I agree that the aggregate cost of individuals complying with particular laws...
I agree with a weaker version of your conclusion: if a law is impractical, disobeying it is permissible. But the cost in terms of respect for the law produced by widespread disobedience should be factored in. Laws lean on each other. Also, I didn’t say (and wouldn’t say) that it’s of itself a moral good to comply with the law. Only that it’s a moral bad to break it. Second, there’s a question of how to respond to impractical laws: are they personally impractical? Then violating the law seems more permissible. If they are personally quite practical but only impractical in aggregate, I think the appropriate response is probably more like political activism.
CR laws may be impractical in aggregate, but the presence of CR laws along with their widespread violation is, I expect, very much more impractical. If the practical situation is ‘no CR laws’, then violating them is not an appropriate response.
I agree with you that in practice I probably have more ability to influence U.S. policy than that of other countries of similar power, and that ability weighs into my moral relationship to U.S. policy.
Well, suppose the president of the US had the power, by imposing sanctions, to limit or prevent some injustice in Iran, like the execution of political prisoners. I think we would agree that this act is of moral significance, but also that it would have to be weighed against the interests of the US, etc. On the other hand, if the president discovered that his or her own government were executing political prisoners, he would be in extreme moral dereliction for not putting a stop to this almost regardless of practical consequences. So a president might have the power to influence such a situation in both cases, but he or she bears much more acute moral responsibility for the actions of his or her own government.
So I don’t think it’s the case that moral responsibility comes down simply to an ability to affect some situation. Does that seem like a reasonable argument?
I don’t endorse feeling ashamed about things I cannot influence.
Perhaps this will seem sophistical, but don’t you only feel shame at things you cannot influence, namely things in the past? If I murder someone, I ought to feel ashamed. But I cannot change the fact of the murder. And before the fact, I cannot feel ashamed of it, since it hasn’t happened.
I think we should agree that enforcing a law is always morally significant: enforcing it against an innocent person is always or for the most part immoral, and it is made permissible only by the breaking of a law. So the relationship between the breaking of a law and its enforcement is on some level a moral one, and for every question of enforcement, there is a morally significant question of guilt.
So if the law isn’t personally as well as in aggregate impractical (CR law isn’t in the cases we’re discussing) and the breaking and enforcing of laws is always morally significant, then I think we’re at least closer to the conclusion that breaking CR laws for personal gain is immoral.
I agree that the cost in terms of respect for the law produced by widespread disobedience should be factored in when deciding whether to comply with a law.
I am confused by how you can say that the “stability of the polity” is a moral good, and that compliance with the law contributes to the stability of the polity, but that compliance with the law is not a moral good.
I’m not quite sure what you mean by “personally impractical” as opposed to “impractical in aggregate,” but in any case, I would say that if the law is a bad law in aggregate, then an individual response is appropriate to the degree that it has an expected value of removing that law and low expected costs. Political activism is sometimes an excellent example of this… and sometimes not. Widespread violation of the law is sometimes an excellent example of this… and sometimes not. (Indeed, sometimes they are one and the same. And sometimes not.)
I disagree that the president of the U.S. has more moral responsibility for policy A than policy B if her ability to influence the policies is the same, and the moral wrong of the policies and the influencing of them is the same, just because policy A is a U.S. policy. I think the intuitive rightness of that idea stems from the presumption that her ability to influence a policy for a given degree of moral wrong is higher for U.S. policies.
I’m not sure what “acute” moral responsibility is.
I do in fact often feel ashamed about things I cannot influence, including things in the past. I don’t endorse it. But I also often feel shame about my present (and anticipated future) willingness to do certain things, and insofar as that shame reduces my likelihood of doing those things and I reject doing those things, I tentatively endorse that shame.
I agree that enforcing a law is morally significant. Enforcing a law against an innocent person is a confused idea (roughly corresponding to attacking someone in an unjustified way under the mistaken belief that I’m enforcing the law) but I agree that it’s usually a moral wrong.
Widespread violation of the law is sometimes an excellent example of this… and sometimes not. (Indeed, sometimes they are one and the same. And sometimes not.)
Can you argue that CR violation, in the form of filesharing, is a good example of an appropriate response to an impractical or immoral law?
