I’m hoping the above hypothetical illustrates why I’m having trouble accepting that.
I’m sorry, but I don’t understand the illustration. My answer would be the same if my original mind/body was immediately and painlessly dissolved, and it was my uploaded (copied?) mind that experienced the thousand years of pain. Same answer in a more realistic scenario in which I remain physically embodied, but the pain and immortality are caused by ordinary vampire venom rather than some bogus cryonics scheme orchestrated by Omega. :)
I would probably request painless death in all cases. Other people here would choose immortality. But the difference has nothing to do with different outlooks about cryonics and uploading. It has to do with different outlooks about torture.
ETA: Having now read TheOtherDave’s analysis, I guess I now do understand the hypothetical. I’m not sure whether I would push the button or not. But if I decided to, I would be anticipating both the joy and the pain of my two future versions.
My understanding of the Lesswrong consensus on this issue is that my uploaded consciousness is me, not just a copy of me.
That is pretty much correct, as I understand it, but it may be worth while breaking that phrase “is me, not just a copy of me” into its semantic parts. I understand it to mean:
That copy of me is someone.
That ‘someone’ remembers being me.
I care about that future someone every bit as much as I care about future me.
Are there any other parts that I have missed?
I’m guessing that the third part above is the one you have trouble swallowing. Ok, but if you do swallow the first two, consider the weirdness of ‘someone’ remembering that his younger self didn’t really care for him.
consider the weirdness of ‘someone’ remembering that his younger self didn’t really care for him.
I have a little trouble seeing this weirdness.
Imagine if you were put in Prismattic’s scenario, and chose a painless death as you said; you would go to sleep fully expecting never to wake up again. Immediately after you fall asleep but before Omega can kill you, his trickster brother Omicron sneaks in, uploads your consciousness, and wakes up your uploaded copy somewhere safe.
Now think about what that consciousness would feel upon waking up. Is that what you were describing in the quote above, and is that particularly weird?
I’m sorry, but I don’t understand the illustration. My answer would be the same if my original mind/body was immediately and painlessly dissolved, and it was my uploaded (copied?) mind that experienced the thousand years of pain. Same answer in a more realistic scenario in which I remain physically embodied, but the pain and immortality are caused by ordinary vampire venom rather than some bogus cryonics scheme orchestrated by Omega. :)
I would probably request painless death in all cases. Other people here would choose immortality. But the difference has nothing to do with different outlooks about cryonics and uploading. It has to do with different outlooks about torture.
ETA: Having now read TheOtherDave’s analysis, I guess I now do understand the hypothetical. I’m not sure whether I would push the button or not. But if I decided to, I would be anticipating both the joy and the pain of my two future versions.
That is pretty much correct, as I understand it, but it may be worth while breaking that phrase “is me, not just a copy of me” into its semantic parts. I understand it to mean:
That copy of me is someone.
That ‘someone’ remembers being me.
I care about that future someone every bit as much as I care about future me.
Are there any other parts that I have missed?
I’m guessing that the third part above is the one you have trouble swallowing. Ok, but if you do swallow the first two, consider the weirdness of ‘someone’ remembering that his younger self didn’t really care for him.
Well, that happens all the time in the actual world. It may be weird, but it’s a weird we’re accustomed to.
Damn. I laughed so hard at your comment that my dentures fell out. I should have flossed more.
I have a little trouble seeing this weirdness.
Imagine if you were put in Prismattic’s scenario, and chose a painless death as you said; you would go to sleep fully expecting never to wake up again. Immediately after you fall asleep but before Omega can kill you, his trickster brother Omicron sneaks in, uploads your consciousness, and wakes up your uploaded copy somewhere safe.
Now think about what that consciousness would feel upon waking up. Is that what you were describing in the quote above, and is that particularly weird?
Yes
No. I was incorrect in calling that ‘weird’. Thx to you and TheOtherDave for pointing out my mistake.