do so. I’m far more interested in explaining punishment as a moral and practical response to some particular class of actions—actions that I call “immoral”.
As to what handoflixue is missing, I would say that he probably wasn’t paying attention in school when communism and socialism were defined, or else he missed the fact that exhibitions of political “attitude” are not appreciated here. Compared to that, his suggestion that redistributive taxation is something like the kind of punishment I claimed doesn’t exist, …, well that suggestion seems rather innocent.
One difference is that “Perplexed” is talking about anger as an individual emotional response …
Uh, no I’m not. I haven’t even mentioned anger. I’m talking about punishment.
Yes, you’re right (in the sense that you’re making a true statement about what you said before), and I’m wrong. I misunderstood your position.
After acknowledging that I misunderstood you, I’d like to make use of my now probably-correct understanding of what you meant, but unfortunately I have nothing useful to say. I’d need a definition of “moral reality” to start with, assuming that’s what you think you are perceiving as a moral realist.
For that matter, I do not punish to transfer funds from healthy young males to impoverished old ladies who have not been stolen from
There are people who feel there is a moral imperative to do just that. Likewise, there is wide disagreement over what deserves punishment. An orthodox Jew, a Muslim, a Catholic, a Lutheran, a Communist, and a Vulcan walk into a bar… I’m sure we can all see the potential for punchlines.
You may punish action X which violates your preferences because you want to see people punished for action X. You could simultaneously choose not to punish action Y which violates your preferences, because for whatever reason you would prefer people not be punished for it. Others could disagree, and people often do disagree on what deserves punishment and what doesn’t.
Neither side in such a debate is objectively incorrect. Each would indeed prefer their position of punishment or non-punishment.
Neither side in such a debate is objectively incorrect.
And a moral realist, such as myself, thinks you are dead wrong about that. I have offered an objective criterion for choosing sides in the debate, as well as a justification for that criterion that is ultimately based on satisfying people’s preferences to the greatest extent possible. Yet you are unimpressed and go back to reciting your original opinions.
I have offered an objective criterion for choosing sides in the debate, as well as a justification for that criterion that is ultimately based on satisfying people’s preferences to the greatest extent possible.
I couldn’t find where you did this in the parents. Could you link or repeat?
Thanks. Interesting thread. It’s a nice hope. It makes me feel good to imagine that it works, and our alien overlords will therefore be fair :)
Not much for me hangs in the balance with this question. I already know that if I feel like I’m a good person, It feels good. But of course I’m interested in how this self-satisfaction lines up with how people are generally judged. I guess it would become crucial if I became more aggressive. Most people are really cautious (at least as far as their image goes).
Ok, so I punish so as to achieve my preference that old ladies not be stolen from. Yet I do not punish to achieve my preferences in other matters.
I’ll bet you do punish people if those matters make you (and enough others) as angry as old ladies being stolen from does.
For that matter, I do not punish to transfer funds from healthy young males to impoverished old ladies who have not been stolen from, though the consequentialist results seem so parallel.
Anyone who votes for welfare does this. (Not saying this is right or wrong, just a fact.)
So, if you can explain why I feel the urge to punish in one case but not the others, you are on your way to “solving metaethics’.
If something makes you angry, and it is socially acceptable to punish it, you may well decide to punish it. I don’t see anything to solve.
If something makes you angry, and it is socially acceptable to punish it, you may well decide to punish it. I don’t see anything to solve.
Hmmm. Perhaps you don’t see the problem because you think like a scientist. Come up with a causal explanation of why people sometimes punish, and you are done.
I on the other hand, am thinking like an engineer. Simply understanding the universe is pointless. I want to use my understanding to change the universe so that it is more to my taste. Therefore, I want to know when I should punish.
We probably both agree that evolution “invented” anger precisely because organisms that punish at the right times are more successful than organisms that punish at the wrong times or perhaps never punish at all. So anger causes punishment. A scientist is satisfied. But there is more to it than that.
Why did natural selection ‘choose’ to make me angry at some things and not make me angry at other things? Can I decide for myself whether to punish, ignoring the cue of my anger? Will I be more successful if I use my reason to make those decisions rather than using my emotions? And does any of this have anything to do with this mysterious thing ‘morality’ that people keep talking about?
I can understand people not being curious about such questions. But I have trouble understanding why people at a rationality blog site are not only incurious, but so often inclined to brag about their lack of interest!
The thought of mentioning other reasons why to punish (such as to make people behave more to your liking) did cross my mind, but I thought it was obvious enough. In fact, there are still other reasons to punish. Someone might reply to your post, “You are thinking like an engineer. I am thinking like a social animal. I want to know when I should punish: I want to use my understanding of social dynamics to make people respect me more. I want to know what it signals about me when I punish someone.”
As I said here, there are a lot of different reasons to use moral language (most of them sort of dark-arts-ish, which is why I guess that post was downvoted), and likewise there are a lot of different reasons to punish.
Do the evolutionary origins of rationality mean that we can eliminate truth and rationality in favour of belief and opinion? Can the arguments for moral relativism not be redeployed as arguments for alethic relativism?
I would say we punish those who steal from old ladies because we would prefer the old ladies not be stolen from. It is that preference, the subjective value we all (except the thief of course) place on a society where the meek are not abused by criminals, that causes us to call that behavior “wrong”.
The evolutionary origins of that preference seem pretty obvious. In any group of social animals there will be one or two top physical competitors, and the remainder would be subject to their will. Of those many weaker individuals, the ones who survived to procreate were those who banded together to make bully-free tribes.
Ok, so I punish so as to achieve my preference that old ladies not be stolen from. Yet I do not punish to achieve my preferences in other matters. For that matter, I do not punish to transfer funds from healthy young males to impoverished old ladies who have not been stolen from, though the consequentialist results seem so parallel. I would prefer that old ladies not be impoverished, regardless of whether they became impoverished by theft.