Well, I’ve asked Anubhav the same thing, and I suppose I should wait and hear his case, since it’s his suggestion I’m arguing against. Thanks for the discussion.
I agree with a weaker version of your conclusion: if a law is impractical, disobeying it is permissible. But the cost in terms of respect for the law produced by widespread disobedience should be factored in. Laws lean on each other. Also, I didn’t say (and wouldn’t say) that it’s of itself a moral good to comply with the law. Only that it’s a moral bad to break it. Second, there’s a question of how to respond to impractical laws: are they personally impractical? Then violating the law seems more permissible. If they are personally quite practical but only impractical in aggregate, I think the appropriate response is probably more like political activism.
CR laws may be impractical in aggregate, but the presence of CR laws along with their widespread violation is, I expect, very much more impractical. If the practical situation is ‘no CR laws’, then violating them is not an appropriate response.
Well, suppose the president of the US had the power, by imposing sanctions, to limit or prevent some injustice in Iran, like the execution of political prisoners. I think we would agree that this act is of moral significance, but also that it would have to be weighed against the interests of the US, etc. On the other hand, if the president discovered that his or her own government were executing political prisoners, he would be in extreme moral dereliction for not putting a stop to this almost regardless of practical consequences. So a president might have the power to influence such a situation in both cases, but he or she bears much more acute moral responsibility for the actions of his or her own government.
So I don’t think it’s the case that moral responsibility comes down simply to an ability to affect some situation. Does that seem like a reasonable argument?
Perhaps this will seem sophistical, but don’t you only feel shame at things you cannot influence, namely things in the past? If I murder someone, I ought to feel ashamed. But I cannot change the fact of the murder. And before the fact, I cannot feel ashamed of it, since it hasn’t happened.
I think we should agree that enforcing a law is always morally significant: enforcing it against an innocent person is always or for the most part immoral, and it is made permissible only by the breaking of a law. So the relationship between the breaking of a law and its enforcement is on some level a moral one, and for every question of enforcement, there is a morally significant question of guilt.
So if the law isn’t personally as well as in aggregate impractical (CR law isn’t in the cases we’re discussing) and the breaking and enforcing of laws is always morally significant, then I think we’re at least closer to the conclusion that breaking CR laws for personal gain is immoral.
I agree that the cost in terms of respect for the law produced by widespread disobedience should be factored in when deciding whether to comply with a law.
I am confused by how you can say that the “stability of the polity” is a moral good, and that compliance with the law contributes to the stability of the polity, but that compliance with the law is not a moral good.
I’m not quite sure what you mean by “personally impractical” as opposed to “impractical in aggregate,” but in any case, I would say that if the law is a bad law in aggregate, then an individual response is appropriate to the degree that it has an expected value of removing that law and low expected costs. Political activism is sometimes an excellent example of this… and sometimes not. Widespread violation of the law is sometimes an excellent example of this… and sometimes not. (Indeed, sometimes they are one and the same. And sometimes not.)
I disagree that the president of the U.S. has more moral responsibility for policy A than policy B if her ability to influence the policies is the same, and the moral wrong of the policies and the influencing of them is the same, just because policy A is a U.S. policy. I think the intuitive rightness of that idea stems from the presumption that her ability to influence a policy for a given degree of moral wrong is higher for U.S. policies.
I’m not sure what “acute” moral responsibility is.
I do in fact often feel ashamed about things I cannot influence, including things in the past. I don’t endorse it. But I also often feel shame about my present (and anticipated future) willingness to do certain things, and insofar as that shame reduces my likelihood of doing those things and I reject doing those things, I tentatively endorse that shame.
I agree that enforcing a law is morally significant. Enforcing a law against an innocent person is a confused idea (roughly corresponding to attacking someone in an unjustified way under the mistaken belief that I’m enforcing the law) but I agree that it’s usually a moral wrong.
Can you argue that CR violation, in the form of filesharing, is a good example of an appropriate response to an impractical or immoral law?
In the general case? Not convincingly.
Well, I’ve asked Anubhav the same thing, and I suppose I should wait and hear his case, since it’s his suggestion I’m arguing against. Thanks for the discussion.