I agree that the cost in terms of respect for the law produced by widespread disobedience should be factored in when deciding whether to comply with a law.
I am confused by how you can say that the “stability of the polity” is a moral good, and that compliance with the law contributes to the stability of the polity, but that compliance with the law is not a moral good.
I’m not quite sure what you mean by “personally impractical” as opposed to “impractical in aggregate,” but in any case, I would say that if the law is a bad law in aggregate, then an individual response is appropriate to the degree that it has an expected value of removing that law and low expected costs. Political activism is sometimes an excellent example of this… and sometimes not. Widespread violation of the law is sometimes an excellent example of this… and sometimes not. (Indeed, sometimes they are one and the same. And sometimes not.)
I disagree that the president of the U.S. has more moral responsibility for policy A than policy B if her ability to influence the policies is the same, and the moral wrong of the policies and the influencing of them is the same, just because policy A is a U.S. policy. I think the intuitive rightness of that idea stems from the presumption that her ability to influence a policy for a given degree of moral wrong is higher for U.S. policies.
I’m not sure what “acute” moral responsibility is.
I do in fact often feel ashamed about things I cannot influence, including things in the past. I don’t endorse it. But I also often feel shame about my present (and anticipated future) willingness to do certain things, and insofar as that shame reduces my likelihood of doing those things and I reject doing those things, I tentatively endorse that shame.
I agree that enforcing a law is morally significant. Enforcing a law against an innocent person is a confused idea (roughly corresponding to attacking someone in an unjustified way under the mistaken belief that I’m enforcing the law) but I agree that it’s usually a moral wrong.
Widespread violation of the law is sometimes an excellent example of this… and sometimes not. (Indeed, sometimes they are one and the same. And sometimes not.)
Can you argue that CR violation, in the form of filesharing, is a good example of an appropriate response to an impractical or immoral law?
Well, I’ve asked Anubhav the same thing, and I suppose I should wait and hear his case, since it’s his suggestion I’m arguing against. Thanks for the discussion.
I agree that the cost in terms of respect for the law produced by widespread disobedience should be factored in when deciding whether to comply with a law.
I am confused by how you can say that the “stability of the polity” is a moral good, and that compliance with the law contributes to the stability of the polity, but that compliance with the law is not a moral good.
I’m not quite sure what you mean by “personally impractical” as opposed to “impractical in aggregate,” but in any case, I would say that if the law is a bad law in aggregate, then an individual response is appropriate to the degree that it has an expected value of removing that law and low expected costs. Political activism is sometimes an excellent example of this… and sometimes not. Widespread violation of the law is sometimes an excellent example of this… and sometimes not. (Indeed, sometimes they are one and the same. And sometimes not.)
I disagree that the president of the U.S. has more moral responsibility for policy A than policy B if her ability to influence the policies is the same, and the moral wrong of the policies and the influencing of them is the same, just because policy A is a U.S. policy. I think the intuitive rightness of that idea stems from the presumption that her ability to influence a policy for a given degree of moral wrong is higher for U.S. policies.
I’m not sure what “acute” moral responsibility is.
I do in fact often feel ashamed about things I cannot influence, including things in the past. I don’t endorse it. But I also often feel shame about my present (and anticipated future) willingness to do certain things, and insofar as that shame reduces my likelihood of doing those things and I reject doing those things, I tentatively endorse that shame.
I agree that enforcing a law is morally significant. Enforcing a law against an innocent person is a confused idea (roughly corresponding to attacking someone in an unjustified way under the mistaken belief that I’m enforcing the law) but I agree that it’s usually a moral wrong.
Can you argue that CR violation, in the form of filesharing, is a good example of an appropriate response to an impractical or immoral law?
In the general case? Not convincingly.
Well, I’ve asked Anubhav the same thing, and I suppose I should wait and hear his case, since it’s his suggestion I’m arguing against. Thanks for the discussion.