Weren’t the Born probabilities successfully derived from decision theory for the MWI in 2007 by Deutsch: “Probabilities used to be regarded as the biggest problem for Everett, but ironically, they are now its most powerful success”—http://forum.astroversum.nl/viewtopic.php?p=1649
Hm, Wei_Dai(2009) seems to have a notion of rationality that is quite permissive if he’s convinced by Finkelstein. If rationality isn’t in fact permissive and instead stringently requires diachronic consistency (exceptionlessness, updatelessness, pre-rational priors) then I don’t think Finkelstein’s arguments are convincing. And there are positive arguments, e.g. by Derek Parfit, that rationality is normatively “thick”.
Weren’t the Born probabilities successfully derived from decision theory for the MWI in 2007 by Deutsch: “Probabilities used to be regarded as the biggest problem for Everett, but ironically, they are now its most powerful success”—http://forum.astroversum.nl/viewtopic.php?p=1649
There are a couple of recent papers on this topic:
A formal proof of the Born rule from decision-theoretic assumptions by David Wallace
Has the Born rule been proven? by J. Finkelstein
I personally find Finkelstein’s response/counterargument convincing.
Hm, Wei_Dai(2009) seems to have a notion of rationality that is quite permissive if he’s convinced by Finkelstein. If rationality isn’t in fact permissive and instead stringently requires diachronic consistency (exceptionlessness, updatelessness, pre-rational priors) then I don’t think Finkelstein’s arguments are convincing. And there are positive arguments, e.g. by Derek Parfit, that rationality is normatively “thick”.