Andy Wood: So, while I highly doubt that CC is equivalent to my view in the first place, I’m still curious about what view you adopted to replace it.
I suspect (nay, know) my answer is still in flux, but it’s actually fairly similar to classical compatibilism—a person chooses of their own free will if they choose by a sufficiently-reasonable process and if other sufficiently-reasonable processes could have supported different choices. However, following the example of Angela Smith (an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Washington), I hold that free will is not required for responsibility. After all, is it not reasonable to hold someone responsible for forgetting an important duty?
Andy Wood: So, while I highly doubt that CC is equivalent to my view in the first place, I’m still curious about what view you adopted to replace it.
I suspect (nay, know) my answer is still in flux, but it’s actually fairly similar to classical compatibilism—a person chooses of their own free will if they choose by a sufficiently-reasonable process and if other sufficiently-reasonable processes could have supported different choices. However, following the example of Angela Smith (an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Washington), I hold that free will is not required for responsibility. After all, is it not reasonable to hold someone responsible for forgetting an important duty?