So, if you can explain why I feel the urge to punish in one case but not the others, you are on your way to “solving metaethics’.
I would think that this is usually referred to as “taxation”, and is actually practiced on a fairly regular basis?
The extreme point where we try to make sure everyone receives according to their needs, and provides according to their ability, is “communism”, and seems to be widely considered as a failure state.
“Socialism” seems to have emerged as a compromise between the goal of taxation, and the desire to avoid the communist failure state.
I feel like I’m obviously trivializing something complex here, but I’m genuinely not sure what I’m missing.
One difference is that “Perplexed” is talking about anger as an individual emotional response, and you’re finding it analogous to taxation which is something that happens in society, rather than individually, and generally doesn’t have strong emotions with it.
I’m always inclined to classify things like this as psychology. “Perplexed” has an emotional response, that’s fine, we can ask a psychologist to explain it, but I don’t see an useful role of metaethics in that, perhaps because I don’t really know a referent for the word “metaethics”.
Uh, no I’m not. I haven’t even mentioned anger. I’m talking about punishment. Which, as a moral realist, I’m claiming is a moral issue. And, given my particular flavor of moral realism, that means that there is a closely related practical issue (involving deterence, etc.).
I am not interested in explaining anger as an instinctive signal that it is time to punish—though I’m sure evolutionary psychologists can do so. I’m far more interested in explaining punishment as a moral and practical response to some particular class of actions—actions that I call “immoral”.
As to what handoflixue is missing, I would say that he probably wasn’t paying attention in school when communism and socialism were defined, or else he missed the fact that exhibitions of political “attitude” are not appreciated here. Compared to that, his suggestion that redistributive taxation is something like the kind of punishment I claimed doesn’t exist, …, well that suggestion seems rather innocent.
Yes, you’re right (in the sense that you’re making a true statement about what you said before), and I’m wrong. I misunderstood your position.
After acknowledging that I misunderstood you, I’d like to make use of my now probably-correct understanding of what you meant, but unfortunately I have nothing useful to say. I’d need a definition of “moral reality” to start with, assuming that’s what you think you are perceiving as a moral realist.
There are people who feel there is a moral imperative to do just that. Likewise, there is wide disagreement over what deserves punishment. An orthodox Jew, a Muslim, a Catholic, a Lutheran, a Communist, and a Vulcan walk into a bar… I’m sure we can all see the potential for punchlines.
You may punish action X which violates your preferences because you want to see people punished for action X. You could simultaneously choose not to punish action Y which violates your preferences, because for whatever reason you would prefer people not be punished for it. Others could disagree, and people often do disagree on what deserves punishment and what doesn’t.
Neither side in such a debate is objectively incorrect. Each would indeed prefer their position of punishment or non-punishment.
And a moral realist, such as myself, thinks you are dead wrong about that. I have offered an objective criterion for choosing sides in the debate, as well as a justification for that criterion that is ultimately based on satisfying people’s preferences to the greatest extent possible. Yet you are unimpressed and go back to reciting your original opinions.
Oh well. I tried. HAND.
I couldn’t find where you did this in the parents. Could you link or repeat?
Whoops. You are right. I made this proposal here and here and in the discussions that followed.
Thanks. Interesting thread. It’s a nice hope. It makes me feel good to imagine that it works, and our alien overlords will therefore be fair :)
Not much for me hangs in the balance with this question. I already know that if I feel like I’m a good person, It feels good. But of course I’m interested in how this self-satisfaction lines up with how people are generally judged. I guess it would become crucial if I became more aggressive. Most people are really cautious (at least as far as their image goes).
I’ll bet you do punish people if those matters make you (and enough others) as angry as old ladies being stolen from does.
Anyone who votes for welfare does this. (Not saying this is right or wrong, just a fact.)
If something makes you angry, and it is socially acceptable to punish it, you may well decide to punish it. I don’t see anything to solve.
Hmmm. Perhaps you don’t see the problem because you think like a scientist. Come up with a causal explanation of why people sometimes punish, and you are done.
I on the other hand, am thinking like an engineer. Simply understanding the universe is pointless. I want to use my understanding to change the universe so that it is more to my taste. Therefore, I want to know when I should punish.
We probably both agree that evolution “invented” anger precisely because organisms that punish at the right times are more successful than organisms that punish at the wrong times or perhaps never punish at all. So anger causes punishment. A scientist is satisfied. But there is more to it than that.
Why did natural selection ‘choose’ to make me angry at some things and not make me angry at other things? Can I decide for myself whether to punish, ignoring the cue of my anger? Will I be more successful if I use my reason to make those decisions rather than using my emotions? And does any of this have anything to do with this mysterious thing ‘morality’ that people keep talking about?
I can understand people not being curious about such questions. But I have trouble understanding why people at a rationality blog site are not only incurious, but so often inclined to brag about their lack of interest!
The thought of mentioning other reasons why to punish (such as to make people behave more to your liking) did cross my mind, but I thought it was obvious enough. In fact, there are still other reasons to punish. Someone might reply to your post, “You are thinking like an engineer. I am thinking like a social animal. I want to know when I should punish: I want to use my understanding of social dynamics to make people respect me more. I want to know what it signals about me when I punish someone.”
As I said here, there are a lot of different reasons to use moral language (most of them sort of dark-arts-ish, which is why I guess that post was downvoted), and likewise there are a lot of different reasons to punish.
Do the evolutionary origins of rationality mean that we can eliminate truth and rationality in favour of belief and opinion? Can the arguments for moral relativism not be redeployed as arguments for alethic relativism?